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…the Idols of the Market Place are the most troublesome of all — idols 
which have crept into the understanding through the alliances of words 
and names. For men believe that their reason governs words…1 
 
Expressions which bear multiple meanings often find themselves 
employed with promiscuous disregard to context and function.2 
 
Introduction 
The practice of international investment tribunals with respect to the legal categories of 
admissibility and jurisdiction is irreversibly confused. These concepts being ultimately blurry, the 
words that are supposed to denote them are ambivalent. Yet, words and legal categories influence 
each other; the unclear application of the law is often the inevitable outcome of a tradition of 
terminological opacity.3 This two-part article sets out to chart the practice, expose and explain this 
confusion, and to propose a solution to it. 
To appreciate the current state of uncertainty a simple instance is sufficient. In the dispute Kılıç v. 
Turkmenistan, the tribunal considered that the investor’s failure to attempt local litigation for at 
least one year determined a lack of jurisdiction under the applicable bilateral investment treaty 
(BIT).4 The investor sought annulment of the award, challenging – among other things – the 
tribunal’s finding on the lack of jurisdiction. According to the investor, the failure to comply with 
the local litigation requirement could, at the most, cause the inadmissibility of the claim.5 
The ad hoc committee looked into the tribunal’s reasoning and the dissenting opinion of one 
member thereof. It took note of their respective strengths and the possible objections to each. 
Eventually, it threw up its figurative hands. The categories of jurisdiction and admissibility are so 
porous that it would be a stretch to consider either solution as mistaken. The tribunal simply noted 
that, 
[f]aced with the same question, other tribunals have decided differently on questions of 
jurisdiction and admissibility; it is not for the committee to favor one or the other of these 
positions.6 
The state of the art, in treaty-based investment arbitration, is such that too often a determination 
on jurisdiction or admissibility is simply non-falsifiable. To the extent that these categories belong 
to a wider procedural tradition of general principles of procedure, an analysis of the practice 
                                                 
1 Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, Liber I, Aphorism LIX: ‘At idola fori omnium molestissima sunt; quae ex foedere 
verborum et nominum se insinuarunt in intellectum. Credunt enim homines, rationem suam verbis imperare.’ 
2 William W Park, ‘The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction’ (2009) 1 Transnational Dispute 
Management 1. 
3 Francis Bacon, above (n 1), describes the detrimental effect of the misalignment between the words and the reality 
they mean to represent, referring to the fallacies deriving from the use of the ‘idols of the market’ (idola fori). In 
particular, reliance on suboptimal language might grow into a habit and hamper the achievement of the truth. 
4 Kılıç İnşaat İthalat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1, Award 
of 2 July 2013, para. 6.3.5. 
5 Which, in the investor’s view, could have led to a suspension of the arbitration, rather than its dismissal. 
6 Kılıç İnşaat İthalat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1, Decision 
on Annulment of 15 July 2015, para. 166. 
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outside investment arbitration can be helpful. This study seeks to inscribe the practice in 
investment litigation within the wider framework of public international law, accounting for the 
scientific fragility of both. 
The essay is divided into two parts, each of which can be read on its own. This article, Part A, 
maps the practice of investment arbitration. It serves as up-to-date handbook, is primarily 
descriptive and informative, and could benefit practitioners and scholars of the discipline. It 
provides a gallery of selected jurisdictional issues and questions of admissibility, with which 
tribunals engage. Where necessary, a critique of the prevailing practice is provided, or a remark 
signalling the difficulty to identify a coherent case law. The purpose of Part B, which will appear 
in the next issue of this series, is to frame this practice in a wider theoretical context and to delve 
on the harder cases. It starts by examining the concepts of jurisdiction and admissibility in public 
international law. The goal is to reconnect the practice of investment arbitration to its normative 
background and to highlight the difficulties that emerge across the two disciplines. In the second 
half of Part B, a number of critical questions that have arisen in the practice are discussed, which 
share a critical aspect: in these cases, the conceptual confusion between jurisdiction and 
admissibility comes with a practical price. 
Part A and Part B complement each other. Part A analyses a representative portion of the practice; 
it addresses several current or controversial issues and – in general – informs the reader of how 
jurisdiction and admissibility questions are handled in investment arbitration. The reader will gain 
insight more through example and inference than through principled reasoning. Part B, conversely, 
attempts to investigate the principles, and invites readers to interpret the practice with a certain 
degree of scepticism. This section illustrates the advantages and drawbacks of proceeding 
deductively, trying to assess whether the confusion in the practice is the result of unprincipled 
notions inherited from public international law or, instead, of a tinkering practice that overlooks 
taxonomies. In the final part of Part B, practice and theory are precipitated together: the ‘hard’ 
cases arise in the practice but reveal the flaws in the theory. 
PART A. The Practice: Jurisdiction and Admissibility in Investment Law Arbitration 
Investment arbitration lies at the intersection between public international law adjudication and 
international commercial arbitration.7 The hybrid nature has implications on its procedure and 
influences in particular the jurisdictional powers of investment tribunals, as well as the regime of 
admissibility of investment claims.8 General principles of public international law regarding 
                                                 
7 Or, better, it consists of a ‘combination of international commercial arbitration procedure and the substantive 
obligations arising under public international law,’ see Ian Laird and Rebecca Askew, ‘Finality Versus Consistency: 
Does Investor-State Arbitration Need an Appellate System’ (2005) 7 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 285, 
285. For a break-down of the laws applicable to the various elements of investment (treaty) arbitration, see For a fuller 
study, see Veijo Heiskanen, ‘Forbidding Dépeçage: Law Governing Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2008) 32 Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review 367, 375, where the following categorisation is made: ‘one must distinguish between: (a) 
the law governing the arbitration agreement; (b) the law governing the arbitral proceedings; (c) the law governing 
the arbitral tribunal; (d) the law governing the merits of the claim, or the subject matter of the dispute; and (e) the 
law governing the recognition, enforcement and execution of the award.’ 
8 See, more extensively, Jan Paulsson, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility’ in Gerald Aksen et al (eds), Global Reflections 
on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert Briner (International 
Chamber of Commerce 2005) 601. 
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jurisdiction and admissibility can be useful tools for specific tribunals,9 when their constituent 
instruments and the documents codifying State consent require interpretation in specific cases.10 
Whereas consent is the bedrock of jurisdiction, there is no space for presumptive interpretation of 
the relevant instruments against jurisdiction (in dubio mitius)11 or in its favour.12 Jurisdictional 
clauses in treaties must be interpreted, like all treaty norms, in accordance with the general rules 
of treaty interpretation.13 
An element that complicates the analysis of consent in this field is the relevance of the investor’s 
consent,14 which is necessary to complement the home State’s consent with respect to the specific 
jurisdiction of the tribunal over a dispute.15 The existence and validity of the claimant’s consent 
can be a matter of contention, especially in the case of mass claims.16 Interestingly, the validity of 
claimant’s consent is one of the few aspects in which general principles of law drawn from 
domestic systems bear directly on the tribunals’ duty to determine their jurisdiction. The Abaclat 
tribunal held that, in the absence of any specific provision in the applicable BIT and the ICSID 
Convention, it was appropriate to review the validity of the claimant’s consent on the basis of the 
                                                 
9 The comprehensive analysis of these principles in public international law is addressed in Part B. For an instance, 
consider how the tribunal in Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, Decision on Preliminary Objections of 27 July 2006, para. 169, rejected the 
possibility to hear ‘hypothetical claims,’ echoing the practice of the International Court of Justice. 
10 Robert Kolb, ‘General Principles of Procedural Law’ in Andreas Zimmermann et al (eds), The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (OUP 212) 871. 
11 See Abaclat and Others (Case formerly known as Giovanna Beccara and Others) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 4 August 2011, Dissenting Opinion of Abi Saab, 
para. 16: ‘The requirement to ascertain the existence and scope of consent, while strict and exacting in international 
law, does not mean the restrictive interpretation of the jurisdictional title (the old theory of interpretation in favour of 
sovereignty, as far as the State party is concerned)’. 
12 Amco Indonesia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 389 (1993), 394; Government of the Province of East Kalimantan 
v. PT Kaltim Prima Coal and others, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/3, Award on Jurisdiction of 28 December 2009, para. 
171. See also Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1, 
Decision on the Preliminary Question of 17 July 2003, para. 64: ‘The Tribunal does not believe that under 
contemporary international law a foreign investor is entitled to the benefit of the doubt with respect to the existence 
and scope of an arbitration agreement.’ This dictum is cited approvingly in National Gas S.A.E. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/7, Award of 3 April 2014, para. 117. See also Eureko BV v Republic of Poland, Ad 
Hoc Arbitration, Partial Award of 19 August 2005, para. 248 (the conclusion of thousands of BITs entailed made the 
in dubio mitius principle obsolete). 
13 Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award of 11 October 2002, 
para. 43; Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 
12/40, Decision on Jurisdiction of 24 February 2014, para. 151. 
14 The relevance of the investor’s consent is minimised in this study. Because investor-State arbitration is largely a 
one-way process, and the request of arbitration is normally considered to qualify as consent, the focus on the analysis 
is rather on the existence and limits of State’s consent. See Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses 
Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction of 21 December 
2012, para. 176. In a highly unusual case, the basis for jurisdiction being a contract and not a BIT, the host State 
launched a claim against the foreign investors. See Government of the Province of East Kalimantan above (n 12) para. 
173-174. 
15 In the ICSID field, consent must therefore exist with respect to the ICSID convention, the relevant BIT (by way of 
ratification) and the parties’ agreement to arbitrate the specific dispute. Abi Saab describes it as ‘triple-layered 
consent’, above (n 11) para. 15. 




general principles of contract law (‘requiring that any consent be genuine and intended, i.e., free 
from coercion, fraud and/or from any essential mistake’).17  
Most often, jurisdictional inquiries focus on the consent of the State. As a tribunal put it, 
… it is of the utmost importance not to forget that no participant in the international 
community, be it a State, an international organisation or a physical or a legal person, has 
an inherent right of access to a jurisdictional recourse. For such right to come into 
existence, specific consent has to be given. As far as investment arbitration is concerned, 
such consent can be given in a contract, a domestic law or an international bilateral or 
multilateral treaty. In all these different hypotheses, the State can shape its consent as it 
sees fit by providing the conditions under which it is given – in other words, the conditions 
subject to which an “offer to arbitrate” is made to the foreign investors. … 
An arbitral tribunal – just as the ICJ or any other international court – does not have a 
general jurisdiction; it only has a “compétence d’attribution,” which has to respect the 
limits provided for by the States.18 
Tribunals must be satisfied that the State has expressed unequivocal consent to submit a dispute to 
arbitration.19 In Churchill v. Venezuela, for instance, it determined that the words ‘shall consent’ 
in the applicable BIT indicated a precise obligation (as opposed to hortatory language) on the part 
of the State to agree to investor’s request to arbitrate a dispute, after a painstaking perusal of the 
negotiating history.20 
Investment arbitration proceedings often consist of two stages. In the first, the host State, more 
often than not, challenges the jurisdiction of the tribunal in a bid to halt the proceedings before 
they reach the merits.21 Even when the proceedings are not subject to bifurcation, potential 
procedural objections are discussed preliminarily, because if any of them succeeds there is no need 
                                                 
17 Ibid, para. 436. 
18 ST-AD GmbH v. Republic of Bulgaria, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011-06, Award on Jurisdiction of 18 July 
2013, para. 337 and 362. For a comparable statement, consider Menzies Middle East and Africa S.A. and Aviation 
Handling Services International Ltd. v. Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/21, Award of 5 August 2016, 
para. 130: ‘selon le droit international en général, et selon l’arbitrage d’investissement en particulier, un Etat 
souverain ne peut pas être assujetti à une juridiction internationale sans son consentement clairement exprimé et non-
équivoque. Cette exigence découle du respect de la souveraineté des Etats et du principe qu’en matière de droit 
international, le consentement des Etats à l’arbitrage est l’exception et non pas la règle.’ 
19 In the case of State consent contained in a domestic law, the expression of consent by the investor might be inferred 
from the investor’s reliance on the set of guarantees created by such statute, see ABCI Investments N.V. v. Republic of 
Tunisia, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/12, Decision on Jurisdiction of 18 February 2011, para. 119. 
20 Churchill above (n 13) para. 181-230, resorting to the supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 
VCLT. 
21 Ole K Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals-An Empirical Analysis’ (2008) 19(2) European Journal 
of International Law 301, 304. 
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to discuss the merits.22 In ICSID and UNCITRAL proceedings, jurisdictional objections cannot be 
raised after the counter-memorial or statement of defense.23  
This article offers a selective but illustrative overview of the practice of investment arbitration 
relating to the State’s objection to the tribunal’s jurisdiction (1) and the claim’s admissibility (2). 
The overview cannot possibly be exhaustive and seeks simply to provide a roadmap of issues that 
are either controversial or recurrent, or both. Whereas other examples might be added to the list, 
the present section is designed to lay the foundation for the following Part B, which explores the 
doctrinal difficulty to draw a line between the two legal notions of jurisdiction and admissibility, 
and the attending complications. The lack of balance between the instances regarding competence 
and those on admissibility is not surprising: tribunals rarely address admissibility on its own right 
and often prefer not to draw a distinction at all.24 
1. Permutations of jurisdictional issues 
In the present essay, the notions of foundational and specific jurisdiction are employed. The former 
refers to the statutory competence of the body, the second on the body’s power to decide a certain 
claim.25 Both flow from the consent to arbitration granted by the host State, normally through a 
standing offer in an investment treaty. Therefore, to determine their scope the starting point is the 
arbitration clause of the applicable investment instrument (which could also be a domestic statute 
or a contract with the State or a State entity). 
A long excerpt from the Malicorp v. Egypt decision illustrates with precision the task of an 
investment tribunal facing a set of objections to its jurisdiction. The attending review (carried out 
under the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle) takes the shape of a checklist of legal and factual 
determinations. 
[Together, the compromissory clause of the applicable BIT and Article 25 ICSID] make 
the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal subject to a certain number of conditions, most of 
which … are not in dispute in the present case: 
a) The consent of the other Contracting State. The respondent State must have consented 
in writing to submit the dispute to the Centre. By the first sentence of Article 8 of the 
                                                 
22 With the obvious exceptions of the objections préliminaires du fond. For a case where bifurcation was not granted 
but the award upheld some preliminary objections, see Ampal-American Israel Corporation and others v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, Award of 1 February 2016. The tribunal acted under Article 41(2) of 
the ICSID Arbitration Rules and issued an award on jurisdiction only, mostly in order to defuse possible conflicts with 
the outcome of parallel arbitrations pending. 
23 ICSID Convention, Article 41(1), UNCITRAL Rules, Article 21(3); Revised UNCITRAL Rules, Article 23(2). On 
this, see Judith Levine, ‘Navigating the parallel universe of investor–State arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules’ 
in Chester Brown and Kate Miles, Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 
2011) 369, 395. 
24 The doctrinal reasons of such blur and the implications are fully explored in Part B of this essay. 
25 The distinction, which is discussed in-depth in Part B, is borrowed from Yuval Shany’s work Questions of 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility before International Courts (CUP 2015). 
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Agreement, Egypt expressly and validly gave its consent to be subject to such an arbitration 
proceeding. 
b) The consent of the investor. The investor intending to take the action must also have 
consented in writing. Malicorp gave its consent, at the latest, by instituting this proceeding. 
c) The nationality of the investor. The investor must be a “national of the other Contracting 
State.” Malicorp is a company incorporated “under the law in force in [a] part of the United 
Kingdom” … and therefore a company of the other Contracting Party. 
d) A legal dispute. The dispute must be one that is legal and not political or other. This 
point is not in issue. 
e) Relating to an investment. This point is not discussed by the Parties as such, but only 
from the standpoint of its relationship to the requirements of good faith. … 
e) [sic] In the territory of the other Contracting State. The investment alleged to have been 
made by the party bringing the action must have been made in the territory of the other 
Contracting State. This is the case here with respect to the 28 investments Malicorp claims 
to have made, since they were intended for the construction and operation of the Ras Sudr 
Airport in Egypt. 
f) [sic] An alleged violation of the Treaty. The party bringing the action must allege that it 
was the victim of a violation of the underlying Treaty. In the present case, Malicorp alleges 
that Egypt breached the obligations prescribed in Articles 2 (“Promotion and protection of 
investments”) and 5 (“Expropriation”) of the Agreement …, an allegation that cannot at 
this stage be rejected out of hand …26 
With the exception of requirements ratione temporis, the checklist touches upon the main tenets 
of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The full discussion of the jurisdictional dimensions (or rationes) of 
investment arbitration is beyond the scope of this study, but it is well researched already.27 A 
discussion of selected problems will suffice here, for the purposes delineated above. This essay 
does not examine preliminary issues regarding consent, such as the possibility that State’s consent 
to arbitration is not valid or effective (for instance because it is contained in a treaty that is 
terminated,28 or in an invalid contract29), the allegation that the arbitration instrument does not 
contain a self-sufficient expression of consent,30 or the ‘unanswerable’ claims that an additional 
                                                 
26 Malicorp Limited v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18, Award of 7 February 2011, para. 
102. For a similar checklist based on the jurisdictional rationes, provided by the claimant, see Copper Mesa Mining 
Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA No. 2012-2, Award of 15 March 2016, para. 5.6. 
27 See Waibel above (n 582). 
28 This is a habitual argument made with respect to intra-EU BITs, which respondents characterise as automatically 
terminated upon the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. See, for instance, Jan Oostergetel and Theodora Laurentius 
v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL Decision on Jurisdiction of 30 April 2010, para. 65-68. 
29 See for instance World Duty Free Company v Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award of 4 October 
2006 (the contract under which the claimant brought the claim was obtained by bribery and was therefore held invalid). 
30 See for instance Millicom International Operations B.V. and Sentel GSM SA v. The Republic of Senegal, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/20, Decision on Jurisdiction of 16 July 2010 (the host State claimed that the arbitral provision in 
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expression of consent by a person with full powers must complement the arbitration clause in the 
BIT, or that the offer to arbitrate is invalid when it is incompatible with domestic law.31 
1. Foundational and specific jurisdiction 
The extract from Malicorp also shows the importance of the ICSID Convention in establishing the 
foundational jurisdiction of a tribunal in ICSID-based arbitration. The precise limits of its specific 
jurisdiction are normally determined by the rules of the applicable investment treaty. The Alemanni 
tribunal used a similar taxonomy while setting out to assess the preliminary objections. The 
language used by the tribunal hinted at a correspondence between foundational jurisdiction and 
competence, on one hand, and specific jurisdiction on the other: 
[there are] two types of limiting factor that go to determine whether a particular case may 
properly be heard by a tribunal established under the ICSID system, the first being the 
overall scope of ICSID arbitration, and the second being the factors germane to the seizing 
of a specific tribunal to hear a specific dispute. The first refers, that is to say, to Article 25 
of the Washington Convention, as the foundation text, which like Article 41 is also phrased 
in terms of the “competence of the Centre” (‘compétence’ and ‘jurisdicción’ in French and 
Spanish, respectively); the second, by contrast, bears primarily on factors such as the 
consent of the parties, the nature of the particular dispute and the like, which would 
normally be thought of, in common parlance in English, as the elements necessary to 
ground the ‘jurisdiction’ of the tribunal.32 
With respect to ad hoc arbitration, foundational and specific jurisdictions flow from the same 
instrument and the same expression of consent instead. Whereas consent is normally provided ex 
ante by the host State, the framing of the case – crucial to circumscribe the tribunal’s powers in 
casu – is left to the characterisation made by the claimant in the act of seisin of the tribunal and by 
the respondent’s reaction thereto.33 
It is clear that the practice of permanent courts, chief among them the ICJ, cannot easily apply as 
such to the jurisdiction of tribunals.34 Investment tribunals’ determinations are subject to review, 
and their competence is formulated ad hoc, for the resolution of a specific dispute. In the case of 
arbitration ad hoc, the foundational jurisdiction overlaps with the specific one (the tribunal does 
not exist outside the scenario of the specific dispute). It is moreover debatable whether forum 
                                                 
the concession was hortatory, and required an additional expression of consent. The tribunal held that, on the basis of 
its language, the provision in the concession constituted a sufficient expression of consent). Likewise, see Churchill 
above (n 13), in particular para. 208 ff. 
31 Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v. The Republic of Paraguay, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/9, Decision on the Objections to Jurisdiction of 29 May 2009, para. 65 ff. 
32 Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, Decision on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility of 17 November 2014, para. 259 (emphasis added). The terminological distinction is not very 
convincing, given that both Article 41 and Rule 41 ICSID, instead, refer to the ‘jurisdiction of the Centre’ and the 
‘competence of the tribunal’. 
33 See Juan Pablo Hugues Arthur, ‘The legal value of prior steps to arbitration in international law of foreign 
investment: Two (different?) approaches, one outcome’ (2015) 15 Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 449. 
34 The parallel between investment tribunals and other international courts and tribunals is developed in Part B. 
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prorogatum can operate in arbitration proceedings.35 Not even an explicit consent of the parties 
can confer onto a tribunal competence that exceeds its statutory (foundational) jurisdiction.36 
The interplay between ICSID and the instrument of specific jurisdiction 
When the claim is brought under the aegis of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Dispute (ICSID), the foundational jurisdiction of the tribunal is additionally governed 
by the ICSID Convention, in particular by Articles 25 to 27 thereof.37 In the case of ICSID, the 
‘double-keyhole’ approach applies, in matters of competence and jurisdiction: the tribunal’s 
powers is delimited by the applicable arbitration clause and the ICSID Convention,38 much like 
the ICJ can hear a claim only if the parties’ consent is recorded both in their membership in the 
Statute (foundational jurisdiction) and through a specific instrument relating to the dispute, 
normally a treaty or a declaration under the optional clause of Article 36 of the ICJ Statute.39 
This double-keyhole approach has caused controversy over the treaty parties’ ability to derogate 
from, and exceed, the outer jurisdictional boundaries40 set in the ICSID Convention.41 The TSA v. 
Argentina tribunal took a firm view on the matter, in a passage that seemed to rely precisely on 
the difference between foundational jurisdiction (of the ICSID Centre) and specific jurisdiction 
(subject to the parties’ agreement): 
                                                 
35 Chittharanjan F Amerasinghe, in his International Arbitral Jurisdiction (Brill 2011) 73, claims that it cannot. 
36 United States of America v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German 
External Debts) (16 May 1980) 59 ILR 495 (Young Loan Arbitration), 524. See also Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and 
others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9 (formerly Giordano Alpi and others v. Argentine Republic), 
Dissenting Opinion of Santiago Torres Bernárdez of 2 May 2013, para. 349: ‘… as a general proposition the 
“undertaking to arbitrate” in international law must be embodied in a written instrument excluding thereby the 
possibility of invoking forum prorogatum as a basis of jurisdiction in international arbitration.’ See also Klöckner 
Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v. United Republic of Cameroon and Société Camerounaise des Engrais, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/81/2, Award of 21 October 1983, 4 (the subject-matter of the dispute may be extended ‘at any time, 
even in written submissions to the Tribunal (“forum prorogatum”)’). 
37 It appears that the same double key-hole analysis applies to cases brought before ICSID’s Additional Facilities, by 
virtue of Rule 4(2) of the Additional Facility, which refers to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. See MNSS B.V. and 
Recupero Credito Acciaio N.V. v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/8, Award of 4 May 2016, para. 186. 
38 See for instance Salini Costruttori s.p.a. and Italstrade s.p.a. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of 23 July 2001, para. 44; Consortium RFCC v. Royaume du Maroc, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/6, Decision on Jurisdiction of 16 July 2001, para. 51. See how this notion is phrased in the SGS Société 
Générale de Surveillance SA v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 
January 2004, para. 154: ‘The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is determined by the combination of the BIT and the ICSID 
Convention’; see also Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction of 14 November 2005, para. 122. It is sometimes suggested that, in the field of 
ICSID, the distinction between competence (of the tribunal) and jurisdiction (of the Centre) might be accurate, at least 
conceptually, see Veijo Heiskanen, ‘Ménage à trois? Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Competence in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’ (2014) 29 ICSID Review 231. 
39 The combination of general jurisdiction (defined by the Convention) and specific competence (defined by a specific 
instrument) is acknowledged in Hanno Wehland, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility in Proceedings under the ICSID 
Convention and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules’ in Crina Baltag (ed), ICSID Convention after 50 Years: 
Unsettled Issues (Kluwer 2016) 230. 
40 The expression ‘outer limits’ is used in Aron Broches, Academy of International Law, Recueil des cours, vol. 136 
[1973 II]. 
41 Judith Levine, ‘Navigating the parallel universe of investor–State arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules’ in 
Brown and Miles above (n 23) 369, 396 ff. 
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Article 25 of the ICSID Convention defines the ambit of ICSID’s jurisdiction. In other 
words, it defines the extent, hence also the objective limits, of this jurisdiction (including 
the jurisdiction of tribunals established therein) which cannot be extended or derogated 
from even by agreement of the Parties.42 
This approach requires assessing the alignment between the Convention’s and the investment 
treaty’s jurisdictional dimensions. States could not, even if they wanted to, expand the foundational 
jurisdiction of the Centre through an inter partes agreement. Conversely, it is possible for the 
parties to restrict their consent to arbitration, excluding certain categories of disputes.43 In 
principle, therefore, the foundational and specific requirements for jurisdiction apply 
cumulatively.44 Some difficulties have occurred in the practice regarding the possible 
misalignment of the requirements in the ICSID Convention and the applicable investment treaty. 
One such issue concerned the definition of ‘investment’ under the Convention (as opposed, and in 
addition to, the definition in the applicable treaty), and the rise and ruin of the arbitrator-made 
requirement that investments contribute to the economic development of the host-state to fall under 
the Convention.45 Currently, tribunals generally downplay this criterion.46 More generally, the 
Salini tribunal’s attempt to unpack the meaning of ‘investment’ under the Convention, which had 
                                                 
42 TSA Spectrum de Argentina SA v. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/ 05/5, Award of 19 December 2008, 
para. 134. Similar statements can be found in Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction of 6 August 2004, para. 50; Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. The 
Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction of 17 May 2007, para. 55. 
43 See in particular Article 25(4) and Article 26 ICSID. As correctly pointed out in Shany above (n 25) 65, these 
allowed limitations can be construed, alternatively, as arrangements relating to the specific jurisdiction of the tribunal 
or variable limits to the foundational jurisdictional of the Centre. See also Robert N Hornick, ‘The Mihaly Arbitration 
Pre-Investment Expenditure as a Basis for ICSID Jurisdiction’ (2003) 20(2) Journal of International Arbitration 189, 
194-195. A case that appears to allow the enlargement of the ICSID jurisdiction agreed inter se is Autopista 
Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 27 September 2001. In this case the State and the investor had agreed in a contract to consider the 
investor foreign by virtue of foreign shareholding (as opposed to foreign control, as required by Article 25(2)(b) 
ICSID). The tribunal accepted this characterisation (para. 119) but also made sure that the outcome would not be 
unreasonable (para. 122). 
44 Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for 
Annulment of the Award of November 1, 2006, para. 31: ‘the parties to an agreement and the States which conclude 
an investment treaty cannot open the jurisdiction of the Centre to any operation they might arbitrarily qualify as an 
investment. It is thus repeated that, before ICSID arbitral tribunals, the Washington Convention has supremacy over 
an agreement between the parties or a BIT.’ 
45 This criterion, listed by the Salini tribunal (Salini v. Morocco above (n 38) para. 37–40, but consider also the 
discussion in Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction of 11 July 1997, para. 43) was subsequently declassified as a descriptive but inessential 
feature of investments. See in particular Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment of 16 April 2009). One member of the Ad Hoc Committee 
disagreed on this point and posited the necessity of the contribution requirement; see Malaysian Historical Salvors, 
SDN, BHD v. Malaysia (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen of 19 
February 2009). See also Mr. Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award of 14 July 2010, 
para. 111. 
46 See the recent example in İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24, Award of 8 
March 2016, para. 295-296. See also Consortium Groupement LESI-Dipenta v. People’s Democratic Republic of 
Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/8, Award of 10 January 2005, para. 13(iv); Victor Pey Casado and President 
Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Award of 8 May 2008, para. 232; Société Civile 
Immobilière de Gaëta v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/36, Award of 21 December 2015, para. 207. 
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met with some approval initially, has more recently been considered as an undue usurpation of the 
parties’ right to shape the meaning of ‘investment’ through consent. A tribunal went as far as 
discarding the Salini criteria and holding that, given the silence of the Convention on what an 
investment is, only the definitions in the treaty are relevant.47 
Another example of the interface between the Convention’s and a treaty’s jurisdictional rationes 
concerns the nationality requirement. On the one hand, Article 25(2)(b) ICSID requires the foreign 
nationality of the legal persons seeking to bring an investment claim to the Centre. This legal 
requirement points to the general principle of nationality by incorporation that prevails in 
customary international law, but also allows States to agree to different nationality criteria, 
including effective seat, control, place of central management or registered office.48 
On the other hand, under art 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, States can agree to extend 
exceptionally the BIT’s protection to investments with the nationality of the host State, which are 
controlled by nationals of the home State. The clause in the Convention setting an ‘objective 
Convention limit,’49 the tribunal is allowed and required to pierce the veil of formal nationality, to 
ascertain the material control of the company.50 If necessary, the tribunal is entitled to pierce the 
veil several times, i.e. ‘up to the source of real control’.51 Even if the parties, in the BIT, have 
agreed to a more formalistic requirement, making the treaty applicable also to companies 
controlled only formally by foreign nationals, the threshold for jurisdiction in the Convention 
prevails.52 
                                                 
47 Mr. Hassan Awdi, Enterprise Business Consultants, Inc. and Alfa El Corporation v. Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/13, Award of 2 March 2015, para. 199: ‘Thus, the definition of “investment” in a treaty will determine its 
content in an exclusive way, with no room for additions or subtractions.’ The debate regarding the parties’ autonomy 
to define investments in the ICSID framework is illustrated in Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdictions of 24 May 1999, para. 
66-68. Conversely, a non-ICSID tribunal referred to the Salini criteria (minus the one about the contribution to the 
local economy one) to construe the term ‘investment’ in the Energy Charter Treaty, see Isolux Netherlands, BV v. 
Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, Award of 17 July 2016, para. 686. 
48 For evidence of such flexibility, see Orascom TMT Investments S.à r.l. v. People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/35, Final Award of 31 May 2017, para. 266; KT Asia Investment Group B.V. v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/8, Award of 17 October 2013, para. 113; Mobil Corporation, Venezuela 
Holdings, B.V., Mobil Cerro negro Holding, Ltd., Mobil Venezolana de Petróleos Holdings, Inc., Mobil Cerro Negro, 
Ltd., and Mobil Venezolana de Petróleos, Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of 10 June 2010, para. 156; The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/3, Decision on the Respondent’s Preliminary Objections on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 18 April 2008, 
para. 113; Soabi v. Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/82/1, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 19 July 
1984, para. 29. 
49 Vacuum Salt Products Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/92/1, Award of 16 February 1994, para. 
36. In this case, the clause granting the investor’s right to resort to ICSID arbitration was contained in a lease 
agreement. 
50 TSA Spectrum above (n 42) para. 147. 
51 Ibid., para. 153. 
52 This is the outcome of the TSA Spectrum v. Argentina arbitration, above (n 42). Under art 1(b)(iii) of the Dutch-
Argentinean BIT the parties agreed to consider as investors of a Contracting Party all ‘legal persons, wherever located, 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by nationals of that Contracting Party.’ The investor was formally owned by a Dutch 
company and considered this fact sufficient to obtain the protection of the BIT. However, since the Dutch company 
was held predominantly by an Argentinean national, the tribunal pierced the veil under Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID 
Convention and declined jurisdiction. 
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2. Ratione Materiae 
Besides the constraints of the ICSID Convention (if applicable), consent ratione materiae in 
investment treaties is regulated directly by the arbitration clauses and indirectly by the clauses that 
set the conditions for the application of the treaty (e.g., the clauses with the definitions, the denial 
of benefits clauses, the MFN and umbrella clauses). Investment treaties only extend protection to 
investments. Whereas sometimes treaties confer jurisdiction to international tribunals generically 
over all disputes in connection with an investment,53 they more commonly limit the jurisdiction to 
disputes arising from the alleged breach of the treaty itself.54 When the basis for jurisdiction is a 
contract, the terms of the arbitration clause and law chosen by the parties to govern the contract 
must be scrutinised to determine whether a claim based on customary international law is within 
the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction (for instance, asserting a breach the minimum standard of 
protection, or seeking protection against unlawful or uncompensated expropriation).55 
The scope ratione materiae of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, of course, is also determined by the reach 
of the substantive obligations of the treaty. The following pages explore selected issues of 
jurisdiction ratione materiae that have arisen in the arbitration practice. 
The preliminary Oil Platforms test of jurisdiction 
To establish its jurisdiction ratione materiae, the tribunal must be satisfied that the claim falls 
under the material normative scope of the applicable investment treaty. In other words, the tribunal 
must ascertain that a finding of breach against the respondent is at least legally possible.56 This 
screening exercise aims to curb (a species of) patently hopeless claims’ procession to the merits, 
by preventing the possibility that the tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae is established 
automatically through the mere mentioning in the claim of a set of obligations on which the tribunal 
has jurisdiction. Given the preliminary nature of this endeavour, tribunals are called to carry out a 
prima facie analysis of the claim.57 To do so, investment tribunals have borrowed from the ICJ the 
                                                 
53 Even when they concern general measures of public policy, such as taxes, which allegedly affect the investment in 
violation of the treaty, see Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award of 7 December 2011, 
para. 490-493 (all matters, including breaches of domestic law or human rights violations, are within the jurisdiction 
of the tribunal, when they concern the investment). See ibid., para. 601, distinguishing from Biloune v. Ghana 
Investments Centre, Award of 27 October 1989 and 30 June 1990, XIX Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11, 1994, 
para. 9 (in which the link with the investment was too remote to warrant the jurisdiction of the tribunal). 
54 An overview of typical dispute settlement clauses in investment treaties is provided in August Reinisch, ‘The Scope 
of Investor-State Dispute Settlement in International Investment Agreements’ (2013) 21 Asia Pacific Law Review 3. 
55 For instance, the tribunal decided in Cambodia Power Company v. Kingdom of Cambodia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/18, Decision on Jurisdiction of 22 March 2011, para. 334-338 that the arbitration clause’s language (covering 
‘any dispute … in connection with this Agreement’) and the selection of English law entitled the claimant to bring 
claims based on customary international law. 
56 The wording of Article 10.20(4) of the DR-CAFTA, which arguably codifies this procedural objection and assigns 
to it an inherently preliminary nature, are instructive, as they refer to an ‘objection by the respondent that, as a matter 
of law, a claim submitted is not a claim for which an award in favor of the claimant may be made.’ 
57 In other jurisdictions, similar checks are ascribed to an admissibility analysis, see for instance Article 35(3)(a) of 
the European Court of Human Rights: ‘The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted 
under Article 34 if it considers that: (a) the application is … manifestly ill-founded’. The reference to admissibility in 
these cases reflect the real nature of the test (which presupposes jurisdiction and effectively consists in an expedite 
analysis of the merits). The Oil Platforms case, instead, operates at an abstract level, as it expressly rules out the 
analysis of any controverted facts of the case. 
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so-called Oil Platforms test, whereby they ascertain prima facie whether the alleged facts, if 
proven, are capable of constituting breaches of the applicable treaty.58 If jurisdiction can be ruled 
out without looking at the evidence, the case can be dismissed. Conversely, if any determination 
need to be done that relies on controverted issues of facts, the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the 
tribunal is deemed established, and the analysis of the evidence will be performed at the stage of 
the merits. 
The precise contours of the prima facie analysis are controversial. Inevitably, the non-prevailing 
party at this stage will argue that the determination was too superficial and that they already 
possess reliable evidence to rebut the outcome. Conversely, any look into such evidence will 
inevitably approximate a full analysis on the merits and engage the parties’ equality of arms, 
legitimating each party’s right to have contrary evidence considered. The task of tribunals is 
ultimately steeped in judicial discretion, but some principles are available. Whereas the tribunal 
will not consider the claimant’s case at face value, it will ascertain whether it is ‘decently 
arguable’; whereas it will not look into the actual probability of success (which depends on the 
merits), it will verify that the case has ‘a reasonable possibility as pleaded’.59 The Cervin v. Costa 
Rica tribunal issued further guidelines. A mere allegation that the respondent breached a treaty is 
insufficient: claimant must explain which facts would be attributable to the State and could 
establish a treaty breach.60 The majority and a dissenting arbitrator differed on the degree of 
precision required in the allegation of facts at this stage.61 
In TECO v. Guatemala, for instance, the tribunal in turn examined the prevailing interpretation of 
the minimum standard of protection in CAFTA,62 which encompasses a duty of good faith, and 
noted that the investor’s allegations against Guatemala pointed to a repudiation of the regulatory 
framework and bad faith behaviour.63 Hence, the claim fell under the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
ratione materiae: 
                                                 
58 See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction of 9 November 2004, para. 137 ff. The tribunal summarised the prevailing 
practice and concluded that the applicable test must take into account ‘two opposing preoccupations: to ensure that 
courts and tribunals are not flooded with claims which have no chance of success and sometimes are even of an 
abusive nature; but to ensure equally that, in considering issues of jurisdiction, courts and tribunals do not go into 
the merits of cases without sufficient prior debate’ (para. 151). 
59 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2009-23, Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 27 February 2012, part IV, para. 4.8. See also 
Société Générale In respect of DR Energy Holdings Limited and Empresa Distribuidora de Electricidad del Este, S.A. 
v. The Dominican Republic, UNCITRAL, LCIA Case No. UN 7927, Award on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction 
of 19 September 2008, para. 61. 
60 Cervin Investissements S.A. and Rhone Investissements S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/2, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of 15 December 2014, para. 322. See also Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. The 
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award of 13 September 2006 para. 68; Continental Casualty 
Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on Jurisdiction of 22 February 2006, para. 
61; Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Recommendation on Provisional Measures of 21 March 2007, para. 83; Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2013-12 (Number 2), Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 20 May 2014, para. 217. 
61 Cervin above (n 60) dissent of Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández, para. 3 ff (in particular para. 13, 21). 
62 TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, Award of 19 December 
2013, para. 458. 
63 Ibid., para. 460-461. 
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There is in fact no doubt in the eyes of the Arbitral Tribunal that, if the Claimant proves 
that Guatemala acted arbitrarily and in complete and willful disregard of the applicable 
regulatory framework, or showed a complete lack of candor or good faith in the regulatory 
process, such behavior would constitute a breach of the minimum standard.64 
Instead, the tribunal held in BIVAC v. Paraguay that the investor’s claim of expropriation did not 
pass the prima facie test65: even if proved, the State’s alleged failure to honour a schedule of 
payments under a concession with the investor could not constitute expropriation under the BIT. 
Likewise, the majority of the Cervin v. Costa Rica tribunal rejected an FET/expropriation claim 
based on an alleged lack of clarity of the regulatory framework, because the reading of the 
regulation offered by the claimant was implausible. In any case, no breach of FET could derive 
from a supposed lack of clarity of the applicable regulations, ‘in the absence of bad faith on the 
part of the regulator or of other special circumstances.’66 A claim of discriminatory treatment was 
similarly rejected prima facie.67 
Ultimately, the Oil Platforms objection must succeed only in the rare occasion of implausible or 
frivolous claims, and the practice reflects such exceptional character.68 
In the ICSID framework, Rule 41.5 affords the possibility to raise a preliminary objection against 
claims that are manifestly without legal merit, in separate incidental proceedings.69 This possibility 
was introduced in 2006, and several recent treaties have included it since.70 The objections are 
reviewed by the tribunals in an expedite fashion, and are therefore appropriate for consideration 
of Oil Platforms objections.71 The appropriateness of Rule 41.5 proceedings for Oil Platforms 
objections can be demonstrated a contrario72: the tribunals often reject Rule 41.5 applications 
mentioning the need to resolve a legal issue through a complete survey of the evidence and the 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 465. Other examples mentioned by the TECO tribunal are Bayindir above (n 38) para. 197; Telefónica S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20, Decision on Jurisdiction of 25 May 2006; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction of 22 April 2005.  
65 Bureau Veritas above (n 31) para. 117. 
66 Cervin above (n 60) para. 362. Arbitrator Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández dissented on this point. 
67 Ibid., para. 379.  
68 Ibid., see dissent, para. 57, noting that only 10% of the cases in which the Oil Platforms objection was raised led to 
a finding of lack of jurisdiction. 
69 Under Rule 41(5), the respondent can raise an objection that the claim is ‘manifestly without legal merit’. Such 
objections include, but are not limited to, a so-called Oil Platform objection (i.e., that the conduct described in the 
claim is unable to engage, even theoretically, the obligations invoked). 
70 See for instance Article 10.20(4) of the DR-CAFTA; Article 8.32 of CETA; Article 9.23(4) of the TPP. 
71 The proceedings can be used to raise other procedural objections too. In Ansung Housing Company Limited v China, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25, Award of 9 March 2017 the respondent successfully raised an objection ratione temporis 
to the tribunal’s jurisdiction; in Rachel S. Grynberg, Stephen M. Grynberg, Miriam Z. Grynberg and RSM Production 
Company v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/6, Award of 10 December 2010 the respondent succeeded in raising 
an objection based on abuse of process and res judicata; in Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, 
Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/11, Award of 1 December 2010, the tribunal found that the claimants had 
no investment.  
72 As of date, no Rule 41(5) decision has rejected a claim for a manifest impossibility of the claim falling under the 
scope ratione materiae of the invoked instrument. 
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legal issues raised by the parties.73 As explained above, this is precisely the kind of predicament 
that would certify the impossibility of upholding an Oil Platforms objection. An ICSID tribunal 
cared to comment on the potential interplay between Rule 41.5 objections and Oil Platforms 
challenges raised without recourse to the expedite proceedings. It remarked on the circumstances 
differentiating the two procedural scenarios,74 but did not dismiss the practical possibility that they 
overlap in substance.75 The point remains, at least, that raising a successful Oil Platforms objection 
after the corresponding objection has been rejected in Rule 41.5 proceedings is technically possible 
– the Rule 41.5 decision is no res judicata for any jurisdictional objection – but practically 
implausible. 
Contractual claims 
In principle, investment treaty tribunals only have jurisdiction ‘to hear and determine breach of 
treaty claims, not breach of contract claims.’76 Nevertheless, it is common for the investor to 
impute to the host State a failure to perform a contractual commitment.77 The relevant conduct, 
which might give rise to a contractual claim, could also underpin a treaty claim, without entailing 
a logical or legal contradiction.78 For instance, the State’s failure to comply with a concession 
contract could also entail a breach of the standard of fair and equitable treatment.79 In other words, 
                                                 
73 For instance, see Álvarez y Marín Corporación S.A. and others v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/14, 
Reasoning of the Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary Objections pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5) of 4 
April 2016, para. 96 (a dispute hinging on controverted facts cannot be resolved in expedite proceedings). 
74 Trans-Global Petroleum, Inc. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/25, Decision on the 
Respondent’s Objection Pursuant to Rule 41(5) of 12 May 2008, para. 103 (notes omitted): ‘The Tribunal does not 
consider that the Respondent’s submissions were materially advanced by the several ICSID decisions and awards 
applying Judge Higgins’ dictum as to disputed facts in the ICJ’s Oil Platforms case. These ICSID materials were 
directed at objections based on the tribunal’s jurisdiction or competence under Article 41 of the ICSID Convention 
and Rule 41(1) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules - not Rule 41(5). Moreover, the procedure for such jurisdictional 
objections is also different from Rule 41(5): the timing of the respondent's jurisdictional objection can follow the 
claimant’s first memorial, long after the request for arbitration and the first session; and the tribunal can postpone 
its decision or award by joining the objection to the merits of the dispute under Article 41(2) of the ICSID Convention 
and Article 41(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules.’ 
75 For instance, the second Rule 41(5) objection raised by Panama in Álvarez y Marín above (n 73) is comparable to 
an Oil Platforms objection in substance (essentially, that the contested act could not produce legal effects, and was for 
this reason incapable of constituting a breach of the applicable treaty). Moreover, the reasons for rejecting this 
objection are redolent of the reasons commonly used to reject Oil Platforms challenges to the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
(essentially, that the issue raised a ‘complex issue [cuestión compleja]’ that could not decided using the ‘standard of 
burden of evidence applicable in this phase of proceedings [el nivel de alegación y prueba existente en la actualidad]’ 
(see para. 102). 
76 Tenaris S.A. and Talta - Trading e Marketing Sociedade Unipessoal Lda. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/23, Award of 29 January 2016, para. 301. See also AES Corporation and Tau Power B.V. 
v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/16, Award of 1 November 2013, para. 192. Jurisdiction on 
contract claims might be warranted when the treaty contains an umbrella clause, or a widely-worded arbitration clause. 
These scenarios are discussed elsewhere in this article. 
77 Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (CUP 2009) para. 447. 
78 EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award of 11 June 2012, para. 931: ‘There is nothing mysterious about the fact that the 
same acts may constitute both a contractual breach and a violation of relevant treaty obligations’. 
79 For a recent example, see MNSS v. Montenegro above (n 37) para. 159: ‘In determining claims for breach of the 
BIT, the Tribunal may examine as a question of fact whether the Privatization Agreement was breached, by way of 
background to a claim that does not have the nature of a contract or an umbrella clause claim. For example, the 
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the same facts could be used to found multiple claims with different legal characterizations.80 The 
prevailing view is that the two distinct aspects can coexist and that, therefore, there is no reason to 
reject a treaty claim only because it is based on State conduct which also amounts to a contractual 
breach,81 or only because contract matters are relevant – as facts – to the outcome of the treaty 
claims.82 
Respondents often attempt to characterise a claim as ‘purely’ contractual, as if the ‘contractual 
purity’ of the claim were a critical legal concept, preventing the possibility of framing the claim 
as treaty-based as well.83 There are cases which confirm this view in dicta,84 but the attending 
principle, if any, is rarely applied in the practice. In fact, so long as a claim – which could be also 
contractual if framed differently – is plausibly based on the standards of protection of the treaty it 
cannot be considered purely contractual, and the tribunal will normally retain jurisdiction on it. 
See the reasoning of the AMPAL v. Egypt tribunal: 
the Tribunal accepts that, in order for it to find that there has been a breach of [the Treaty] 
standards in relation to the Gas Supply Dispute, it will need to determine as an incidental 
question whether the [concession contract] was validly terminated. However, this does not 
change the fact that the key issue under the Treaty in respect of a claim for unlawful 
expropriation or breach of the fair and equitable treatment is whether there has been a loss 
of property right constituted by the contract or whether legitimate expectations arose under 
the contract.85 
This approach, however, complicates the coordination of parallel domestic and arbitration 
proceedings. Since there is no formal identity between the causes of action of each dispute, the 
principles of lis pendens or forum non conveniens cannot lead the tribunal to decline its jurisdiction 
when a contractual claim which revolves on the same factual circumstances has been brought to a 
                                                 
Tribunal is entitled to decide, as a question of fact, whether the Privatization Agreement was breached when deciding 
a claim for violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard in the BIT.’ See also AES above (n 76) para. 193. 
80 On the analytical distinction between treaty and contract claims, with particular reference to the rules on attribution 
of State responsibility, see Impregilo v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan above (n 64) para. 262. 
81 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija SA. and Vivendi Universal SA. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment of 3 July 2002, para. 105; Bayindir above (n 38) para. 215; Impregilo S.p.A. v. 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan above (n 64) para. 219, 258. 
82 Bayindir above (n 38) para. 235-236. 
83 Among the many cases, see for instance Ampal above (n 23) para. 233: ‘In view of the fact that the Gas Supply 
Dispute is purely contractual in nature, the Respondent submits that it thus falls outside the scope of the arbitration 
clauses in the Treaties.’ 
84 Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, 18 June 2010, 
para. 329; Malicorp above (n 26). 
85 Ampal above (n 23) para. 255. 
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national court,86 or should be brought before it.87 For the same reason (a lack of identity between 
the causes of action of the domestic and the international claims), a fork-in-the-road provision will 
apply only rarely.88 These clauses, which bar recourse to arbitration if the same claim has already 
been brought to domestic courts, only operate when the triple-identity test is satisfied,89 unless the 
tribunal opts for a test based on the ‘essential basis’ of the claim.90 In AES v. Kazakhstan, the 
tribunal concluded that the claim before it differed from the one brought to domestic courts, under 
either test.91 In Hassan Awdi v. Romania the tribunal stopped short of running the triple identity 
test. It noted that the claimant had indeed brought a claim before local courts, but the proceedings 
were discontinued before any hearings took place, for failure to pay court fees. As a result, there 
was no risk of parallel litigation, which fork-in-the-road clauses seek to prevent.92 
When arbitration is launched in spite of an exclusive dispute settlement clause in the contract, the 
host State’s attempt to label the claim as purely contractual seeks to achieve the result prefigured 
in a dictum of the ad hoc committee in Vivendi: 
                                                 
86 See Reinisch, above (n 54) 16, referring to CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ARB/01/8, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003, para. 80 and other cases. When the triple identity test is used, even fork-in-the-road clauses 
are hardly effective. See for instance Transglobal Green Energy, LLC and Transglobal Green Energy de Panama, 
S.A. v. The Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/28, Award of 2 June 2016, where the Respondent, at para. 
88, complains that ‘no tribunal that has applied the triple identity test has found the fork-in-the-road clause to have 
been triggered, thus depriving this clause of practical significance.’ A similar remark is made by the tribunal in 
Chevron v. Ecuador above (n 59) Part IV, para. 4.76. In this dispute, the fork in the road clause only applied to claims 
submitted by the claimant. The tribunal accordingly and did not decline jurisdiction on claims referring to situations 
on which national litigation had been launched by the responding State. An issue arose regarding the pleas in defense 
made by the investors in domestic proceedings, which could theoretically trigger the fork-in-the-road provision. The 
arbitration tribunal distinguished between autonomous claims (including counterclaims) and pleas in defense, holding 
that the latter fell outside the fork clause, see ibid., para. 4.82: ‘The notion of ‘submission’ of a dispute connotes the 
making of a choice and a voluntary decision to refer the dispute to the court for resolution: as a matter of the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the term, it does not extend to the raising of a defence in response to another’s claim 
submitted to that court’. 
87 Commenting on the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause for contract claims, the tribunal in Bayindir above 
(n 38) reasoned (para. 150-151): ‘it is undisputed that the 1997 Contract contains a dispute settlement clause providing 
for arbitration under the 1940 Arbitration Act of Pakistan. … As a matter of principle, this arbitration clause is 
irrelevant for the purpose of the jurisdiction of this Tribunal over the Treaty Claims’. See also Camuzzi International 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/2, Decision on Jurisdiction of 11 May 2005, para. 89 
88 See Christoph Schreuer, ‘Consent to Arbitration’, in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2012) 831, 848, and case-law referred to therein. 
89 Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 
Award of 25 June 2001, para. 331. 
90 In Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, 
Award of 30 July 2009, Paulsson (sole arbitrator) took issue with the formalistic requirements of the triple identity 
test and proposed a more substantive test, see para. 64: ‘The Tribunal must determine whether the claim truly does 
have an autonomous existence outside the contract. Otherwise the Claimant must live with the consequences of having 
elected to take its grievances to the national courts.’ See also Supervision y Control S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/4, Final Award of 18 January 2017 para. 330. 
91 AES above (n 76) para. 226-230. 
92 Hassan Awdi above (n 47) para. 203-205. 
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In a case where the essential basis of a claim brought before an international tribunal is a 
breach of contract, the tribunal will give effect to any valid choice of forum clause in the 
contract.93 
Nonetheless, the lack of jurisdiction over contractual disputes cannot entail a lapse of competence 
over the potential treaty claims.94 Even in a clear-cut case of exclusive jurisdiction of domestic 
courts, which was sanctioned by the investment contract and reinforced by an express safeguard 
in the applicable treaty,95 the tribunal took pains to explain that the treaty-based jurisdiction of the 
tribunal was not affected, let alone excluded: 
…the Tribunal will note that the dispute settlement procedures provided for in the Contract 
could only cover claims based on breaches of the Contract. Those procedures cannot cover 
claims based on breaches of the BIT (including breaches of those provisions of the BIT 
guaranteeing fulfillment of contracts signed with foreign investors). Therefore Article 9(2) 
does not deprive the Tribunal of such jurisdiction, as it may have, to entertain treaty claims 
of this nature under other provisions of the BIT.96 
The case Getma v. Guinea tested the limits of this approach.97 The ICSID arbitration clause in the 
national investment law envisaged the possibility for the parties to agree on a different forum. The 
concession contract between the claimant and the host State, indeed, contained an exclusive 
commercial arbitration clause.98 The tribunal considered this exclusive forum clause insufficient 
to undermine its competence per se: the arbitration clause in the concession contract covered only 
the claims arising from it, which could not exhaust all the possible claims made under the 
investment statute.99 Nonetheless, the concession contract governed expressly certain breaches of 
the contract that plainly entailed a breach also of the investment code which would be arbitrable 
before ICSID, such as an act of expropriation carried out through the unilateral termination of the 
concession. Therefore, the tribunal found that the clause ‘contractualised’ certain treaty claims.100 
Accordingly, the tribunal lacked competence over the claims based on the State termination of the 
concession, even if it could otherwise qualify as expropriation and support an investment claim.101 
The ICSID tribunal’s competence could be upheld residually on such act only insofar as the 
                                                 
93 Vivendi I annulment decision 2002 above (n 81) para. 98. 
94 Tenaris above (n 76), para. 307, referring to the decision of the Vivendi I annulment committee, and to numerous 
arbitration awards. See also Crystallex International Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award of 4 April 2016, para. 480. 
95 See Article 9(2) of the Italy/Jordan BIT, which affords priority to the choice of forum in an investment contract, 
over the means of dispute settlement listed in the treaty itself. 
96 Salini v. Jordan above (n 58) para. 96. 
97 Getma International and others v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/29, Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 
December 2012. 
98 Which required the parties to submit any dispute arising from the concession to a tribunal established by the Cour 
Commune de Justice et d’Arbitrage, an arbitration institution based in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire). 
99 Getma v. Guinea above (n 97) para. 105: ‘Or, les différends «découlant de la présente Convention» ne sont a priori 
pas nécessairement les mêmes que ceux «relatifs à l’application et l’interprétation du Code des investissements».’ 
100 Ibid., para. 123: ‘Dans la mesure où la résiliation est consécutive à un Acte de la Puissance Publique, l’article 
32.5 «contractualise» les treaty claims qui, par voie de conséquence, doivent être soumis au Tribunal CCJA 
conformément à l’article 31 de la Convention.’ The reference to ‘treaty’ claims is perhaps inaccurate since the claim 
before the ICSID tribunal was based on an investment statute, not on a treaty. 




claimant could envisage, under the investment code, further consequences and damages arising 
from the termination other than those regulated in the concession, which included a cap on the 
recovery of damages.102 The investor’s attempt to seek before the ICSID tribunal damages arising 
from the unilateral termination of the contract, in excess of the contractual cap, did not succeed. 
In the tribunal’s view, the claimants ‘failed to explain why … , in spite of the clear agreement [in 
the concession], it would be sufficient to seise another tribunal and invoke the investment code to 
invalidate the contractual limitation on damages-interests’.103 In other words, the tribunal 
subscribed to the traditional view that exclusive forum provisions in the contract might in theory 
coexist with the jurisdiction of an investment tribunal; however, a purely contractual claim fell 
squarely within the competence of the selected forum. Since the contract expressly absorbed under 
its regulatory reach certain State acts, the tribunal found that these were removed from its 
competence by the agreement of the parties,104 unless the claimant could show that an investment 
claim would have entailed additional consequences and different remedies. 
Ultimately, it is true that a treaty breach can result from a contractual breach, even if not necessarily 
all contractual breaches will result in a treaty breach.105 The only defense available to the State, it 
follows, is not so much to prove that the claim is contractual (which is an irrelevant objection), but 
to prove that the claim has no connection with the treaty (which is an obvious objection).106 
Sometimes tribunals accept the treaty-nature of a claim only if the alleged conduct of the State 
goes ‘beyond that which an ordinary contracting party could adopt.’107 In other words, the actions 
imputable to the State must transcend a case of mere non-performance that could be attributed to 
any contracting party, and must instead engage its sovereign authority or puissance publique (i.e., 
there must be a ‘State interference with the operation of the contract involved’108). This approach 
has gained traction and is now described as ‘the main test … to determine whether a contract claim 
has been disguised as a treaty claim.’109 
                                                 
102 Getma v. Guinea above (n 97) para. 125. 
103 Getma v. Guinea, Award above (n 101) para. 332. My translation. The original text reads ‘[l]es Demanderesses … 
n’ont pas expliqué … pourquoi, nonobstant l’accord clair, il suffirait de s’adresser à un autre tribunal et d’invoquer 
le Code des investissements pour que la limitation contractuelle des dommages-intérêts ne soit plus valable.’ 
104 Ibid., para. 334: the jurisdiction of the tribunal ‘concerne exclusivement les violations du Code des investissements 
à l’exception de celles qui ont été contractualisées.’ 
105 Consortium RFCC v. Royaume du Maroc, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Award of 22 December 2003, para. 48. 
106 It might be helpful to distinguish between a breach of a contract binding the investor and the State, as opposed to 
the breach of a contract that the investor has with a State-controlled entity. The former breach could fall directly under 
the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the tribunal, when the relevant clause refers to ‘all disputes … relating to an 
investment’. The latter kind, instead, is not covered as such by the offer to arbitrate, and a claim might be brought only 
if the breach also results in a treaty breach attributable to the State. See Consortium RFCC v. Royaume du Maroc 
above (n 38) para. 67-69. 
107 Salini v. Jordan above (n 58), para. 155. See also Impregilo v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan above (n 64) para. 260; 
Bureau Veritas above (n 31) para. 125. 
108 Joy Mining v. Egypt above (n 42) para. 72. 
109 Stanimir A Alexandrov and James Mendenhall, ‘Breach of Treaty Claims and Breach of Contract Claims: 
Simplification of International Jurisprudence’ in Arthur W Rovine (ed), Contemporary Issues in International 
Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2014 (Brill 2015) 24, 37. See also Convial Callao S.A. y CCI – 
Compañía de concesiones de Infraestructura S.A. c. República del Perú, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/2, Laudo Final of 
21 May 2013, para. 501; Kristian Almås and Geir Almås v. The Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, Award of 27 June 
2016, para. 273-284 (the tribunal did not consider the contractual breach attributable to the State but noted that, even 
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The only avenue available to States to found a jurisdictional objection on an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause in a contract might be to characterise it as a waiver, on the part of the investor, of the right 
to resort to arbitration.110 This characterisation, however, should be assisted by unequivocal 
language:  
a waiver, if and when admissible at all, is never to be lightly admitted as it requires 
knowledge and intent of forgoing a right, a conduct rather unusual in economic 
transactions.111 
Contracts with non-State organs and umbrella clauses 
When a legal person other than the State is responsible for the contractual breach, it is necessary 
to consider some specific aspects. At the outset, it must be noted that a lack of privity (the State 
has no direct contractual dealings with the investor) is not necessarily a valid objection to 
jurisdiction over investment claims.112 Before assessing whether there can be a breach of the treaty 
it is essential to ascertain the attribution of the alleged misconduct to the State, under the customary 
principles of State responsibility.113 Unless the contractor is an organ of the State, it might be 
necessary to determine whether the contractual breach was committed jure imperii114; if so, the 
breach of contract could be attributed to the State and possibly engage its treaty obligations, since 
it was committed by an entity exercising governmental authority while ‘acting in that capacity’.115 
Matters of attribution, however, tend to be reviewed at the stage of the merits and, therefore, exceed 
the present discussion on jurisdictional requirements.116 It is just apposite to recall an obverse 
scenario: when the investor’s acts are attributable to the home State, for instance when a company 
discharges essentially governmental functions, the investor loses standing. Since the dispute is in 
fact an inter-state one, the claimant cannot be considered a national of the home State and access 
                                                 
if it had been attributable, it would have constituted at most a contractual behaviour – even if allegedly wrongful – 
and could not entail in any event a treaty breach). 
110 See Alexandrov and Mendenhall above (n 109) 41-42. 
111 Crystallex above (n 94) para. 481. See also Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction of 21 October 2005, para. 119. 
112 See Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte. Ltd. v. Government of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN Case No ARB/01/1, Award 
of 31 March 2003, para. 39: ‘A dispute can arise directly from an investment whether or not the investment is made 
pursuant to a contract with the host State or one of its organs.’ 
113 See in particular Articles 4, 5 and 8 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. 
114 See Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. The Government of 
Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability of 28 April 2011, para. 592: ‘The Tribunal therefore has 
no hesitation in concluding that MongolBank acted de jure imperii, … Therefore, even if MongolBank were not to be 
considered an organ of the State but merely an entity exercising elements of governmental authority, Claimants would 
be entitled to pursue their claim against Respondent in connection with the actions mentioned above.’ 
115 Article 5 of the ILC Articles. See, for instance, the award in Vigotop Limited v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/22, Award of 1 October 2014, para. 441. 
116 It is common, however, for respondents to raise points of attribution in their preliminary objections, alleging a lack 
of passive standing (the State is not the rightful defendant in the case). For this reason, tribunals often enter, if only 
prima facie or ex abundanti cautela, into the analysis of attribution at the jurisdictional stage. See, for instance, Helnan 
International Hotels A/S v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction 
of 17 October 2006, para. 911 ff. See also Tenaris above (n 76) para. 303. In Almås v. Poland above (n 109), the 
tribunal expressly denied the jurisdictional nature of the objections on attribution, see para. 202.  
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to investor-State litigation is, in principle, barred.117 This principle can give way to the parties’ 
agreement, when the applicable instrument recording the States’ consent to arbitration expressly 
envisions the possibility of States or State entreprises acting as investors.118 
Instead, if a State-owned company has a separate legal personality from the State and its acts are 
performed in a commercial capacity (jure gestionis), they are not attributable to the State.119 A 
breach of a contract with a State company, therefore, will not per se engage the State’s obligations 
under an investment treaty. Conversely, if it is possible to formulate a treaty-based claim against 
the State, an exclusive forum-selection clause in the contract with the State company will not bar 
the investor’s resort to investment arbitration, since there is no identity between the parties to the 
two disputes at stake (the contract claim being directed at the State company, the treaty one at the 
State).120 
Re-characterisation of a contractual claim into a treaty claim might not be necessary if the 
applicable BIT contains a so-called umbrella clause.121 Under these provisions, all State 
commitments towards the investor122 are safeguarded by a specific treaty obligation, hence 
expanding the BIT’s material scope and, correspondingly, the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the 
tribunal seised. After the apparently incurable split between the SGS v. Pakistan123 and SGS v. 
Philippines124 tribunals, the subsequent awards could be grouped into two approaches, each 
tributary to the outcome and reasoning of either case. Some tribunals have espoused the reasoning 
of the former, i.e., that umbrella clauses do not automatically elevate contractual claims to the level 
of treaty claims and that other conditions must be met to bring a contractual claim to arbitration.125 
More often, tribunals have sided with the SGS v. Philippines case, mostly noting that additional 
                                                 
117 CSOB above (n 47) para. 18-27. In that case, the tribunal recognised that the investor was controlled by the State 
and promoted the State policies, but carried out activities of essentially commercial character, and therefore qualified 
as investor. 
118 Consider, for example, Article 1 of the US Model BIT of 2012, which expressly states that ‘a Party or state 
enterprise thereof’ enjoys protection when it makes an investment in the host State. 
119 Almås v. Poland above (n 109) para. 253. 
120 Ulysseas, Inc. v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Interim Award of 28 September 2010, para. 154-156. See 
in particular para. 151: ‘In order for the alleged contractual waiver by Claimant to be effective, the parties involved 
must be identical. The parties to the contracts which, according to Respondent, would have given effect to the waiver 
by Claimant of the BIT arbitration, i.e. the two Licence Contracts, should be Ulysseas, on one side, and the State of 
Ecuador, on the other.’ 
121 Whereas proper umbrella clauses normally require host States to ‘observe’ or ‘respect’ their undertakings vis-à-vis 
the investor, other clauses have a hortatory wording and do not empower investors to bring a contractual dispute to 
arbitration. See for instance Article 2(4) of the Italy/Jordan BIT, as discussed in Salini v. Jordan above (n 58). 
122 Umbrella clauses cover specific undertakings relating to the investment, not general obligations found, for instance, 
in domestic law. See CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, Decision of the ad hoc 
Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic of 25 September 2007, para. 95(a) and WNC 
Factoring Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-34, Award of 22 February 2017, para. 345-347. 
123 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/01/13, Decision 
on Jurisdiction of 6 August 2003. 
124 SGS v. Philippines above (n 38). 
125 See, for instance, El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/15, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, para. 85. Pan American above (n 9) para. 113. Salini v. Jordan above (n 58). 
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conditions would render virtually superfluous the umbrella clause, the effet utile of which must lie 
precisely in its capacity to turn contractual claims into treaty claims.126 
When the essential cause of action of a claim brought under an umbrella clause is a breach of a 
contract with the host State, any contractual forum-selection clause in favour of domestic courts, 
or any fork-in-the-road provisions in the treaty might apply. When a contract claim is 
‘treatified,’127 indeed, there is triple identity (parties, object, cause of action) between the claim 
brought to arbitration and the claim that was brought or ought to be brought to local courts. In this 
respect, the umbrella clause cuts against the investor: the contractual obligations of the State are 
elevated together with the exclusive forum selection.128 For this reason, investors are better 
advised, if they are able to formulate a treaty claim, to avoid invoking the umbrella clause 
altogether.129 
If an umbrella clause is invoked, a problem arises when the underlying contract is not stipulated 
between the investor and the government of the host State. A lack of privity might occur when, for 
instance, the parties to the contract are the investor’s domestic vehicle and/or a State-owned 
entity.130 Tribunals tend to postulate the necessity of privity,131 but the exact wording of the 
applicable umbrella clause (for instance, the use of ‘investments’ instead of ‘investors’) might be 
relevant and warrant its extension to contracts stipulated by entities connected to the investor: 
the protection of [the umbrella clause] goes beyond the simple direct contractual 
relationship between the investor and the host State, because such provision establishes 
that the State shall comply with the obligations undertaken ‘… related to investments by 
investors of the other Contracting Party …’. Such drafting is sufficiently broad to interpret 
that the obligations contracted by Costa Rica with Riteve, a company controlled by the 
Claimant and created exclusively to hold the rights of the Contract, are included under the 
                                                 
126 Noble Ventures, Inc v. Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/O 1/11, Award of 12 October 2005, para. 53; SGS Société 
Générale de Surveillance SA v. The Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No ARB/07/29, Award of 12 February 2012, 
para. 91. Contra, see Joy Mining above (n 42) para. 81. 
127 That is, presented as such (by virtue of an umbrella clause or a generic arbitration clause covering non-treaty 
disputes) rather than repackaged as a treaty claim. 
128 Bureau Veritas above (n 31) para. 148: ‘the parties to a contract are not free to pick and choose those parts of the 
Contract that they may wish to incorporate into an “umbrella clause” provision such as Article 3(4) and to ignore 
others.’  
129 See, for instance, the claimant’s emphatic refusal to rely on the umbrella clause in Tulip Real Estate and 
Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award of 10 March 2014, para. 
351-352. 
130 The issue is discussed in Shotaro Hamamoto, ‘Parties to the ‘Obligations’ in the Obligations Observance 
(‘Umbrella’) Clause’ (2015) 30(2) ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 449-464. For a case of a contract 
between a subsidiary of the investor and a State-owned company, see Tenaris above (n 76) para. 305. In the case  
131 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award 
of 18 August 2008, para. 323; Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador (formerly Burlington Resources Inc. 
and others v. Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (PetroEcuador)), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability of 14 December 2012, para. 220; WNC above (n 122) para. 325: ‘the dominant view 
is that in respect of contractual obligations, only parties entitled to enforce the obligation under the proper law of the 
contract may sue.’ 
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scope of protection of the Treaty. As a result, the Tribunal has jurisdiction ratione materiae 
over the dispute.132 
On the other hand, the investor might want to enforce through the umbrella clause a contract 
stipulated by a State-owned entity that has a legal personality distinct from the host State. In EDF 
v. Romania, the tribunal observed that, in a similar scenario, the State has not entered into any 
obligation under the contract, hence the umbrella clause is inapplicable irrespective of whether the 
breach of the contract committed by the state-owned entity is attributable to the State.133 In other 
words, attribution of responsibility is not the same as attribution of obligations: the former is only 
possible when the State is already bound by an existing obligation. 
Attribution does not change the extent and content of the obligations arising under the 
ASRO Contract and the SKY Contract, that remain contractual, nor does it make Romania 
party to such contracts.134 
Lack of privity has not prevented some tribunals to entertain umbrella clause claims when the 
State-owned entity had entered into the contractual commitments on behalf of the State, i.e., to 
bind it directly.135 In that scenario, it was possible to attribute the contractual arrangement to the 
State – as it were – and consider it bound by the deriving obligations. The attributability of the 
relevant conduct under the rules of State responsibility, in these scenarios, would effectively 
warrant the indication of the State as the correct defendant to an umbrella-clause claim. 
Domestic regulatory disputes 
Similarly to those hinging on the contractual/treaty divide, objections are sometimes made against 
domestic regulatory claims. Respondent States can argue that the claim revolves in fact around the 
application of domestic law and has therefore no international character. Tribunals normally make 
short shrift of similar objections: as long as there is a plausible treaty-based claim, the involvement 
of domestic law is not fatal to the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the tribunal. 
This reasonable conclusion can be reached, a contrario, looking at the set of the applicable laws 
in treaty-based investment arbitration. If the necessity of determinations based on domestic law 
were sufficient to exclude treaty-based jurisdiction, the ICSID Convention (Article 42(1)) and 
several treaties would not explicitly include domestic law among the applicable sources.136 
Determinations based on domestic law (or other sources), which are necessary en route to the 
treaty-based review of State measures, are acceptable as a matter of applicable law (or incidental 
                                                 
132 Supervision v. Costa Rica, supra (n 90), para. 287. Emphasis in the original. See also AMTO v. Ukraine, SCC No. 
80/2005, Award of 26 March 2008, para. 110. 
133 EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award of 8 October 2009, para. 317-318. 
134 Ibid., para. 319. Note that the tribunal had determined that there had been no breach of contract, therefore the claim 
under the umbrella clause would have failed even if privity had not been required. 
135 Noble Ventures above (n 126) para. 85 (the State-owned entities did represent the State, in the framework of 
privatisation plans carried out with private investors); Eureko above (n 12) para. 248 ff. 
136 TECO above (n 62) para. 469-470. 
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jurisdiction). Claims based, in part, on these determinations do not, as such, fall outside the 
tribunal’s primary jurisdiction.137 See the reasoning of the tribunal in TECO v. Venezuela: 
the Arbitral Tribunal’s task is fundamentally to assess the legal relevance of the facts under 
customary international law [determining the minimum standard protected in the CAFTA]. 
As a consequence, although the decisions made by the Constitutional Court of Guatemala 
will have consequences on the findings that the Arbitral Tribunal will have to make under 
Guatemalan law, such circumstance cannot deprive the Arbitral Tribunal of its jurisdiction 
to decide the case under international law. In addition, as will be discussed further, the 
parties in the Guatemalan court proceedings were in any event different.138 
Whereas the tribunal’s primary jurisdiction only concerns the legality of the State’s measure under 
international law, ‘the facts in dispute’ include the content of domestic law as interpreted in 
domestic courts.139 Obversely, when the tribunal’s jurisdiction goes beyond treaty claims (for 
instance, when an umbrella clause applies), claims based on domestic regulatory law might be 
entertained, subject to the applicable requirements.140 
In the case Iberdrola v. Guatemala,141 the host State’s objection ratione materiae lamenting the 
purely internal nature of the dispute convinced the tribunal. Since the applicable BIT provided for 
international arbitration only over disputes ‘arising … over issues governed by [the BIT itself]’,142 
the tribunal interpreted accordingly the States’ consent to arbitration and its own attending 
jurisdiction ratione materiae. The tribunal noted that ‘issues governed by [the BIT]’ 
… is not a broad formulation that includes any kind of dispute; it does not even refer to 
disputes arising out of or relating to an investment, but only to disputes concerning 
matters covered by the Treaty.143 
                                                 
137 For instance, consider the case Tidewater Inc., Tidewater Investment SRL, Tidewater Caribe, C.A., et al. v. The 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Decision on Jurisdiction of 8 February 2013. The 
tribunal examined domestic law to determine whether a Venezuelan statute established the requisite consent under 
Article 25 ICSID (para. 106) and whether the dispute submitted to arbitration was merely the continuation of a 
previous dispute on matters of domestic law, which would have fallen outwith the application ratione temporis of the 
applicable treaty, because it had occurred before the claimant had acquired the Barbadian nationality which allowed 
the invocation of the Barbados – Venezuela BIT (para. 187). 
138 TECO above (n 62) para. 475. 
139 Ibid., para. 477. 
140 In Oxus v. Uzbekistan, for instance, the claimant attempted to invoke the breach of certain municipal decrees, 
jointly with the umbrella clause, to establish the host State’s responsibility under the BIT. The tribunal rejected the 
claim, holding that the umbrella clause entailed a privity requirement that the State obligations invoked be ‘specifically 
entered into with Claimant.’ Accordingly, non-compliance with general regulations, or with obligations owed to the 
local vehicle of the foreign investors, could not establish a breach under the umbrella clause. See Oxus Gold plc v. 
Republic of Uzbekistan, the State Committee of Uzbekistan for Geology & Mineral Resources, and Navoi Mining & 
Metallurgical Kombinat, UNCITRAL, Award of 17 December 2015, para. 851. 
141 Iberdrola Energía S.A. v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/5, Award of 17 August 2012. 
142 BIT Spain/Guatemala, Article 11(1). Our translation, the original reading: ‘Toda controversia relativa a las 
inversiones que surja … respecto a cuestiones reguladas por el presente Acuerdo.’ 
143 Iberdrola Energía S.A. v. Republic of Guatemala above (n 141) para. 301. Courtesy translation, emphasis in the 
original. The original text reads: ‘No se trata de una expresión amplia que comprenda cualquier tipo de controversias; 
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The tribunal found that the investor’s case, variously and erratically referring to the standards of 
the BIT, consisted mostly of a claim regarding Guatemala’s mistaken interpretation of domestic 
law. It therefore dismissed the investor’s attempt to ‘label’144 the claim as a treaty-based one. 
Ultimately, the tribunal implemented the narrow reading of the arbitration clause and rejected the 
claim on a prima facie review of competence (the Oil Platforms test). Even if Iberdrola’s 
allegations would prove correct, they could not result in treaty breaches.145 The finding of lack of 
jurisdiction was challenged in annulment, unsuccessfully.146 
Narrow arbitration clauses and carve-outs ratione materiae 
Sometimes, jurisdictional clauses restrict the tribunal’s competence. They can refer to a specific 
means of dispute settlement to the exclusion of others. If ICSID arbitration is excluded, for 
instance, the clause does not contain the State’s consent to that specific arbitration method and, 
accordingly, an ICSID tribunal seised would not be competent. Conversely, resort to UNCITRAL 
arbitration might be precluded if the clause provides for the exclusive competence of ICSID 
tribunals or compulsory recourse to the ICSID Additional Facility.147 
Arbitration clauses, moreover, can exclude certain subject matters148 or narrow down the 
substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal to specific categories of cases,149 such as the disputes 
relating to the amount of compensation for expropriation.150 In the latter cases, the tribunal cannot 
                                                 
ni siquiera se refiere a controversias derivadas de o relacionadas con una inversión, sino solamente a controversias 
referentes a cuestiones reguladas por el Tratado.’ 
144 Ibid., para. 349. In the Spanish original text: ‘Más allá de etiquetar las actuaciones de la Demandada, la 
Demandante no presenta un razonamiento claro y concreto sobre cuáles son, a su juicio, los actos de imperio de la 
República de Guatemala que, en derecho internacional, podrían constituir violaciones del Tratado’ (emphasis added). 
145 Ibid., para. 357. 
146 Iberdrola Energía S.A. v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/5, Decision on Annulment of 13 
January 2015. 
147 This is the scenario discussed in Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (Canada) v. República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 
UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction of 22 April 2010, para. 137. The investor launched UNCITRAL arbitration 
even if the arbitration clause of the BIT made this means of dispute settlement available only if arbitration under 
ICSID (or its Additional Facility) was not available. Since the investor did not prove as much, the UNCITRAL tribunal 
declined jurisdiction. 
148 Taxation being a common example, see for instance US/Latvia BIT, Article 10. In other (more recent) agreements, 
taxation measures are not just excluded from the arbitration clause, but also from the application of the treaty at large. 
See for instance the Canada/Serbia BIT, Article 14(1); Egypt/Mauritius BIT, Article 2(3)(a). See also the case 
Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)04/6, Decision on Jurisdiction 
of 22 August 2008, in which at stake was the exclusion from the arbitration clause of the Canada/Venezuela BIT of 
any decision, by the host States, not to permit the acquisition of an existing enterprise (see Annex to the BIT, Article 
II(3)(b)). 
149 See August Reinisch, ‘How Narrow Are Narrow Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investment Treaties?’ (2011) 2 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement 1-60. 
150 Many BITs concluded by former centralised economy countries contain such clauses. Several cases have concerned 
the jurisdiction of tribunals entertaining claims based on Hungarian BITs, which have narrow arbitration clauses. See 
for instance Emmis International Holding, B.V., Emmis Radio Operating, B.V., MEM Magyar Electronic Media 
Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/2, Decision on Respondent’s 
Objection under ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5) of 11 March 2013, para. 70: ‘the plain text of the Treaties makes it 




entertain claims relating to other standards of protection (e.g., the FET), and it is doubtful whether 
it has jurisdiction to ascertain whether expropriation took place in the first place. 
In the case Sanum151 the tribunal concluded that determining the existence of expropriation (not 
just the quantum of compensation) fell within its jurisdiction, because the clause spoke of 
‘dispute[s] involving’152 the calculation of compensation for expropriation. The parties could have 
chosen a more restrictive language had they wanted the tribunal to only exercise jurisdictions only 
on disputes ‘limited to’ the amount of damages.153 Moreover, the BIT contained a fork-in-the-road 
provision barring access to arbitration for disputes on the quantum already submitted to domestic 
courts.154 This, in the tribunal’s view, was decisive in interpreting expansively the jurisdictional 
clause.155 A restrictive construction of the arbitration clause would have produced the absurd effect 
of forcing the investor to first address the expropriation claim to domestic courts. The domestic 
courts, in turn, would have necessarily to look into the issue of compensation to determine the 
existence of expropriation and its legality. As a result, all matters of compensation having been 
presented to domestic courts by necessity, the arbitration clause would never allow re-submission 
to arbitration, not even of the compensation claim alone.156 In other cases, in which the applicable 
BIT had no fork-in-the-road, the tribunal opted for the literal reading of the dispute settlement 
clause and declined to entertain questions regarding the existence of expropriation.157 
In Emmis v. Hungary, the investor had framed the claim as one of expropriation, thus fitting within 
the narrow boundaries of the applicable arbitration clause. The claim was nevertheless rejected at 
the jurisdictional stage for a defect ratione materiae. The tribunal found that the investor could not 
prove to have a property right that was capable of being dispossessed. Whereas the investor’s 
alleged rights might have been considered as investments protected by other clauses of the BIT, 
arbitration was possible only over expropriation claims. Accordingly, the tribunal had only 
competence ratione materiae over expropriable rights, of which the investor had none.158 
Sometimes, specific subject-matters are carved out from the scope of application of the whole 
treaty, rather than the compromissory clause alone. Oftentimes, investment treaties do not cover 
taxation measures of the host State, curtailing the jurisdiction of tribunals accordingly. In AMPAL, 
for instance, the tribunal upheld the limitation ratione materiae of Article XI of the US/Egypt BIT, 
                                                 
151 Sanum Investments Limited v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2013-13, 
jurisdictional award of 13 December 2013. 
152 BIT between China and Lao, Article 8(3). Emphasis added. 
153 Sanum v. Laos above (n 151) para. 329. 
154 Article 8(3), second sentence. 
155 Sanum v. Laos above (n 151) para. 340. 
156 The same conclusion was reached in the case Señor Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/6, Decision of Jurisdiction of 19 June 2009, para. 188. 
157 See for instance Vladimir and Moise Berschader v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No 080/2004, Award of 21 
April 2006, para. 153 and Austrian Airlines AG v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL Final Award of 9 October 2009. 
In the case ST-AD above (n 18), the applicable rule allowed no margin for interpretation. Article 4(3) of the 
Germany/Bulgaria BIT reads, in the relevant part: ‘the amount of the compensation shall … be reviewed … by means 
of an international arbitral tribunal.’ As the tribunal noted (para. 372), ‘the BIT provide[d] a “narrow door” to enter 
the realm of international arbitration.’ 
158 Emmis International Holding, B.V., Emmis Radio Operating, B.V., MEM Magyar Electronic Media Kereskedelmi 
és Szolgáltató Kft. v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/2, Award of 16 April 2014, para. 255. 
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noting however that the carve-out contained an exception for expropriatory measures.159 The 
tribunal, therefore, retained jurisdiction on fiscal measure only insofar as deprivation of property 
might have occurred. Another issue concerning subject-matter carve-outs is whether domestic law 
categories are relevant to determine whether a claim is covered or not by the exception. In Murphy 
v. Ecuador (UNCITRAL),160 the tribunal found that the domestic legal characterisation of a 
measure was not dispositive of the issue, but should be considered to interpret the treaty 
language.161 
The problem of MFN-based jurisdiction. 
Through the most-favoured nation (MFN) clauses, the investor can demand to be granted the better 
standard of protection (i.e., the better ‘treatment’) that the host State grants to investors of third 
States. These clauses permit to ‘import’ the provisions of other BITs concluded by the host State 
into the applicable one.162 The application of MFN clauses inevitably influences the jurisdiction 
ratione materiae of the tribunal.163 Importing a better standard of protection might entail a better 
chance of success for the investor’s claim on the merits (with wider obligations to observe, more 
State acts fall to be wrongful); sometimes, though, the use of an MFN clause can also result in an 
enlarged substantive scope of the BIT (when the State must observe additional obligations, more 
disputes fall to be covered by its jurisdictional clause).164 
In Société Générale v. the Dominican Republic165 the investor tried to secure the application of the 
wider definitions of investments contained in a comparator treaty. The tribunal did not allow this 
attempt, noting that the MFN applies to the treatment of investments, not to their definition.166 
                                                 
159 Ampal above (n 23) para. 266-267. 
160 Murphy Exploration & Production Company International v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012-16 
(formerly AA 434), Partial Final Award of 6 May 2016. 
161 Ibid., para. 161 and 185. See also Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5 
(formerly Burlington Resources Inc. and others v. Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador 
(PetroEcuador)), Decision on Jurisdiction of 2 June 2010, para. 159 ff. 
162 Unless the parties agree, in the relevant text, that the provisions in a separate agreement shall not, per se, constitute 
treatment. See for instance Article 8.7.4 of CETA, which not only removes jurisdictional provisions from the scope 
of the MFN clauses, but clarifies that substantive provisions in other BITs, per se, do not constitute treatment. See 
also Article of the 2016 India Model BIT. 
163 See, below, how the MFN is sometimes used in relation to the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the tribunal. 
164 See RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. V079/2005, award on jurisdiction of 1 October 
2007, para. 131: ‘indeed the application of the MFN clause … widens the scope of [the arbitration clause] and thus 
is in conflict to its limitation, this is a normal result of the application of MFN clauses, the very character and intention 
of which is that protection not accepted in one treaty is widened by transferring the protection accorded in another 
treaty’. Nota bene: if the arbitration clause refers to claims based on specific standards of the treaty other than the 
MFN, an MFN-based claim might fall outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction. See WNC above (n 122) para. 353. 
165 Société Générale v. The Dominican Republic above (n 59). 
166 Ibid., para. 40-41. Other cases involving the invocation of an MFN clause to expand the applicable notions of 
investor or investments include Yaung Chi Oo above (n 112) para. 64; HICEE B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-11, Partial Award of 23 May 2011, para. 149 (‘[the MFN clause] cannot 
legitimately be used to broaden the definition of the investors or the investments themselves’); Vannessa Ventures 
above (n 148); Rafat Ali Rizvi v Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/13, Award on Jurisdiction of 16 July 
2013, para. 220 (the Tribunal took notice of the parties’ agreement that the MFN cannot be used ‘to alter the BIT’s 
definition of “investment”’) and para. 225 (since the investment did not satisfy the admission requirements in the 
original BIT, there was no ‘treatment’ thereunder to begin with, and the MFN clause could not apply); MetalTech Ltd. 
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Often, MFN clauses are invoked to import advantageous procedural provisions from external 
treaties. The attempt is made, understandably, when the arbitration clause in the applicable treaty 
refers only to a specific category of disputes (e.g., to disputes on the calculation of compensation 
for expropriation). The arbitration clause of an external treaty, covering all investment disputes 
without limitations, would serve the investor better. In Sanum, the tribunal rebuked the investor’s 
attempt to use the MFN clause to bypass the narrow applicable arbitration clause and bring an 
expropriation claim. It refused to read into the MFN clause referring to ‘protection’ an extensive 
dispute settlement provision, referring to the parties’ assumed consent as the baseline: 
[hearing the MFN-claim] would result in a substantial re-write of the Treaty and an 
extension of the States Parties’ consent to arbitration beyond what may be assumed to have 
been their intention, given the limited reach of the Treaty protection and dispute settlement 
clauses. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that it has no jurisdiction for claims submitted under 
[the MFN clause] of the Treaty.167 
The Rosinvestco tribunal, instead, concluded differently, mainly based on the more comprehensive 
wording of the applicable MFN clause,168 which also covered the investor’s ‘use’ and ‘enjoyment’ 
of the investment.169 
A more common occurrence is the investor’s invocation of MFN to circumvent certain procedural 
duties that are not required in the external treaty.170 MFN clauses have often been invoked to skip 
cooling-off periods and compulsory periods of domestic litigation. The arbitral practice in this 
respect is infamously ambivalent and has led States to expressly exclude this possibility in recent 
treaties and model BITs.171 In Maffezini v. Spain the tribunal allowed the investor’s use of the 
MFN to skip the 18-month cooling-off requirement in the Argentina/Spain BIT.172 In Salini v. 
                                                 
v Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award of 4 October 2013, para. 145 (‘one must be under the 
treaty to claim through the treaty’) emphasis in the original. 
167 Sanum, above (n 151). Note that, as clarified above, the tribunal had already found an alternative basis to entertain 
the expropriation claim under the arbitration clause of the China/Lao BIT, hence the rejection of the MFN-claim did 
not change the outcome of the jurisdictional decision. A similar rejection of the claimant’s attempt to extend the 
arbitration clause occurred in the cases Telenor above (n 60) para. 81-82 and Accession Mezzanine Capital L.P. and 
Danubius Kereskedöház Vagyonkezelö Zrt. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/3, Decision on Respondent’s 
Objection under Arbitration Rule 41(5) of 16 January 2013, para. 74: ‘In the instant case, the arbitrable scope of the 
basic treaty is expropriation, including fact and law questions related thereto. In that light, Claimants are entitled to 
rely on the MFN provisions of the BIT, but only insofar as such provisions relate to expropriation.’ 
168 Art 3(2) of the UK-Russia BIT. 
169 RosInvestCo above (n 164) para. 130. 
170 The uncertainty in the case-law has served as fertile ground for scholarly commentaries. See Kaj Hober, ‘MFN 
Clauses and Dispute Resolution in Investment Treaties: Have we reached the end of the road?’ in Cristina Binder, 
Ursula Kriebaum, August Reinisch, Stephan Wittich (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century (OUP 
2009) 31; Julie A Maupin, ‘MFN-based Jurisdiction in Investor–State Arbitration: Is There Any Hope for a Consistent 
Approach?’ (2011) 14(1) Journal of International Economic Law 157-190; Stephan W Schill, ‘Allocating 
Adjudicatory Authority: Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses as a Basis of Jurisdiction—A Reply to Zachary Douglas’ 
(2011) 2(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 353-371. 
171 For instance, see Article 9(3) of the TPP: ‘For greater certainty, the treatment referred to [in the MFN clause] does 
not encompass international dispute resolution procedures or mechanisms, such as those included in Section B 
(Investor-State Dispute Settlement).’ See also Article 8.7(4) of CETA. 
172 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction of 25 
January 2000, para. 64. 
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Jordan,173 instead, the tribunal refused to apply the MFN of the Italy/Jordan BIT to extend the 
consent to arbitrate over contractual disputes (the Jordanian BITs with USA and UK contained 
wider litigation clauses174). The Plama v. Bulgaria tribunal similarly declined to accept MFN-
based jurisdiction.175 In that case, since the applicable BIT between Bulgaria and Cyprus only 
provided for arbitration regarding the amount of compensation, the claimant attempted to reach 
out for another Bulgarian BIT which contained a more comprehensive arbitration clause, and 
establish the tribunal jurisdiction on it. 
The subsequent cases diverge in outcome, and the contradiction cannot be ascribed only to the 
textual differences between the treaties. Tribunals siding with the Plama/Salini approach176 
normally rely on the ejusdem generis principle, whereby the MFN can only operate with respect 
to clauses of the same kind177 of those in the original BIT; since procedural rights are not 
‘treatment’ (i.e., substantive treatment), MFN provisions cannot be used to enhance and expand 
them.178 Another objection to the use of MFN to extend the jurisdiction of the tribunal is a logical 
one: if the claimant cannot show to enjoy protection under the original treaty, there cannot be any 
‘treatment,’ less favourable or other, on which to plant the MFN clause to reach for a better 
treatment in a comparator treaty.179 Finally, when the MFN refers to treatment ‘in the territory’ of 
the host State, recourse to international arbitration appears ill-fitted to the text of the clause, since 
arbitration proceedings rarely if ever take place in the territory of the host State.180 
The arbitral progeny of Maffezini, instead,181 often notes that access to arbitration is one of the 
most important forms of protection of investors. As such, its falls under the notion of ‘treatment’ 
                                                 
173 Salini v. Jordan above (n 58). 
174 For instance, Article IX(1) of the Jordan/US BIT reads, in the relevant part: ‘an investment dispute is a dispute … 
arising out of or relating to an investment authorization, an investment agreement or an alleged breach of any right 
conferred, created or recognized by this Treaty with respect to a covered investment’ (emphasis added). 
175 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction of 8 
February 2005, para. 184. 
176 Berschader above (n 157) (with a dissenting opinion on the point by Weiler); Telenor above (n 60); Wintershall 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award of 8 December 2008; Renta 4 S.V.S.A, 
Ahorro Corporación Emergentes F.I., Ahorro Corporación Eurofondo F.I., Rovime Inversiones SICAV S.A., Quasar 
de Valors SICAV S.A., Orgor de Valores SICAV S.A., GBI 9000 SICAV S.A. v. The Russian Federation, SCC No. 
24/2007, Award on Preliminary Objections of 20 March 2009 (with a separate opinion by Brower); Tza Yap Shum 
above (n 156); Austrian Airlines above (n 157) (with a dissenting opinion by Brower); ICS Inspection and Control 
Services Limited (United Kingdom) v. The Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2010-9, Award on 
Jurisdiction of 10 February 2012; Daimler v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award of 22 August 2012 (with 
a dissenting opinion by Brower). 
177 For an overview of the principle, see Endre Ustor, ‘International Law Commission: The Most-Favoured-Nation 
Clause’ (1977) 11(5) Journal of World Trade 462; the International Law Commission is currently working on a report 
on MFN clauses, see Article 9(1) of the UN Draft Articles on the MFN Clause. See also Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 2015, vol. II. Unsurprisingly, as of 2015, one of the conclusions of the ILC was that ‘[t]he central 
interpretative issue in respect of the MFN clauses relates to the scope of the clause and the application of the ejusdem 
generis principle.’ 
178 See, for instance, Telenor above (n 60) para. 90 ff. 
179 ST-AD above (n 18) para. 397-398: ‘consent has to be exchanged first, under the conditions stated in the BIT, 
before the Tribunal can even discuss the scope of the MFN clause.’ In this case, the MFN clause was in contained in 
the same article providing for arbitration, weakening the ejusdem generis objection to its use. 
180 Berschader above (n 157) 185; ICS above (n 176) para. 309. 
181 Camuzzi above (n 87); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales 
del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction of 16 May 2006; 
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used in MFN clauses, and there is no analytically compelling value to the distinction between 
‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ provisions.182 In truth, whereas the substantive/procedural divide is 
descriptively valid, it is not clear why it should self-evidently correspond to the outer limits of the 
MFN’s reach. Nor is it clear why, as the White Industrial v. India tribunal seemingly conceded, 
the use of MFN clauses to import dispute settlement provision should ‘have the effect of 
fundamentally subverting the carefully negotiated balance of the BIT in question’183 more than the 
importation of substantive standards of protection would. In both cases, ultimately, the host State 
would be bound by international obligations it did not bargain expressly for in the original treaty, 
but this is not inherently troublesome: the carefully negotiated balance of a treaty in fact 
incorporates, if an MFN clause is inserted, the parties’ wish that their obligations evolve and 
expand.184 
In the EDF case185 a further permutation was attempted: the use of an MFN clause to import into 
the basic treaty an umbrella clause.186 The tribunal upheld the investor’s attempt; it recognised the 
divergence of opinions regarding the use of MFN to import dispute settlement clauses but 
ultimately noted that by permitting the importation of an umbrella clause the tribunal simply 
brought ‘into consideration the clearly substantive provisions requiring respect for explicit host 
state undertakings such as concession agreements.’187 A similar attempt failed in Paushok v. 
Mongolia, because the MFN clause in the applicable BIT operated only with respect to the FET 
treatment; hence, it could not be used to invoke ‘completely new substantive rights, such as those 
granted under an umbrella clause’.188 In Impregilo, the tribunal noted that the investor was 
                                                 
Telefónica above (n 64); National Grid plc v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction of 20 
June 2006; AWG Group v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2006; Hochtief 
AG v. Argentina, ICSID Case no. ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction of 24 October 2011 (with a dissenting opinion 
on the point by Thomas); Teinver above (n 14) (with a dissenting opinion by Hossain). 
182 Tomoko Ishikawa, ‘Interpreting the Most-Favoured-nation Clause in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Interpretation 
as a Process of Creating an obligation?’, in Charles J G Sampford, Spencer Zifcak, Derya Aydın Okur (eds), 
Rethinking International Law and Justice (Ashgate 2015) 127, 129. See Werner Schneider, acting in his capacity as 
insolvency administrator of Walter Bau Ag (In Liquidation) v. The Kingdom of Thailand, UNCITRAL (formerly 
Walter Bau AG (in liquidation) v. The Kingdom of Thailand), Award of 1 July 2009, para. 9.71. See also the Separate 
Opinion of Charles N Brower to Austrian Airlines above (n 157), para. 4-5, on why the word ‘treatment’ cannot be 
held to implicitly exclude procedural benefits. 
183 White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award of 30 November 2011, 
para. 11.2.1-3, referring to India’s reliance on a passage of Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew 
Weininger, International Investment Arbitration (OUP 2007) which had gained the endorsement of the Wintershall 
tribunal, see Wintershall above (n 176) para. 188-189. 
184 The precise function of MFN clauses is to expand the obligations of the treaty parties. It allows each treaty party 
to benefit from the progresses in draftmanship and standard-setting that are necessary to align future treaties to the 
ever-evolving economic practice. See Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘Most Favored-Nation Standard in British State 
Practice’ (1945) 22 Brit. YB Int'l L. 96-121, 99-100: ‘the use of the m.f.n. standard leads to the constant self-adaptation 
of such treaties and greatly contributes to the rationalization of international affairs.’  
185 EDF above (n 78). 
186 On the issue, see the analysis in Tarcisio Gazzini and Attila Tanzi, ‘Handle with care: Umbrella clauses and MFN 
treatment in investment arbitration’ (2013) 14 Journal of World Investment and Trade 978-994. 
187 EDF above (n 78) para. 931. The attempt was also granted in Mr. Franck Charles Arif v. Republic of Moldova, 
ICSID ARB/11/23, Award of 8 April 2013. The tribunal confirmed the substantive nature of the umbrella clauses in 
para. 395.  
188 Paushok v. Mongolia above (n 114) para. 570. See Articles 3(1) and 3(2) of the Russia/Mongolia BIT. A similar 
conclusion was reached in WNC above (n 122) para. 349, because the arbitration clause did not list the MFN clause 
among the clauses that might be invoked, hence ruling out altogether the possibility of MFN-based jurisdiction. 
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challenging the breach of contracts into which it had entered not with the host State, but with its 
instrumentalities. Therefore, the importation of an umbrella clause, even if accepted arguendo, 
would have not assisted its claim, for lack of privity.189 In Teinver v. Argentina, the MFN clause 
covered ‘all matters governed by [the original BIT]’ and, since the original treaty did not include 
an umbrella clause, the importation of one such clause from a third treaty was not warranted.190 In 
other words, the language of the treaty codified an ejusdem generis requirement that left no space 
to interpretation. The Tribunal took pains to distinguish MTD and Bayindir, which apparently 
reached a different conclusion. In MTD v. Chile, the MFN clause was internal to the FET one, and 
the tribunal considered the imported treatment191 to fall under the FET standard of protection.192 
In Bayindir v. Pakistan, the tribunal allowed the importing of an FET clause, even if there was 
none in the original treaty. However, the preamble of the original treaty referred to fair and 
equitable treatment, and the MFN clause was not expressly restricted to the matters covered by the 
treaty.193 As a result, this line of awards is not at odds with the ejusdem generis principle. The 
claimant in Teinver succeeded, however, to import the full protection and security standard from 
a comparator treaty.194 
At the moment, it is impossible to reconcile the different schools of thought through hair-splitting 
distinguishing or conceptual discrimination (for instance, arguing that an MFN can successfully 
circumvent pre-litigation requirements, but not create a competence that does not exist in the 
original treaty).195 It is, perhaps, not a coincidence that treaty parties are increasingly resorting to 
a more sophisticated language in MFN clauses, for the avoidance of doubts,196 and that tribunals 
are increasingly reluctant to pronounce on the matter, using judicial economy to avoid it when 
possible197 or questioning the possibility that a treaty investment clause, as such, constitutes 
treatment.198 Occasionally, the tribunals can sidestep the controversy relying on the text of the 
applicable MFN, which expressly extends to the dispute settlement provisions of the original 
treaty. One such case is Garanti Koza v. Turkmenistan,199 in which the tribunal – not without 
                                                 
189 Impregilo v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan above (n 64) para, 223. 
190 Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/09/1, Award of the Tribunal of 21 July 2017para. 884. 
191 Regarding the obligation to award permits to an approved investment.  
192 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile SA v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award of 25 May 2004, para. 104. 
193 Bayindir above (n 38) para. 155. 
194 Teinver above (n 190) para. 896-897. 
195 Schreuer 2012, above (n 88) 855. 
196 Whereas the more common occurrence is the exclusion of dispute settlement provisions from the application of the 
MFN clause, sometimes drafters opt for the opposite clarification, i.e., they include expressly the consent to arbitration 
under the treatment covered by the MFN. See, for instance, Article 3(3) of the UK Model BIT 2008, available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2847, and the comment in Chester Brown and Audley 
Sheppard, ‘United Kingdom’ in Chester Brown (ed), Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties (OUP 
2013) 697, 728. See also CETA, 2016, Article 8.7.4. 
197 In some recent cases, the tribunals held that pre-arbitration requirements were not compulsory, thus rendering the 
attempt at circumventing them through an MFN clause unnecessary. See Alemanni above (n 32) para. 317; Muhammet 
Çap Sehil Inşaat Endustri Ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/6, Decision on Respondent’s 
Jurisdiction under Article VII(2) of 13 February 2015, para. 282. 
198 İçkale above (n 46) para. 332 (the tribunal observed that MFN-based treatment can only be invoked to remedy 
actual discrimination and not to import treaty provisions in the abstract, in light of the ‘in similar situations’ language 
of the applicable MFN clause).  
199 Garanti Koza LLP v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/20, Decision on the Objection to Jurisdiction for 
Lack of Consent of 3 July 2013. 
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expressing some relief200 – upheld the investor’s attempt to accede ICSID arbitration, which was 
unavailable under the original BIT but was offered as an alternative in the comparator BIT.201 This 
conclusion was reached based on the text of the applicable MFN clause, which confirmed ‘[f]or 
the avoidance of doubt … that the treatment provided for in [the MFN clause] shall apply to the 
provisions of Articles 1 to 11 of [the BIT, Article 8 being the provision codifying the States’ consent 
to arbitration]’.202 The same outcome was reached in Venezuela US v. Venezuela, where a 
similarly worded MFN clause was found to grant access to UNCITRAL arbitration, unavailable 
in the original treaty but offered in the comparator BIT.203 
The latter case highlights a bolder use of the MFN clause: whereas in Garanti v. Turkmenistan 
access to ICSID arbitration was simply preferable for the investor than ad hoc arbitration, in 
Venezuela US v. Venezuela the MFN-based access to UNCITRAL arbitration was vital for the 
investor’s claim, the original BIT offering no viable arbitration system. For this reason, the tribunal 
took pains to highlight that Venezuela had indeed ‘given its consent’204 to arbitration in the original 
BIT, and the MFN only assisted the investor to bypass ‘the conditions for resorting to arbitration’ 
therein,205 which had become unfulfillable after Venezuela’s withdrawal from ICISD. The 
dissenting arbitrator took issue with this decision, noting that the MFN had been used to import an 
arbitration offer into a treaty that had none (better: none available any longer).206 
In Menzies v. Senegal, the investor made an extreme attempt to use an MFN clause in the absence 
of an applicable BIT. It invoked the MFN clause of the GATS agreement207 to benefit from the 
arbitration clauses of BITs between the host State and third States. The tribunal found that the 
attempt to ‘compose’ the State’s consent by ‘gluing together’ several instruments ‘[wa]s a manifest 
example of a “consent” to arbitration that is equivocal and doubtful.’208 In any event, it noted that 
even if the MFN clause in the GATS could be construed to cover arbitration, it created an 
obligation to consent (which the State could chose to disregard), not a valid expression of consent 
(that the investor could accept).209 
                                                 
200 Ibid., para. 42: ‘Fortunately, perhaps, the present case does not require this Tribunal to take a position on the 
policy issues implicated in deciding whether an MFN clause ought to be applied to the investor-state arbitration 
article of a BIT.’ 
201 Ibid., para. 75-76. Boisson de Chazournes appended a dissenting opinion to the award, arguing that the investor’s 
claim sought to bypass the requirement of consent (ibid., para. 78) but the tribunal found that consent to arbitration 
had been given, the MFN only operating to expand the choice of procedural venues available to the investor. 
202 See Article 3(3) of the UK/Turkmenistan BIT. 
203 Venezuela US, S.R.L. (Barbados) v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, PCA Case No. 2013-34, Interim Award on 
Jurisdiction on the Respondent Objection to Jurisdiction Ratione Voluntatis of 26 July 2016.  
204 Ibid., para. 109. 
205 Ibid., para. 111. 
206 Dissenting Opinion of Professor Marcelo G Kohen (on the Respondent’s Objection to Jurisdiction Ratione 
Voluntatis), para. 5. 
207 Stipulated in the framework of the World Trade Organisation. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1B 
of the WTO Agreement, 1869 UNTS 183; 33 ILM 1167 (1994), see Article II. 
208 Menzies above (n 18) para. 135. 
209 Ibid., para. 140. 
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Some of the cases in which the MFN clauses are invoked to elude pre-arbitration procedural 
requirements raise critical issues for the present study. These are discussed in detail in the next 
Part. 
Investments of financial nature 
What counts as investment determines in practice the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Hence, 
the instrument that records the parties’ consent to arbitration (the investment treaty or the 
investment stateute) is the starting point of any inquiry into whether the asset of the claimants 
qualify as protected investments.210 The analysis usually involves understanding what 
‘investment’ means in the applicable source, a task often facilitated by the inclusion of a clause 
providing a definition. When the claim is brought before the ICSID, the applicability of the 
Convention is a further condition for establishing the tribunal’s jurisdiction. As a result, what 
‘investment’ means in the Convention is also relevant, in addition.211 
Respondent States might challenge the notion that intangible assets – like financial interests – are 
protected investments. Economic interests with no physical medium complicate the analysis 
ratione loci (there might be an investment, but is doubtful whether it is made in the relevant 
territory, see below) and are often challenged as investments tout court.  
Already in 1997 did the Fedax tribunal find that promissory notes were investments.212 It relied on 
the negotiating history of the ICSID Convention and the consensus regarding long term loan 
contracts with public authorities. Essentially, it discarded the idea that only direct investments 
were covered by the ICSID Convention and by open-ended BITs, confirmed that the requirement 
ratione loci can be satisfied also when the investment’s economic contribution is not physically 
transferred into the territory of the host State,213 and pointed out that transactions backed-up by the 
State’s exercise of governmental powers cannot be considered ordinary commercial 
transactions.214  
                                                 
210 Such inquiry is moot, of course, when the arbitration clause is contained in an investment contract. In that case 
the parties have expressly confirmed their consent to make arbitration available to disputes relating to the underlying 
asset (the problem might remain to ensure the application of the ICSID Convention, when the claim is brought 
before the Centre). 
211 See above, part 1.1 titled The interplay between ICSID and the instrument of specific jurisdiction. 
212 Fedax above (n 43). 
213 Ibid., see para. 41: ‘The important question is whether the funds made available are utilized by the beneficiary of 
the credit, as in the case of the [host State], so as to finance its various governmental needs.’ Likewise, see Gold 
Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award of 22 September 2014 para. 
261: ‘According to the ordinary meaning of the words, “making an investment in the territory of Venezuela” does not 
require that there must be a movement of capital or other values across Venezuelan borders.’ 
214 Ibid., para. 42. 
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On several occasions, it has been disputed whether loans could qualify as investments.215 In 
Deutsche Bank v. Sri Lanka,216 at stake was whether an oil hedging agreement217 was an 
investment. The tribunal rejected the host State’s contention that ‘claims to money’ – one of the 
investment’s definitions in the treaty – needed to relate to a separate investment to obtain 
protection under the relevant BIT.218 It then turned to the requirements ratione materiae inherent 
in Article 25 ICSID. The tribunal found that the hedging agreement was no ordinary commercial 
transaction,219 given the lengthy negotiation which preceded it and the involvement of several 
high-rank State officers. Critically, the tribunal also rejected the argument that the hedging 
agreement was in fact a speculative transaction and, as a consequence, was null ab initio.220 This 
conclusion was particularly delicate because an English court221 and a commercial tribunal 
established at the London Court of International Arbitration222 had reached opposite conclusions 
in similar disputes initiated by other banks against Sri Lankan entities. Other financial transactions 
which did not satisfy the minimum objective criteria of an investment (duration, financial 
contribution, risk) were not accepted by other arbitral tribunals, such as the temporary transfer of 
shares223 or the purchase of fiscal credits.224 
In the case of Poštová Banka v. Greece,225 the tribunal held that sovereign bonds did not constitute 
protected investments under the applicable BIT. This conclusion was reached even though the 
Slovakia – Greece BIT defined investments as ‘every kind of asset’,226 and provided an illustrative 
list of ‘particular’ though ‘not exclusive[]’ examples which included ‘loans’ and ‘claims to 
money.’ The tribunal reasoned that the list had a narrowing function in spite of its open-endedness 
(otherwise it would have served no purpose).227 Varying lists in different treaties might point to a 
different constellation of investments under each instrument. Whereas the Fedax, Abaclat and 
Ambiente Ufficio tribunals drew reassurance from the illustrative lists of the respective BITs 
                                                 
215 CSOB above (n 47) para. 77; Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award of 8 
November 2010, para. 273. 
216 Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, Award of 31 October 
2012. 
217 Oil hedging agreements are derivative transactions, essentially oil future contracts. The Sri Lankan state oil 
corporation sought to offset the financial risk deriving from the expected increase of oil price and concluded the 
agreement with Deutsche Bank. The agreed strike price (the threshold used to determine which party should 
compensate the other for flotation in the price) was 112.5$ per barrel, at a time when the price on the market was 
comfortably higher (137$). In July 2008, however, oil price dropped by roughly 60%. Accordingly, the State company 
was bound contractually to make massive payments to the investor and tried to restructure the agreement – hence the 
dispute. 
218 Deutsche Bank v. Sri Lanka above (n 216) para. 286. 
219 Ibid., para. 310. 
220 Since the State company that entered the agreement had no power to conclude speculative transactions, the 
distinction was critical for the validity of the investment.  
221 Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon Petroleum Corporation [2011] EWHC 1785 (Comm) (11 July 2011). 
222 Citibank N.A. v. Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, First Partial Award, LCIA ab# 81215, 31 July 2011. 
223 Saba Fakes above (n 45) para. 140-148. 
224 Nations Energy Corporation, Electric Machinery Enterprises Inc., and Jamie Jurado v. The Republic of Panama, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/19, Award of 24 November 2010, para. 430. The claimant had indeed made an actual 
investment in a company, but the tribunal paused to consider whether the expropriated asset (the fiscal credits) could 
be regarded as an investment in its own right. 
225 Poštová Banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. The Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, Award of 9 April 
2015. 
226 Article 1(1).  
227 Poštová Banka above (n 225) para. 288. 
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(which pointed at public securities, listing ‘obligations’ and ‘public titles’228), the Slovakia/Greece 
BIT only referred to loans of a commercial kind, and would not cover State bonds.229 This 
conclusion is not very compelling: the effet utile of an illustrative list can very well be to avoid 
doubts rather than delimit the application ratione materiae of the treaty contrary to its express 
language (which embraces ‘every kind of asset’).230 Moreover, interpretation based on the 
comparison with treaties concluded by different parties is not sanctioned by the VCLT and appears 
to stretch the notion of context in an unwarranted way.231 
The case Alps Finance v. Slovakia is even more interesting because it was resolved through 
UNCITRAL proceedings, hence without the necessity to impose the objective, inferred 
requirements of the ICSID Convention on the notion of investment. At stake was the possibility to 
qualify a contract of purchase of receivables as investment under the loose terms of the applicable 
BIT.232 Nevertheless, the tribunal adopted the now-familiar Salini criteria to conclude that the 
contract did not satisfy the minimum requirements that an investment should satisfy (duration, 
risk, contribution) and was better characterised as a one-off transaction.233 The tribunal also 
observed that since ICSID arbitration was available under the BIT, the parties ‘must have 
inevitably intended to refer to what constitutes “investment” under the ICSID Convention’.234 A 
similar approach permeated the reasoning of the Nova Scotia v. Venezuela (ICSID AF) tribunal.235 
Convinced that the definition of investments must hinge on some inherent meaning, irrespective 
of the BIT’s open-endedness and the applicability (or not) of Article 25 ICSID, the tribunal noted: 
It cannot be the case that the scope of “investment” in a bilateral investment treaty changes 
depending on the arbitral forum. No matter what the forum, the ordinary meaning of 
                                                 
228 Ibid., para. 306-307. 
229 Ibid., para. 303. 
230 In Hassan Awdi above (n 47), para. 198-200, for instance, the tribunal took the view that since the US/Romania 
BIT covered ‘every kind of investment,’ it was sufficient to find an economic contribution by the claimant to be 
satisfied as regards the investment requirement. 
231 On this procedure, see Andrew D Mitchell and James Munro, ‘Someone Else’s Deal: Interpreting International 
Investment Agreements in the Light of Third-Party Agreements’ (2017) European Journal of International Law 
(forthcoming). 
232 Alps Finance and Trade AG v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Award of 5 March 2011. The BIT between 
Slovak Republic and Switzerland, referring to ‘every kind of assets’ under Article 1(2). 
233 Ibid., para. 241-245. See also Malaysian Historical Salvors above (n 42) para. 107-146. Likewise, see Romak S.A. 
(Switzerland) v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, PCA Case No. AA280 (UNCITRAL Rules), Award of 26 November 
2009, para. 205: ‘Contracting States can even go as far as stipulating that a “pure” one-off sales contract constitutes 
an investment, even if such a transaction would not normally be covered by the ordinary meaning of the term 
“investment.” However, in such cases, the wording of the instrument in question must leave no room for doubt that 
the intention of the contracting States was to accord to the term “investment” an extraordinary and counterintuitive 
meaning. … the wording of the BIT does not permit the Arbitral Tribunal to infer such an intent in the present case.’ 
The presumption that sale contracts cannot qualify as investments is such that an ICSID tribunal dismissed through 
the expedite proceedings of Rule 41(5) a case in which the claimants claimed to hold investments in the form of sale 
and purchase contracts with the government of the host State. See Global Trading above (n 71). 
234 Alps Finance above (n 232) para. 239. 
235 Nova Scotia Power Incorporated v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/1, Award of 
30 April 2014. 
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investment in the relevant bilateral investment treaty derives from something more than a 
list of examples and calls for an examination of the inherent features of an investment.236 
In ultimate analysis, the essential elements of an investment (duration, risk and economic 
contribution) may now be inevitably considered by some to represent the non-negotiable minimum 
in investor-State arbitration.237 Even when the objective standards inferred from the ICSID 
Convention do not apply, the definitions of the treaty may nonetheless also be inferred as de facto 
minimum requirements as part of the analysis of definitions found in the applicable instrument. 
Consider the reasoning of the tribunal in Mytilineos238 with respect to certain contractual rights of 
the claimant. Since the applicable treaty covered ‘every kind of asset’ including ‘claims to money,’ 
the tribunal held that it was unnecessary to investigate the entrepreneurial risk shouldered by the 
claimants or its commitment of capital, or to make sure that the investment entailed something 
more than a sale of services.239 The tribunal was content with noting that the language of the treaty 
(the only requirement which needed to be met, given the inapplicability of ICSID240) would include 
any economic activity. Nevertheless, it took pains to note, somewhat unnecessarily, that the 
claimant’s contracts provided for the ‘establishment of a long-term business relationship’ and 
entailed ‘a significant contribution to [the host State’s] development,’ that the claimant expected 
‘various returns and profits’ and that the engagement ‘was substantial in monetary terms and also 
not without risks’.241 
3. Ratione Temporis 
The time at which several relevant facts occur (e.g., the making of the investment, the entry into 
force or the termination of a treaty, the alleged breach, the acquisition of a different nationality, 
the arising of a dispute, the bringing of a claim, its registration) might therefore also affect the 
jurisdiction ratione temporis of the tribunal.242 A few aspects of this proposition are discussed 
below. 
The critical dates 
                                                 
236 Ibid., para. 80. See also the illuminating treatment of the subject by Paulsson in Pantechniki above (n 90) para. 32-
49. However, the tribunal seemed to do precisely what it professed to avoid: determining the meaning of investment 
through an analysis of the procedural rules – rather than the intent of the parties. Its conclusion proceeds from the 
concern to make one notion of investment applicable to disputes governed by different procedural rules. However, 
one could argue that the notion selected is, in fact, derived from the interpretation of the ICSID Convention. 
237 See also Orascom above (n 48) para. 372, using the three elements as the minimum and sufficient test, and rejecting 
the suggestion that an indirect participation obtained through a corporate restructuring could not qualify as investment, 
for lack of a genuine investing mind-set (para. 376). 
238 Mytilineos Holdings SA v. The State Union of Serbia & Montenegro and Republic of Serbia, UNCITRAL, Partial 
Award on Jurisdiction of 8 September 2006. 
239 Ibid., para. 104-105. 
240 Ibid., para. 118. 
241 Ibid., para. 124.  
242 For a full study of the topic, see Nick Gallus, The Temporal Jurisdiction of Tribunals (OUP 2017). 
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Treaty-based protection of investments starts with the entry into force of the applicable treaty,243 
unless otherwise specified.244 As a result, the jurisdiction of a tribunal seised with a treaty claim 
will exist only with respect to violations and disputes arisen after that date,245 sometimes subject 
to an explicit time bar for the submission of the claim after the claimant has constructive 
knowledge of the breach.246 This is the conclusion dictated by the principle of non-retroactivity of 
treaties.247 Consider how the Berkowitz v. Costa Rica tribunal set out the critical dates, when called 
to determine two concurring jurisdictional objection ratione temporis, i.e., that a) the breach had 
occurred before the treaty’s enter into force and b) that the claim was filed more than three years 
after the claimant knew or should have known about the breach: 
If the Claimants cannot establish, to an objective standard, that they first acquired 
knowledge of the breaches and losses that they allege in the period after 10 June 2010 [i.e., 
three years before the claim], they fall at the first hurdle. To surmount this obstacle, each 
claimant must show, in respect of each property claim, that they have a cause of action, a 
distinct and legally significant event that is capable of founding a claim in its own right, of 
                                                 
243 Société Générale v. The Dominican Republic above (n 59) para. 80; ST-AD above (n 18) para. 300.  
244 The obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, codified in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969, cannot be construed to entail the retroactive application of the treaty’s obligation since 
its signature, see M.C.I. Power Group L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case ARB/03/6, 
Award of 31 July 2007, para. 117. Specific treaties might contain express provisions requiring the provisional 
application before ratification, like the Energy Charter Treaty (see Article 45 and the award in Hulley Enterprises 
Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 226, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility of 30 November 2009, para. 394-395. 
245 Société Générale v. The Dominican Republic above (n 59) para. 84. 
246 For instance, Article 1116(2) NAFTA disallows investment claims made after three years from the date of the 
breach (or the date the investor knew or should have known about it). See Apotex Inc. v. The Government of the United 
States of America, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 14 June 2013, para. 314. Likewise, the 
investor’s claim was rejected under ICSID Rule 41(5) in the case Ansung above (n 71), because the institution of 
ICSID proceedings occurred more than three years after the claimant first acquired knowledge of its loss (see Article 
9(7) of the China-Korea BIT). A similar provision was included in Article XII of the Canada/Venezuela BIT, see 
Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, Award of 22 August 2016, 
para. 190 ff. The tribunal considered whether acts committed more than three years before the claim could be 
considered jointly with the acts occurring after. Because the two sets of measures were factually distinct, the tribunal 
accepted to consider the investor’s claims separately, and bar the claims relating to the measures occurred before the 
cut-off date (para. 231). See also William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton 
and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction 
and Liability of 17 March 2015, para. 266. There have not been cases in which a claim was considered time-barred in 
application of general considerations of procedural fairness, see Wena Hotels LTD. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 2000, para. 104–105; Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Georgia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Award of 3 March 2010, para. 104–106, 261, 264–268. In fact, the available information 
regarding the cases World Wide Minerals v. Kazakhstan suggests that time bars do not operate implicitly over treaty 
claims (a Canadian investor seeking to obtain redress from Kazakhstan for acts occurred in the late ‘90s first saw its 
claim thrown out due to a statutory time bar in the domestic investment law, then succeeded at the jurisdictional stage 
when it invoked a Russian BIT as jurisdictional basis in lieu of the domestic statute, see respectively World Wide 
Minerals v. Republic of Kazakhstan, UNCITRAL (Case 1), Award of 22 December 2010 and World Wide Minerals 
v. Republic of Kazakhstan, UNCITRAL (Case 2), Decision on Jurisdiction of 15 October 2015). See also CAFTA 
Article 10.18.1, as applied in Aaron C. Berkowitz, Brett E. Berkowitz and Trevor B. Berkowitz (formerly Spence 
International Investments and others) v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/13/2, Interim Award of 25 
October 2016, para.  
247 Lao Holdings NV. v. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/6, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 21 February 2014, para. 113-118. 
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which they first became aware in the period after 10 June 2010. If they can establish this, 
a further jurisdictional question arises, namely, whether, in the circumstances of each claim 
presented, that post-critical limitation date cause of action can be sufficiently detached from 
acts or facts that pre-date the CAFTA’s entry into force on 1 January 2009 so as to be 
independently justiciable, even if it may be appropriate still to have regard to pre-1 
January 2009 conduct and developments for purposes of determining whether there was a 
subsequent breach of a CAFTA obligation.248 
In other words, the tribunal noted that for the tribunal to have jurisdiction the claimant must show 
two things. First, that a distinct breach breach occurred after the treaty’s enter into force, which is 
sufficiently unrelated to prior events. Second, that knowledge of such breach occurred after the 
critical date of three years before the claim.249  
Normally there is no precise indication in the applicable treaties of the chronological interplay 
between the tenets of jurisdiction – nationality, investment, breach, dispute, filing of the claim –, 
other than the requirement that the protected nationality must exist at the time of the claim (or its 
registration with ICSID).250 In a basic sense, which does not exhaust the facets of the analysis 
ratione temporis, the application of a treaty’s obligation and the competence of the tribunal 
correspond. Normally, the starting element of the analysis is the time at which the obligations are 
allegedly breached by the State: 
Because the BIT is at the same time the instrument that creates the substantive obligation 
forming the basis of the claim before the Tribunal and the instrument that confers 
jurisdiction upon the Tribunal, a claimant bringing a claim based on a Treaty obligation 
must have owned or controlled the investment when that obligation was allegedly 
breached.251 
The application of a treaty to investments made before its entry into force is a common 
occurrence,252 but it does not imply any retroactive effect. Simply, it avoids arbitrary 
discriminations: after the treaty comes into force, it applies prospectively to all existing 
investments, whatever their date of establishment. This is, in essence, a specification of the 
application ratione personae of the treaty, not a limit to the competence ratione temporis of the 
tribunal. Dicta referring to the non-identity between application of a treaty ratione temporis and 
                                                 
248 Berkowitz above (n 246) para. 163, footnotes omitted, emphases added. 
249 Given the heavily fact-specifity of the jurisdictional analysis, the tribunal expressly declared that its findings 
would have limited ‘precedential’ effects, see ibid., para. 166. 
250 See Article 25(2)(a) and (b) ICSID; see for instance Article 8(3) of the France/Peru BIT, referring to the possibility 
of considering locally incorporated companies as nationals of the ‘other State’ when they are controlled by the other 
State’s national ‘before the claim arises/is brought.’ 
251 Renée Rose Levy and Gremcitel S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/17, Award of 9 January 2015, 
para. 147. 
252 See for instance Article II(2) of the Argentina/Spain BIT: ‘This agreement shall apply also to capital investments 
made before its entry into force by investors of one Party in accordance with the laws of the other Party in the territory 
of the latter. However, this greement shall not apply to disputes or claims originating before its entry into force.’ 
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competence ratione temporis of a tribunal simply refer to this possibility: pre-BIT investments can 
be protected, but only with respect to post-BIT events.253 
Furthermore, State measures can only fall under a tribunal’s jurisdiction after an investment of the 
right nationality has come into existence254 and before its dissolution.255 Before a treaty’s entry 
into force, or without an investment of the right nationality, or when the investment was made 
before a cut-off date,256 an investment-protection treaty cannot apply and, therefore, the host State 
has no obligation vis-à-vis the (non) investor.257 Conversely, the State’s consent to arbitration 
granted unilaterally might be revoked, but the revocation will only affect future investments, not 
existing ones.258 In Nordzucker v. Poland, an issue arose regarding the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
ratione temporis over a FET claim. Whilst FET protection was available to the investor at the time 
of the alleged breaches, arbitration was not: the arbitration clause was reserved for claims about 
expropriation and transfers of money. The treaty was subsequently amended and its arbitration 
clause extended to all standards of treatment in the treaty,259 whereupon the claimant brought an 
FET claim. The tribunal upheld its competence on the claim, and took the opportunity to specify 
the critical dates with respect to each genre of treaty provisions: 
For a provision creating a right/obligation to arbitrate, this is the bringing of the claim. For 
a provision creating a substantive obligation, this is the breach of such obligation. Each 
obligation, the substantive obligation, on the one hand, and the procedural obligation to 
submit to arbitration, on the other hand, has to be assessed in relation to the respective date 
at which it took effect.260 
A similar scenario, relating to two subsequent treaties, led to a different conclusion in the ABCI v. 
Tunisia case, since the latter treaty expressly provided that all disputes arisen before its entry into 
force would be governed by the previous treaty, including its less-favourable arbitration clause.261 
A first order of issues concerns the distinction between the facts underlying the controversy, the 
legal dispute and the submission of a claim. The sequence that leads from a certain factual 
                                                 
253 See, for instance, Ping An Life Insurance Company, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company, Limited v. 
The Government of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29, Award of 30 April 2015, para. 173. 
254 Phoenix Action Ltd v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award of 15 April 2009, para. 67: ‘It does not 
need extended explanation to assert that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction ratione temporis to consider Phoenix’s claims 
arising prior to December 26, 2002, the date of Phoenix’s alleged investment, because the BIT did not become 
applicable to Phoenix for acts committed by the Czech Republic until Phoenix “invested” in the Czech Republic’. See 
also Gami Inv., Inc. v. The Government of the United Mexican States, UNCITRAL-NAFTA, Final Award of 15 
November 2004, para. 93. Société Générale v. The Dominican Republic above (n 59) para. 106: ‘Thus, the investment 
could not be protected by this Treaty until both this Treaty entered into force and Claimant, as a French company, 
acquired the investment and it became a French investment.’ Likewise, see Cervin above (n 60) para. 278. 
255 Phoenix above (n 254) 71. 
256 For instance, the Russia/Mongolia BIT (entered into force in 2006) applies to investments made since 1949, see 
Article 9. The Italy/Pakistan BIT applies to investments made after 1954, see Article 1(1). 
257 Société Générale v. The Dominican Republic above (n 59). 
258 AES above (n 76) para. 223. Consent to arbitration was contained in a domestic statute. This approach is dubious 
as it does not require that the investor has already consented to arbitration, to keep the State’s consent effective even 
after revocation. 
259 Without any specification regarding the transitional regime applicable to previous breaches. 
260 Nordzucker v. Poland, UNCITRAL, Partial Award on Jurisdiction of 10 December 2008, para. 107. 
261 ABCI above (n 19) para. 163. 
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framework to the solidification of a legal controversy and, later, to the submission of a claim to 
arbitration ‘has to be taken into account in establishing the critical date for determining when 
under the BIT a dispute qualifies as one covered by the consent necessary to establish ICSID’s 
jurisdiction’.262 Normally, the tribunal has jurisdiction over disputes arisen or at least crystallised 
after the entry into force of the treaty, even if some of the underlying events predate it.263 Whereas 
the existence of a legal dispute does not correspond to the presentation of a claim which can result 
from it, the difference between the two relevant times is not critical for the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal, which must cover both.264 Obviously, a claim submitted before the entry into force of the 
treaty falls outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction.265 
Whereas the pivot of the analysis is the date of occurrence of the challenged State measures which 
underlie the dispute, some caveats are in order. First, it is possible to envisage a treaty breach 
resulting from a series of acts and facts occurring over a long period of time, whose lawfulness 
under the treaty must be assessed as a whole. Second, it is possible to resort to the concept of 
continuing (or composite) breach – shifting the attention from the instantaneous wrongful act to 
its permanent effects.266 Accordingly, it is possible to envisage breaches that are somewhat 
connected to acts occurred before the entry into force of the treaty, but that either materialise or 
persist thereafter: 
… there might be situations in which the continuing nature of the acts and events 
questioned could result in a breach as a result of acts commencing before the critical date 
but which only become legally characterized as a wrongful act in violation of an 
international obligation when such an obligation had come into existence after the effective 
date of the treaty. … If it is merely the continuing effects of a one-time individual act that 
as such has ceased to exist that is involved, then the non-retroactivity principle fully 
applies, but when both the existence of the wrongful act and its effects continue both before 
and after the critical date, then the non-retroactivity principle will not exclude the 
application of the obligations of the treaty to the acts and omissions that occur after its 
effective date.267 
                                                 
262 Maffezini above (n 172) para. 96. 
263 Ibid., para. 97; Levy v. Peru above (n 251) para. 149: ‘It is not uncommon that divergences or disagreements 
develop over a period of time before they finally “crystallize” in an actual measure affecting the investor's treaty 
rights.’  
264 Sanum v. Laos above (n 151) para. 84-86. 
265 Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction of 24 December 
1996, para. 47. 
266 See Barton Legum et al, ‘Ratione Temporis or Temporal Scope,’ in Barton Legum (eds) ), The Investment Treaty 
Arbitration Review (Law Business Research 2016) 30 ff. 
267 Société Générale v. The Dominican Republic above (n 59) para. 87-88, footnotes omitted. See also Técnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003, 
p. 22; Walter Bau v. Thailand, UNCITRAL, Award of 1 July 2009, para. 9.84; ABCI above (n 19) para. 165, 178; 
Paushok v. Mongolia above (n 114) para. 491. Certain treaties expressly exclude their application to disputes or facts 
that predate their entry into force, even with respect to injurious effects that persist over time, see for instance Article 
11(1) of the Spain-Colombia BIT. 
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Conversely, when the first knowledge of a breach constitutes a critical date (for time-bars), the 
continuous nature of a breach is not relevant, and knowledge of the inception of the breach is the 
only relevant element.268 
In ultimate analysis, the tribunal has jurisdiction over acts committed after the critical date (the 
latter between the entry into force of the treaty, the acquisition of protected nationality, the 
acquisition of the investment and the relevant cut-off date if there is a time bar),269 and can award 
damages only regarding those.270 The time at which the dispute arises, which normally follows 
such acts or omissions, might be additionally relevant. The timing of the dispute matters when the 
instrument defining jurisdiction links to it another essential element, such as the requirement of 
protected nationality,271 and when the tribunal’s jurisdiction is premised expressly on the existence 
of a dispute – as in Article 25(1) ICSID.272 Acts occurred before the critical date might be taken 
into account – in the absence of a specific expression to the contrary273 – to colour the assessment 
of liability, especially in the case of continuing situations, or to calculate damages.274 For instance, 
in Berkowitz v. Costa Rica, the tribunal declined jurisdiction over certain conduct –i.e. 
expropriation – that occurred before the treaty’s entry into force and/or the critical time-bar, and 
on other acts that post-dated those critical dates but could not constitute an autonomous cause of 
action – i.e., the court decrees liquidating insufficient compensation in the wake of the 
expropriation.275 Instead, it upheld jurisdiction over the FET claims relating to the unfair conduct 
of the domestic court proceedings regarding expropriation, which occurred after the critical dates 
and were sufficiently independent from the expropriation claim (i.e., they did not hinge on the 
necessary determination of liabilities for claims falling outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione 
temporis).276 
                                                 
268 Berkowitz above (n 246) para. 208: ‘While it may be that a continuing course of conduct constitutes a continuing 
breach, … such conduct cannot without more renew the limitation period as this would effectively denude the 
limitation clause of its essential purpose, namely, to draw a line under the prosecution of historic claims.’ 
269 Ibid., para. 217: ‘Pre-entry into force conduct cannot be relied upon … to found liability in-and-of-itself in 
circumstances in which liability could not properly rest on the post-entry into force breach that has been alleged 
and on which the Tribunal’s jurisdiction was founded.’ 
270 Ibid., para. 212. 
271 See for instance Article 26(7) of the ECT. 
272 Duke Energy International Peru Investments No. 1 Ltd. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/28, Decision 
on Jurisdiction of 1 February 2006, para. 148: ‘What is decisive of the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction ratione temporis is the 
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Republic of Ecuador above (n 244) para. 61. 
273 Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, Decision on Annulment of 
5 September 2007, para. 94-95. The Committee noted that it would take a special provision in the applicable treaty to 
remove from the jurisdiction of the tribunal disputes that, despite having arisen after the entry into force of the treaty, 
related to facts or situations occurred before.  
274 Berkowitz above (n 246) para. 217-218. This interpretation cannot, for instance, extend the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal over disputes that have arisen before the entry into force of the BIT, just because they continue thereafter. See 
M.C.I. above (n 244) para. 61-67. Earlier events might be relevant to assess the breach, but ‘it must still be possible to 
point to the conduct of the State after that [critical] date which is itself a breach’, see Mondev above (n 13) para. 70. 
See also, in the context of time bars, the clarification of the tribunal in Rusoro above (n 246) para. 233. 
275 Berkowitz above (n 246) para. 280. 
276 Ibid., para. 286. 
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In ST-AD, the claimant acquired the investment after the critical dates – all breaches had occurred 
already and the dispute had already crystallised. The claimant tried to recoup the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction ratione temporis instituting before the domestic courts a claim identical to one that 
had been rejected six years earlier. The purpose of this choice was to obtain a State breach (in the 
form of a second adverse judicial decision) after the cut-off date for jurisdiction. The tribunal 
dismissed the claim: 
it is not acceptable for a claimant to artificially create a new act of the State allegedly 
interfering with its rights by simply “mirroring” events that occurred before it became a 
protected investor. For example, if a claimant, before coming under the protection of a 
given BIT, had asked for and been refused a license, it could not simply purport to create 
an event posterior to it becoming a protected investor by presenting the very same request 
for a license that would, no doubt, be similarly refused.277 
The tribunal in Paushok v. Mongolia followed a similar approach, and cautioned against the 
expansion of jurisdiction over a dispute relating to pre-BIT actions, even when it arises after the 
treaty entered into force: 
… the Treaty should not be interpreted as granting it jurisdiction concerning disputes which 
arose after the entry into force but which are based on actions that have occurred before 
such entry into force, except for the particular situation of continuing or composite acts.278 
Whether the dispute presented to the tribunal is in fact a re-hash or a continuation of a previously 
existing one can be hard to tell. Essentially, tribunals ascertain whether there is identity between 
the two: a treaty-based dispute is not the same as a domestic dispute, especially if the domestic 
judgment delivered in the latter is singled out as a specific treaty breach in the former279; a pre-
BIT divergence (different views) is note the same as a post-BIT dispute (formalised attempt to 
resolve the difference) even if the latter develops from the former.280 
The sequencing of the relevant elements of the dispute could determine the lapse of the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. For instance, if treaty-based protection expires after the breach but before the raising 
of the claim which signals the investor’s consent to arbitration, the tribunal might lack jurisdiction 
because the investor might have lost the opportunity to accept the State’s consent to arbitration 
when it was still available.281 Likewise, when there are stricter requirement ratione temporis in the 
instrument of consent, the lapse of jurisdiction might occur as early as the rising of the dispute. 
For instance, the ECT contains the parties’ consent to arbitration regarding claims brought by local 
companies controlled by foreign investors, and requires foreign control to exist ‘before the 
                                                 
277 ST-AD above (n 18) para. 332. 
278 Paushok above (n 114) para. 467-468. See also M.C.I. above (n 244) para. 66. 
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dispute’.282 If foreign control existed at the time of the breach but is not maintained until the dispute 
arises, the claimant would be barred from bringing a claim.283 
The non-retroactivity of arbitration clauses over existing disputes might cause issues when there 
are two successive treaties: the latter one cannot in principle be used to bring a pre-existing claim 
to arbitration. In Jan de Nul v. Egypt284 the tribunal accepted jurisdiction because the dispute had 
crystallised after the entry into force of the latter BIT, but noted that some of the State measures 
challenged by the investor fell under the application of the substantive provisions of the former 
BIT. In Walter Bau v. Thailand,285 instead, the tribunal concluded that the dispute had come into 
existence before the second BIT had come into force. The latter treaty afforded investor with the 
possibility to launch investor-State arbitration, which was unavailable under the former one. The 
tribunal held that the arbitration clause in the latter treaty was a ‘substantive provision’ which 
could not apply retroactively, and rejected the claim for lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis.286 
In Ping An v. Belgium,287 instead, the latter treaty expressly regulated the transition between two 
consecutive treaties. It provided that the new treaty would not apply to any dispute ‘which was 
already under judicial or arbitral process before its entry into force’.288 There was no express 
provision, instead, regarding disputes that had arisen and had been notified under the previous 
treaty, but had not yet been brought to arbitration. The tribunal held that one such dispute could 
not be covered by the latter treaty. It found among other things that the much wider scope ratione 
materiae of the new arbitration clause (which was not limited to the amount of compensation for 
expropriation, like the old one) advised against approving its retroactive effect.289 
A peculiar problem ratione temporis arose in the dispute Venezuela US v. Venezuela,290 hinging 
on the Barbados/Venezuela BIT. The peculiarity of the case revolved around the atypical language 
of the arbitration clause, the denunciation of ICSID by the respondent,291 and the bold attempt by 
the investor to use the MFN clause to circumvent jurisdictional problems. The bilateral treaty was 
signed after Venezuela had signed the ICSID Convention, but before it had ratified it. The parties 
                                                 
282 Article 26(7) ECT. 
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therefore inserted a clause in the arbitration provision making ICSID Additional Facility 
arbitration available ‘[a]s long as the Republic of Venezuela has not become a Contracting State 
of the Convention’. If the Additional Facility proved unavailable for any reason, recourse could be 
had to UNCITRAL arbitration.292 Venezuela reasoned that its consent to non-ICSID arbitration 
applied only to the period prior to its accession to ICSID; the investor argued instead that it could 
apply also after Venezuela denounced the Convention, and launched UNCITRAL arbitration. The 
tribunal sided with Venezuela as regards the non-availability of UNCITRAL arbitration in the 
original BIT (which had lapsed as soon as Venezuela had joined ICSID). Nonetheless, it granted 
access to UNCITRAL arbitration under the MFN clause, which expressly applied to procedural 
rights.293  
Acquisition of nationality and jurisdiction ratione temporis 
Assuming for ease of argument that breach and dispute are contemporaneous and that in any case 
the dispute follows the breach,294 the distinction between the emergence of dispute and the formal 
submission of a claim has often been relevant when the investor acquired the qualifying nationality 
shortly before launching proceedings, but after the dispute had already materialised. In certain 
cases, jurisdictional objections were raised when a change in nationality seemed aimed precisely 
at acquiring treaty protection with the view of bringing a dispute. The objections hinted at an 
abusive use of the jurisdictional requirements ratione personae (the investor was not a genuine 
national) and/or temporis (the investor’s nationality was obtained too late). 
Nationality planning is, per se, permissible (as discussed below in relation to personal jurisdiction). 
Sometimes, however, a precipitous attempt to acquire the qualifying nationality can fail. In Banro 
v. DR Congo the Canadian investment was transferred to a US subsidiary to launch ICSID 
arbitration (Canada is not party to ICSID). The tribunal found that the resulting investor was not a 
national of an ICSID member, and declined jurisdiction.295 Given the chronological succession, 
the tribunal regarded the transfer an assignment of a (defective but already existing) claim, rather 
than an acceptable restructuring occurring before the dispute had arisen.296 The tribunal in Phoenix 
v. Czech Republic invoked precisely a defect of jurisdiction297 when the investor acquired a treaty-
protected nationality only after the dispute had fully materialised. Although framed as an analysis 
ratione materiae (hinging on whether there was a protected investment) the reasoning revolved 
                                                 
292 Article 8(2) Barbados/Venezuela BIT. 
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critically on the timing of the claim.298 In general, whereas prospective nationality planning is 
allowed, it is harder to ‘create a remedy for existing grievances’.299 Speculating on a corporate 
transaction that turned out to be wholly fabricated, but that would have granted the investor the 
requisite nationality 12 days before the critical date of the State breach, the tribunal in 
Cementownia v. Turkey reasoned: 
Even if they did occur, the share transfers would not have been bona fide transactions, but 
rather attempts (in the face of government measures dating back some years about to 
culminate in the concessions’ termination) to fabricate international jurisdiction where 
none should exist.300 
In the award Philip Morris v. Australia,301 the investor had restructured the company in Hong 
Kong to gain protection under the Hong Kong/Australia BIT. The restructuring entailed the 
acquisition of the qualifying nationality shortly before the challenged measures occurred (and the 
ensuing dispute arose with the host-State). Correctly, the tribunal referred to a strand of cases 
which distinguished between objections based on jurisdiction ratione temporis and abuse of rights. 
Namely,  
if a company changes its nationality in order to gain ICSID jurisdiction at a moment when 
things have started to deteriorate so that a dispute is highly probable, it can be considered 
an abuse of process, but for an objection based on ratione temporis to be upheld, the dispute 
has to have actually arisen before the critical date to conform to the general principle of 
non-retroactivity in the interpretation and application of international treaties.302 
The tribunal therefore concluded that the critical date for jurisdiction was that of the enactment of 
the challenged measures.303 Even if obtained with abusive intent, the Hong Kong nationality was 
obtained in time for the tribunal to have jurisdiction, before the alleged treaty breach occurred. The 
tribunal turned therefore to matters of admissibility to analyse the investor’s tactic as a possible 
abuse of rights (see below).304 
In García and García v. Venezuela, the claimants did not have Spanish nationality at the time of 
making the investment, but they had acquired it when the breaches occurred and subsequently 
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retained it, continuously, until the request for arbitration. The tribunal did not consider this to be a 
problem for its jurisdiction.305 
MFN and jurisdiction ratione temporis 
An MFN might be invoked to found the jurisdiction on the clauses of another treaty, which might 
have entered into force at a later time. The issue was at stake in the Maffezini case (where certain 
jurisdictional hurdles in the Argentine-Spain BIT were overcome relying on the later Chile-Spain 
BIT). However, in that case, the tribunal found that both BITs had entered into force before ‘the 
conflict of legal views and interests came to be clearly established’.306 There is no publicly known 
case in which the treaty made applicable through the MFN clause entered into force after the 
critical time of the dispute, giving rise to a hiatus ratione temporis with respect to the original 
treaty. In ST-AD, the investor tried to invoke pre-investment protection reaching back to the time 
of its preliminary contract of investment. The tribunal found that the investor failed to elaborate 
on this claim, noting that ‘it ha[d] not presented any treaty entered into by [the host State] granting 
such rights’.307 This dictum appears to suggest that, through an MFN clause, it might be possible 
to achieve pre-investment protection, thus extending retroactively the jurisdiction ratione temporis 
of the tribunal. In Tecmed,308 instead, the attempt was made to use the MFN clause to extend the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione temporis (the comparator treaty had – allegedly – retroactive 
effects). The tribunal noted that the attempt sought to extend the application of the treaty and 
jurisdiction of the tribunal, and rejected the MFN-based claim.309 In MCI v. Ecuador,310 the 
applicable BIT had entered into force in 1997, after the dispute had arisen. The investor attempted 
to use the MFN clause to import the treatment granted in the comparator BIT, which had entered 
into force in 1995. The attempt hinged on a creative reading of the imported provision (which 
obviously referred to the ‘Contracting Parties’ of the comparator BIT, not to any contracting 
parties of any future treaty as the claimant suggested) and was disallowed.311 
In Ansung v. China,312 the investor sought to invoke an MFN clause to avoid the three-year time 
bar in the applicable BIT. The tribunal rejected the attempt, noting that the relevant MFN provision 
limited its operation ‘to investment and business activities,’313 which the applicable BIT defined 
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as including ‘the expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, and sale or 
other disposal of investments’.314 According to the tribunal, therefore, matters of access to 
arbitration lay outside the ambit of the MFN clause.315 
The effects of denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
Article 71 ICSID allows contracting parties to withdraw from the Convention.316 The denunciation 
takes effect six months after the State gives written notice to the World Bank. Article 72 ICSID 
protects investors from the effects of the State’s unilateral action, providing that the denunciation 
shall not affect the State’s obligations arising out of consent to the jurisdiction of Centre given 
before the denunciation. This undoubtedly means that investors who have already accepted the 
State’s offer to arbitrate are unaffected by the denunciation (the ‘offer-and-acceptance’ approach). 
According to a wider construction, Article 72 ICSID applies also to the consent given unilaterally 
by the State, for instance in a BIT arbitration clause, hence even if the investor has not accepted it 
yet (the ‘firm offer’ approach).317 Both readings would expose States to ICSID arbitration after 
their withdrawal from the Convention comes into effect. Following the ‘firm offer’ approach, the 
State would not be spared from its obligations under ICSID for as long as there are treaty 
arbitration clauses (or other instruments like contracts and laws) in force which provide for ICSID 
arbitration.318 The crux of the interpretive issue is whether a unilateral standing offer is enough to 
entail the ‘consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre given by [the State]’ (from which Article 72 
ICSID derives post-denunciation obligations) or, instead, the combination of State’s offer and 
investor’s acceptance is necessary to create consent.319 
After Venezuela’s denunciation of the ICSID Convention, tribunals have had to determine their 
jurisdiction ratione temporis320 over investment claims aimed at Venezuela under the surviving 
BITs, applying the rules in Articles 71 and 72 ICSID. In Venoklim v. Venezuela,321 the investor 
filed an ICSID claim on 23 July 2012, almost six months after the respondent State’s ICSID 
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denunciation of 24 January 2012. The tribunal rejected Venezuela’s attempt to evaluate the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal at the date of the notice of registration of the claim by the Secretariat, 
which occurred after the critical cut-off date.322 The investor’s right to launch ICSID proceedings 
was granted by Article 71 ICSID, since the claim was filed when Venezuela was still an ICSID 
member, if only for two days.323 It is worth noting the tribunal’s finding, made in passing, that 
under Article 72 ICSID the State’s consent is simply the unilateral offer to arbitrate (resulting from 
the joint effects of the national investment law and the BIT with the Netherlands), rather than the 
consent resulting from the investor’s acceptance of that offer.324 The tribunal remarked that a State 
must comply with its offer to arbitrate, even during the six months that follow the denunciation of 
ICSID.325 This conclusion on Article 72 ICSID is plausible and lends credence to the ‘firm-offer’ 
school of thought, but it is unclear why the tribunal took pains to specify that the State’s obligations 
flowing from its unilateral consent must be observed ‘even during the six-month period’ after 
denunciation. This specification is at least irrelevant, at most misleading: the ‘firm-offer’ approach 
entails that the State’s obligation extends even after the withdrawal and its six-month incubation 
period, surviving for as long as there is an offer to consent to ICSID arbitration (in the BIT, the 
national law, or any other pre-denunciation instrument). 
In the Rusoro case, the request for arbitration was submitted a week before Venezuela’s 
denunciation came into effect. Arbitration under the ICSID Additional Facility was still 
available.326 Conversely, in Nova Scotia v. Venezuela the investor’s attempt to launch UNCITRAL 
arbitration was rejected, precisely because recourse to the ICSID Additional Facility was still 
available.327 Whereas the role of the Secretariat is considered as merely administrative at this stage, 
it is possible to envision circumstances in which a claim is made after the six-month period and 
the Secretariat refuses registration, implicitly endorsing the offer-and-acceptance approach. 
Conversely, the Secretariat might limit itself to register the case and leave the jurisdictional 
                                                 
322 Ibid., para. 78-79. A similar scenario emerged in the Blue Bank case (above n 317, para. 107), in which the request 
for arbitration was made on 22 June 2012, before the critical date of 25 July 2012. However, because ICSID required 
additional clarification from the Claimant, the registration occurred only after it, on 7 August 2012. The tribunal found 
that consent had crystallise before the denunciation entered into effect, see para. 120. 
323 At the time of writing, the award is being challenged in annulment proceedings. 
324 It can be suggested that the tribunal in Pan American Energy LLC v. Plurinational State of Bolivia (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/8) might have reached the same conclusion, given that Bolivia’s denunciation of ICSID came into effect 
in November 2009, and the claim was brought in April 2010. Whereas the details of the case are confidential, it is 
known that the tribunal issued a decision regarding the jurisdictional objections in November 2013 and the parties 
requested thereafter a suspension of proceedings, which led ultimately to a settlement. It could be inferred that the 
respondent’s jurisdictional objections were rejected, and that the negotiation is evidence that the tribunal was ready to 
look into the merits. If so, it would mean that Article 72 ICSID was interpreted to refer to ‘firm-offer’ consent, allowing 
recourse to arbitration on the basis of the US/Bolivia BIT after the denunciation of ICSID came into effect. It cannot 
be known, however, whether the claimant had accepted the offer to arbitration before the critical date of November 
2009, in a separate act different from the filing of the claim. 
325 Venoklim above (n 321) para. 65-66: ‘considera el Tribunal que el consentimiento al que se refiere el Artículo 72 
es, en este caso, el del Estado en sí, es decir la simple oferta unilateral de arbitraje, y no el consentimiento del Estado 
perfeccionado con la aceptación del inversionista de dicha oferta al presentar su solicitud de arbitraje. ... Una vez 
que un Estado ha hecho una oferta de arbitraje internacional válida, una de sus principales obligaciones es la de 
cumplir con la misma, inclusive durante el periodo de seis meses previsto por el Convenio CIADI para que la denuncia 
surta efectos.’ 
326 Rusoro above (n 246) para. 269-273. 
327 Nova Scotia above (n 147). The case has since been registered under the ICSID Additional Facility, see Nova Scotia 
above (n 235). 
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objection to the tribunal. In such latter scenario, the risk is that the Secretariat’s conduct might be 
read as a preference for the firm offer approach. 
4. Ratione Loci 
Investments made ‘in the territory’ 
Whereas it is not often at the centre of litigation, the restriction ratione loci of a treaty’s application 
speaks to the essence of foreign investment protection: 
it is quite plain that NAFTA Chapter Eleven was not intended to provide substantive 
protections or rights of action to investors whose investments are wholly confined to their 
own national States, in circumstances where those investments may be affected by 
measures taken by another NAFTA State Party. The NAFTA should not be interpreted so 
as to bring about this unintended result.328 
This territorial nexus329 is often expressed in the applicable treaty, which covers investments made 
‘in the territory’ of the host State.330 Even when the definition of investor does not expressly refer 
to the location of the investment (see for instance Article 1101(1)(a) NAFTA), foreign investors 
are protected by investment treaties only insofar as they have an investment in the host State.331 
The territorial link normally pertains to the investment rather than the investor. Therefore, in the 
absence of specific restrictions, that the investor has no substantial business in the host country is 
irrelevant: shareholding in an investment made there, even indirect, would be sufficient.332 
                                                 
328 Bayview Irrigation District et al. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/1, Award of 19 July 
2007, para. 103; see para. 104: ‘… The economic dependence of an enterprise upon supplies of goods - in this case, 
water - from another State is not sufficient to make the dependent enterprise an 'investor' in that other State’; Grand 
River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award of 12 January 2011, para. 
87-89. See also Abi Saab’s dissenting opinion above (n 11) para. 74: ‘A territorial link or nexus is inherent in the 
concept of “investment” in article 25 of the ICSID Convention. The whole idea behind the Convention was to 
encourage the flow of private foreign investment to developing countries by offering an international guarantee in the 
form of an alternative neutral adjudication of disputes arising out of such investment in the territory of the host States, 
typically subject to its laws and courts.’ 
329 On which, see diffusedly Christina Knahr, ‘The Territorial Nexus between an Investment and the Host State’, in 
Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel et al. (eds), International Investment Law: a Handbook (Nomos/Hart Publishing/C.H. 
Beck 2015) 590. 
330 See for instance Article 1 of the Canada/ Côte d’Ivoire BIT: ‘“covered investment” means, with respect to a Party, 
an investment in its territory of an investor of the other Party…’ (emphasis added). See also Philippe Gruslin v. 
Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award of 27 November 2000, para. 13.11. 
331 The Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States of America, UNCITRAL (formerly Consolidated 
Canadian Claims v. United States of America), Award of Jurisdiction of 28 January 2008, para. 169. The review of 
the territorial element does not depend on its inclusion in the treaty, see Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services 
GmbH and others v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, Decision on Jurisdiction of 8 March 2010, para. 113–121; 
Philippe Gruslin v. Malaysia above (n 330) para. 13.9–13.12 (the territoriality objection was ultimately not reviewed 
by the sole arbitrator). 
332 Flemingo DutyFree Shop Private Limited v the Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, Award of 12 August 2016, para. 
342: ‘It is also not an impediment for the Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction if Claimant, an Indian company, allegedly 
does not deploy commercial activities in India and is not involved in the Polish operations of the Flemingo Group.’ 
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Jurisdictional issues ratione loci tend to overlap with others ratione materiae (e.g., the existence 
of an investment) and ratione personae (e.g., the identification of the correct respondent, and of 
the claimant’s nationality). The requirement that investments be made in the territory of the host 
State, indeed, excludes business operations that are entirely carried out abroad. In the case of trans-
border operations, at issue might be the relevance of the elements that are located in the host State. 
Thus, the critical question might be framed interchangeably as one about the place of the alleged 
investment (there is an investment, but not in the host State), one about its substance (what is 
located in the host State is not an investment), or one about the identification of the host State (the 
investment is made in the territory of a State different from the putative respondent). 
A pertinent case in point is the dispute Apotex v. USA (UNCITRAL).333 The claimant (a Canadian 
pharmaceutical company) challenged the import alert issued by the US authorities, which 
prevented the company from shipping goods to the US for two years. The tribunal ultimately found 
that the part of the operations occurring in the US did not qualify as investment under NAFTA’s 
Article 1139. In other words, what took place in the US was not an investment (but, at most, a 
trade operation, mostly consisting of importing and distributing goods from Canada); conversely, 
what was indeed an investment was not located in the US (i.e., the developing and production of 
pharmaceutical products).334 The NAFTA tribunal in the Grand Rivers v. US case faced a similar 
set of circumstances. The claimants’ main asset, a tobacco manufacturing plant, was located in the 
home State. Three of the four claimants’ purported investment in the US allegedly consisted in an 
enterprise to distribute cigarettes, which operated in the ‘undocumented manner customary among 
indigenous peoples’.335 The tribunal rejected this characterisation.336 
The cognate issue of whether damages must arise in the host State to be recoverable (which 
presupposes the existence of a foreign investment337 and of a breach) was considered briefly by 
the SD Myers NAFTA tribunal, which simply noted that ‘[t]here is no provision that requires that 
all of the investor’s losses must be sustained within the host state in order to be recoverable’338 
Another controversial instance occurred in the Abaclat case (and in the germane disputes Ambiente 
Ufficio and Giovanni Alemanni). At stake was whether Argentinean sovereign bonds bought by 
Italian citizens were made in the territory of Argentina. In spite of Abi Saab’s strenuous arguing 
to the opposite,339 the majority sided with the claimants in light of the nature of the investments 
considered: 
With regard to an investment of a purely financial nature, the relevant criteria [to identify 
its location] cannot be the same as those applying to an investment consisting of business 
operations and/or involving manpower and property. With regard to investments of a 
purely financial nature, the relevant criteria should be where and/or for the benefit of whom 
                                                 
333 Apotex UNCITRAL above (n 246). 
334 Ibid., para. 176. 
335 Grand River above (n 328) para. 91. 
336 Ibid., para. 106. 
337 On whether the claimants held an investment in Canada, see Partial Award of 13 November 2000, para. 231. 
338 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Second Partial Award of 21 October 2002, para. 118. 
339 See Abi Saab’s dissenting opinion above (n 11) para. 73 ff. 
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the funds are ultimately used, and not the place where the funds were paid out or 
transferred.340 
The ‘benefit’ criterion, in the tribunal’s account, is inherited from a line of cases.341 Of particular 
relevance is the case S.G.S. v. the Philippines, where the tribunal held that the investment was 
made in the territory of the host State, even if it mainly consisted in the carrying out of pre-
shipment inspections abroad. The inspections, critically, were instrumental to obtain a certificate 
which would ease importing operations into the country, issued by a liaison office based in the 
host State. Resultantly, ‘[a] substantial and non-severable aspect of the overall service was 
provided in the Philippines’.342 It appears clearly that the S.G.S. v. the Philippines tribunal did not 
deal with purely financial investments; moreover, it rejected outright the relevance of benefit as a 
territorial nexus: 
investments made outside the territory of the Respondent State, however beneficial to it, 
would not be covered by the BIT.343 
A more fitting analogue is the Fedax v. Venezuela case, described above, in which the tribunal 
considered the debt instruments issued by the host State to be investments; the territorial 
requirement was met because the investor’s contribution was made available to the government of 
the host State.344 The same approach was used by the CSOB v. Slovak Republic, with reference to 
a loan made by the investor to a State-owned company of the host State.345 Likewise, in Inmaris 
Perestroika v. Ukraine,346 the tribunal did not consider it necessary to investigate whether there is 
a direct transfer of funds into the host State, as long as ‘the transaction accrues to the benefit of 
the State itself.’347 
Treaty application over a specific territory 
A different set of issues ratione loci can arise when the nexus between respondent’s rights and 
obligations and the territory is contested. Contestation could derive from an episode of unlawful 
occupation, or when the application of a treaty depends on treaty succession. It could also arise in 
case of concurrent application of investment treaties stipulated by different host States with respect 
to the same territory. These problems could be repackaged as ratione personae impediments, as 
                                                 
340 Para. 374. This approach was followed in the case Deutsche Bank v. Sri Lanka above (n 216) para. 288 ff. Abi Saab 
contested this interpretation and claimed that even if financial investment are covered by the BIT, they must be linked 
to the funding of ‘specific economic projects, enterprises or activities which, had they been undertaken directly by 
these foreign financial investors, would have constituted foreign direct investment’ in the territory of the host State. 
See Abi Saab’s dissenting opinion above (n 11) para. 98. 
341 Fedax above (n 43) para. 41. See also SGS v. Pakistan above (n 123) para. 136-140, where emphasis was led on 
the fact that the aim of SGS‘s activity was to raise the financial revenue of the State (para. 139); SGS v. Philippines 
above (n 38) para. 111. 
342 SGS v. Philippines above (n 38) para. 102. See also Bureau Veritas above (n 31) para. 103-104. 
343 Ibid., para. 99. This passage was highlighted in Abi Saab’s dissenting opinion above (n 11) para. 100. 
344 Fedax above (n 43) para. 41. 
345 CSOB above (n 47) para. 78-91. 
346 Inmaris above (n 331) para. 123. 
347 Ibid., para. 124 (the investor renovated a boat and subsequently used it jointly with the host State government). 
Likewise, see Gold Reserve above (n 213) para. 262. 
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they call into question whether the State indicated as respondent is really bound by investment 
protection obligations for conduct occurred in a specific place. 
After Russia’s de facto annexation of Crimea in 2014, a number of Ukrainian investors brought 
claims against Russia relating to the acts of Russian authorities in Crimea.348 These claims imply 
the applicability of the Ukraine – Russia BIT to the facts of the dispute, including their location.349 
Russia has not participated in these proceedings, but sent a letter to the PCA stating that the BIT 
cannot ‘serve as a basis for composing an arbitral tribunal’ seised with such claims.350 Russia’s 
characterisation of the Crimea events (lawful annexation or accession) would warrant the 
application of Russia’s investment obligations on that territory – by virtue of succession in 
Ukraine’s obligations. However, the consensus is that Crimea was unlawfully occupied. As a 
result, and under the rules of nullity and non-recognition351 reflected also in Article 53 VCLT and 
Article 41(2) of the ILC State Responsibility Articles,352 the occupied territory must not be 
considered part of Russia. This conclusion might deal a fatal blow to the claims of the Ukrainian 
investors, insofar as their investments would be considered to be ‘put’ in Ukraine and, accordingly, 
be divested of treaty protection. 
It is known that at least in one case the Tribunal upheld jurisdiction.353 This decision might have 
relied on one of these reasons (or a combination of them): the Tribunal did not examine the 
territorial objection, since neither party raised it; the tribunal considered that the duty of non-
recognition cannot benefit the wrongdoer; and/or the Tribunal considered that Russia’s de facto 
control over Crimea warranted the extra-territorial application of its obligations. The former 
circumstance should be ruled out: not only can Tribunals examine jurisdictional flaws proprio 
motu, they must do so (ex officio).354 The second circumstance would engage the principle that 
Russia cannot benefit from its own wrongdoing, or a sort of estoppel: given Russian claims to 
sovereignty over Crimea’s territory, a territorial objection would be precluded. Since no such 
objection was effectively raised, this argument is doubtful. The more pertinent question would be 
whether the Ukrainian investors could benefit from Russia’s wrongdoing (i.e., deriving from it 
unanticipated treaty protection). The third circumstance would draw inspiration from the doctrine 
                                                 
348 For a full list of these claims, and an overview, see Odysseas G Repousis, ‘Why Russian investment treaties could 
apply to Crimea and what would this mean for the ongoing Russo–Ukrainian territorial conflict’ (2016) 32(3) 
Arbitration International 459-481; Richard Happ, Sebastian Wuschka, ‘Horror Vacui: Or Why Investment Treaties 
Should Apply to Illegally Annexed Territories’ (2016) 33(3) Journal of International Arbitration 245–268. 
349 Article 1(1) of the Russia-Ukraine BIT provides that ‘investments’ are those ‘put … on the territory of the other 
Contracting Party,’ and Article 1(4) extends the notion of territory to each Contracting Party’s territory, EEZ and 
continental shelf, ‘as defined in conformity with international law.’ 
350 FIND SOURCE, CITED IN http://www.cisarbitration.com/2016/02/17/arbitration-claims-by-ukrainian-investors-
under-the-russia-ukraine-bit-between-crimea-and-a-hard-place/  
351 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, UN Doc. Res 2734 (XXV) (16 
Dec. 1970): ‘no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat of use of force shall be recognized as legal.’ 
352 Reading: ‘No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 
40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.’ 
353 PJSC Ukrnafta v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2015-34, Award on Jurisdiction of 4 July 
2017, see PCA Press Release. 
354 Contra, see Repousis above (n 348) 470: ‘an investment tribunal would not have to determine whether it has 




of extra-territorial application of human rights obligations, employed by human rights bodies355 
and endorsed by the ICJ.356 According to this doctrine, a State exercising jurisdiction outside its 
territory is bound by the same human rights obligations it must uphold internally. The parallel is 
imperfect: this doctrine typically operates to rule out a lapse in human rights protection, hence it 
assumes that one State must necessarily be in charge. The territorial State being effectively ousted, 
the occupying one takes upon the responsibility, lest the individuals suddenly lose their rights. 
BIT-derived obligations, however, are not granted by State parties to ‘everyone within their 
jurisdiction,’357 but only to qualified subjects: when the territorial requirement is a specific 
requirement of jurisdiction it cannot be replaced by de facto control, the former is. Moreover, there 
would be no issue of rights’ discontinuation; in the cases against Russia, the Ukrainian investors 
did not hold treaty-derived rights beforehand, so there is no compelling reason of fairness to create 
them ex novo after the occupation. 
An issue of State succession arose also in the Sanum v. Laos case.358 The investor was an entity 
incorporated in the Macao Special Administrative Region, which sought to invoke the China–Laos 
BIT in the dispute. The Respondent, however, argued that investors from Macao do not fall under 
the territorial scope of the 1993 China–Laos BIT, because Macao is not part of China for the 
purposes of that treaty, as illustrated by its ability to conclude autonomous investment treaties.359 
The question hinged on the extension of the pre-existing China-Laos BIT to the territory of 
Macao,360 which Portugal handed over to China in 1999, and on whether some circumstance would 
impede such extension.361 One such circumstance was the apparent possibility that both China and 
Macao enter separate BITs with the same third State, with respect to the same territory.362 The 
Respondent contended that the existence of a Macao BIT with a State implied the exclusion of 
Macao’s territory from the application of a Chinese BIT with that same State.363 The tribunal 
disagreed: 
The Tribunal does not accept this conclusion. It can indeed also mean, with as much if not 
more logic, that the PRC-BIT applies to the whole territory including the Macao SAR, 
while the Macao SAR-BIT is confined to the territory of Macao but cannot extend to 
                                                 
355 Human Rights Committee (1981) ICCPR Comm. No. 52/1979, para. 12.3, referring to Art. 2 of the UN Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; European Court of Human Rights, Bankovic and Others v Belgium and 16 Other 
Contracting States, Eur. Ct. H.R. 52207/99, 41 ILM 517 (2001), para. 71. 
356 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 2004, para. 109.  
357 European Convention of Human Rights, Article 1. 
358 Sanum v. Laos above (n 151). 
359 An equivalent question arose in the Tza Yap Shum case, above (n 156), regarding the applicability of a Chinese 
BIT to the Hong Kong territory. 
360 Under Article 29 VCLT and Article 15(b) of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties 
(neither State was party to the VCST, but the provision was deemed to reflect customary law). 
361 The tribunal discarded the hypothesis that the BIT would impose ‘communist’ values on Macao – hence considered 
it compatible with the ‘one country, two systems’ doctrine. See Sanum v. Laos above (n 151) para. 249. It also found 
that, under the pacta tertiis principle, Laos could not be bound by any arrangement between China and Macao (para. 
267). 
362 This possibility had indeed materialised with Portugal and the Netherlands. 
363 Cases of explicit carve-outs are, obviously, easier to determine. In Menzies above (n 18) the tribunal noted that the 
investor, incorporated in the Virgin Islands, could not invoke the BIT between Senegal and UK, because Article 1(e)(i) 
of such treaty only includes Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the definition of ‘territory’ applicable to the UK, 
see para. 154. 
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Mainland China. … In the Tribunal’s view, the superposition of instruments of protection 
does not bring about chaos, but rather better protection to foreign investors.364 
Other instances of State succession concerned Kazakhstan and Serbia, which were sued in their 
alleged capacity as successors of the USSR and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 
Kazakhstan was found to succeed in the obligations deriving from the 1991 Canada-USSR BIT, 
in a case relating to alleged breaches occurred after 1997.365 In Mytilineos, the tribunal determined 
that Serbia was not bound by the obligations of the 1997 BIT between Greece and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. At the critical time of the seisin of the tribunal, whereas the Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro was deemed to succeed the Yugoslav Federation, Serbia was only a 
constituent subdivision. As such, it could not have deemed to have consented to arbitration in its 
own right.366 
5. Ratione Personae 
An obvious jurisdictional issue ratione personae is the lack of standing of an investor that is not a 
party to the relevant arbitration clause. Whereas this circumstance is rare (most often investors 
accede an open-ended offer to arbitrate, proffered unilaterally in a treaty or a statute), it can arise 
when the arbitration clause is contained in a contract. In the case Niko v. Bangladesh,367 the tribunal 
declined its jurisdiction over two of the three claimants, which were not parties to the applicable 
contract and, therefore, could not participate in the arbitration.368 Likewise, tribunals do not have 
jurisdiction ratione personae over claimants who are unable to prove their relationship with the 
                                                 
364 Ibid., para. 290; 292. See also para. 294: ‘The Tribunal does not consider that the concomitant application of these 
two BITs would lead to “legal chaos”. The more dispute settlement options an investor has, the better it is protected, 
and the more enhanced the economic cooperation will be between the concerned States.’ The same conclusion was 
reached by the tribunal in Tza Yap Shum above (n 156) para. 76. The Singapore Court of Appeal (competent because 
the seat of the investment arbitration was Singapore) confirmed the Sanum award, after the High Court had annulled 
it. See Sanum Investments Ltd v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic [2016] SGCA 57 
365 World Wide Minerals (Case 2) above (n 246). The case is not public, so it is not possible to elaborate on the 
tribunal’s analysis. 
366 Mytilineos above (n 238) para. 173-174. This conclusion was without prejudice to the possibility that Serbia’s 
conduct might engage the responsibility of the Union, see para. 175. 
367 Niko Resources Ltd. v. Bangladesh Petroleum Exploration & Production Company Limited and Bangladesh Oil 
Gas and Mineral Corporation, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/11, Decision on Jurisdiction of 19 August 2013. 
368 Ibid., para. 515. 
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investment,369 that have acquired a defective claim,370 or that have not yet made an investment.371 
In Nations Energy v. Panama, interestingly enough, the tribunal took pains to re-characterise an 
objection ratione personae (the host State alleged that the claimant had transferred the investment 
and admitted its unlawfulness) as one of admissibility.372 In Tulip v. Turkey, the tribunal rejected 
the claimant’s attempt to act also on behalf and in representation of another investor who had not 
joined the claimant in the proceedings.373 
An obverse and atypical issue of standing arose in Cambodia Power v. Cambodia374 with respect 
to the respondent. Besides Cambodia, the claim was brought against a Cambodian State-owned 
company. The claimant asserted the locus standi of the latter as an agency ‘designated’ to ICSID 
by the host State under Article 25(1) of the Convention, but the tribunal noted that the lack of a 
formal designation prevented it from establishing jurisdiction over the company as co-
respondent.375 
Claims by shareholders and indirect investments 
Shareholders typically qualify as investors with respect to their shares in a company incorporated 
in the host State376; they are entitled to bring claims for reflective loss.377 Accordingly, they have 
                                                 
369 In Ampal above (n 23), an individual claiming to have a substantial interest in the investment failed to convince 
the tribunal that this was actually the case. See para. 218-223. The tribunal conceded that the absence of reliable 
evidence regarding the link between the individual and the investment might have been due to the former’s attempt to 
avoid fiscal liability using an anonymous trust scheme. However, the evidence before the tribunal was considered 
insufficient to discharge the requisite burden of proof, see para. 226. In a couplet of twin cases, the tribunals concluded 
that the claimant had no relationship with the investor or the investment, see Europe Cement Investment & Trade S.A. 
v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2, Award of 13 August 2009; Cementownia above (n 300). Likewise, the 
claimant must prove to have made a contribution to the investment (this requirement can be framed as one ratione 
materiae: insofar as an essential component of investments is the economic contribution, without it there is no 
investment, at least as far as claimant is concerned). See Saba Fakes above (n 45) para. 130-149; KT Asia above (n 
48) para. 188-206 and Gaëta above (n 46) 222-223; Flughafen Zürich A.G. et Gestión e Ingenería IDC S.A. v. 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID CASE No. ARB/10/19, Award of 18 November 2014, para. 254. 
370 Mihaly International Corporation v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2, Award, 15 March 2002, para. 24. A 
Canadian company had transferred its claim against the host State to a US company, so as to enjoy protection under 
the US/Sri Lanka BIT. Because the transferring company enjoyed no protection under the treaty, the tribunal found 
that it could not transfer a valid claim to the claimant (nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet). 
371 Whereas this is normally an issue ratione materiae (there is no investment yet), it might emerge also in the analysis 
of the autonomous protection granted to investors as such. In Nordzucker above (n 260), the treaty language allowed 
for the protection of pre-investment interests, since the Germany-Poland BIT requires investors to be ‘entitled to 
engage in investments’ (and not to have made an investment) and future investments enjoy some minimal protection 
(namely, to be admitted in compliance with domestic law and enjoy FET, see Article 2(1) of the BIT). 
372 Nations Energy Corporation above (n 224) para. 410-415. 
373 Tulip above (n 129) para. 231. 
374 Cambodia Power Company v. Kingdom of Cambodia above (n 55). 
375 Ibid., para. 257-259. See also Province of East Kalimantan v. PT Kaltim Prima Coal above (n 14) para. 201.  
376 Normally, shares in companies incorporated in the home State cannot be considered protected investments. See 
Berschader above (n 157) para. 121, and separate opinion by Todd Weiler (which concurs on this point), para. 9-10. 
377 For an overview of the practice, see David Gaukrodger, ‘Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims: Analysis of 
Treaty Practice’ (2014) OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2014/03, at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxvk6shpvs4-en. See also David Gaukrodger, ‘Investment Treaties as Corporate Law: 
Shareholder Claims and Issues of Consistency’ (2013) OECD Working Paper on Investment 2013/3, at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3w9t44mt0v-en. See also Martin J Valasek and Patrick Dumberry, ‘Developments in the 
Legal Standing of Shareholders and Holding Corporations in Investor-State Disputes’ (2011) ICSID Review 73. 
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locus standi in proceedings hinging on the treatment granted to the company by the host State. 
Their right proceeds from a dedicated provision, like Article 1117(1) NAFTA378 and Article 
1(6)(b) ECT379 or, more commonly, from the inclusion of shares in the definition of investment in 
treaties and statutes.380 Claims based on shareholding in an investment and claims based on 
(indirect) investments are theoretically distinct, but not mutually exclusive: 
…under investment treaties, investments can just as well consist of a shareholding in a 
local company, as of the investments made by a local company, controlled by successive 
intermediate companies. The investor “steps into the shoes” of the local company and 
claims for damages suffered by the local company as if it had been inflicted, on a pro rata 
basis, on itself. … Each type of investment gives rise to specific legal questions: in the case 
of shares, whether the value of the shareholding is affected; in case of indirect investments, 
whether the rights of the local company have been violated.381 
Since companies can be investors and bring a claim in their own right, the possibility of 
shareholders’ claims is particularly relevant when the company is incorporated in the host State 
but the shareholders are foreign (of a treaty-protected nationality). This scenario, incidentally, is 
proximate to that contemplated by Article 25(2)(b) ICSID, which allows a local company to bring 
claims on its own behalf on grounds of foreign control. This possibility, which depends on State 
consent, is legally distinct from the standing rights of shareholders382: it does not rule out the right 
of foreign shareholders to bring a claim on their own behalf.383 Moreover, shareholders claims and 
claims brought by a local company under Article 25(2)(b) ICSID are subject to different 
conditions.384 Primarily, while foreign shareholders can bring claim by virtue of their owning the 
local investment, the local company seeking to be treated as a foreign one under the exception of 
Article 25(2)(b) ICSID must base its claim on foreign control. Ownership and control can be 
related, but they are distinct: ownership is a formal requirement whereas the exercise of control 
must exist objectively to meet the ‘foreign control’ requirement.385 
                                                 
378 ‘An investor of a Party, on behalf of an enterprise of another Party that is a juridical person that the investor owns 
or controls directly or indirectly, may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim …’ (emphasis added). Note 
however that: a) control is necessary to bring the claim and b) the claim is brought on behalf of the company. 
379 According to which ‘investment’ includes ‘a company or business enterprise, or shares, stock, or other forms of 
equity participation in a company or business enterprise.’ 
380 See Gaukrodger (2013) above (n 377) 25 ff. 
381 Flemingo above (n 332) para. 310. 
382 Vivendi I annulment above (n 81) para. 50. 
383 Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on Objections to 
Jurisdiction of 11 May 2005, para. 42; CMS above (n 86) para. 51. 
384 Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, above (n 26) para. 5.53. Since the claimant companies could bring a claim on their own 
behalf as shareholders, they did not need to request the waivers of their subsidiaries as per the provision of Article 
XIII(12)(a)(iii) of the BIT between Canada and Ecuador. 
385 National Gas S.A.E v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/7, Award of 3 April 2014, para. 133, 
citing Vacuum Salt above (n 49); see also Banro above (n 295); TSA Spectrum above (n 42) para. 147, 153. See also 
Plama above (n 175) para. 170: ‘control includes control in fact.’ Guardian Fiduciary Trust, Ltd, f/k/a Capital 
Conservator Savings & Loan, Ltd v. Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/31, Award 
of 22 September 2015, para. 134: ‘The issue of control is therefore ultimately a matter of evidence and cannot be 
determined solely on the basis of an analysis of [domestic] law.’ 
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For shareholders to qualify as investors there is no inherent requirement to control the company; 
minority shareholders are equally entitled,386 and their claim is pro quota (that is, claims and 
remedies are measured upon the fraction of the company held by them387). Moreover, shareholders 
(including indirect ones388) can normally bring investment claims irrespective of company 
recourse389 or of claims brought by shareholders at a different level of the corporate ladder.390 In 
addition, shareholders at an intermediate position in the corporate structure can bring claims, 
without either directly owning the shares of the investment nor being the ultimate beneficiaries 
thereof.391 
A case of lack of jurisdiction ratione personae (which could also be construed as a flaw ratione 
materiae) is the lack of standing of shareholders that seek to enforce treaty-based protection over 
the assets of their companies – which sometimes can be considered the investments of their 
investment.392 The formal distinction between a company and its shareholders under international 
law393 colours the applicable regime, and distinguish the scenario from that of indirect control in 
the investment. The case Poštová Banka v. Greece394 summarises the prevailing principle.395 At 
stake was the claim brought by a Slovak bank holding Greek sovereign bonds. When Greece 
refused to repay the bonds in full, the Slovak bank brought an investment claim, accompanied by 
one of its shareholders, a Cypriot company. The latter, in particular, sought to bring a claim resting 
on the bonds held by the Slovak company, rather than on its own shares therein.396 The claim was 
rejected: tribunals are competent to entertain shareholders’ claims regarding their investment (for 
instance, allegations that the host State has breached the treaty and caused the loss of value of their 
                                                 
386 Lanco International Inc. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 8 December 1998, para. 10; ST-AD above (n 18) para. 275. 
387 See for instance the dictum in United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, Award on the 
Merits of 24 May 2007, para. 35: ‘UPS is the sole owner of UPS Canada. As such, it is entitled to file a claim for its 
losses, including losses incurred by UPS Canada. If there were multiple owners and divided ownership shares for 
UPS Canada, the question of how much of UPS Canada’s losses flow through to UPS – the question posed by Canada 
here – may have a very different purchase.’ 
388 Whereas the precise legal standard might vary from treaty to treaty, indirect investments are routinely considered 
to qualify as investments. See for instance Hesham T. M. Al Warraq v. Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final 
Award of 15 December 2014, para. 510-511. Other decisions in this sense, based on different investment treaties, are 
cited in support. See also Berschader above (n 157) para. 112, where the tribunal accepts that the protection of 
investments granted in the applicable treaty covers ‘indirect investments made by investors of one of the Contracting 
Parties in the territory of the other Contracting Party by the intermediary of an investor of a third state.’ See Ioannis 
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 July 2007, para. 123-124; Tza 
Yap Shum above (n 156) para. 106-111; Mobil above (n 48) para. 162-166. 
389 See Eskosol S.p.A. in liquidazione v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/50, Decision on Respondent’s 
Application under Rule 41(5) of 20 March 2017, para. 170. 
390 Flemingo above (n 332) para. 339. 
391 Ibid. para. 325. 
392 This is the position, incidentally, taken by the European Court of Human Rights, which normally rejects the 
applications brought under Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (right to property) by the shareholders, with respect to the assets 
of the company, see for instance Agrotexim v. Greece (application 14807/89) (1995) 21 EHRR 250. For an overview 
on this point, see Ursula Kriebaum, ‘The Nature of Investment Disciplines’ in Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn and 
Jorge E Viñuales, The Foundations of International Investment Law (OUP 2014) 45, 53-54. 
393 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1970, 3, 32.  
394 Poštová Banka above (n 225). 
395 See also ST-AD above (n 18) para. 278; CMS above (n 86) para. 68; Paushok above (n 114) para. 202. 
396 Poštová Banka above (n 225) para. 228. 
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shares) but have ‘no jurisdiction to deal, in whatever manner, with property which does not belong 
to [the shareholders]’,397 such as the assets of their company. 
In the Berschader case, the majority of the tribunal reached a similar conclusion, when dealing 
with a case of compound indirectness of the investment: the claimants owned shares in a company 
incorporated in the home State, holding assets in the host State (contracts, property, credit rights). 
Their claims, ultimately, regarded assets in the host State held in turn by assets in the home State 
(the company) which could not qualify as foreign investments. In spite of the treaty’s express 
coverage of indirect investments held through companies in third States,398 the tribunal held that 
investments made through a corporate vehicle in the home State are not implitictly protected as 
indirect investments too.399 The apparently odd result (vehicles in third parties can be used, whilst 
vehicles in the home State cannot) must be read in light of the obvious assumption that such vehicle 
could normally bring a treaty claim in its own right, as a home-State investor with investments in 
the host State.400 
An apparently different conclusion was reached by the ad hoc Committee in the annulment 
proceedings of the Azurix v. Argentina award.401 In the decision, the Committee noted that the 
‘legal and contractual rights’ of the company (ABA) could be regarded as investment of the 
shareholder (Azurix).402 Possibly, the conclusion depended on the specific wording of the 
US/Argentina BIT, which qualified as ‘investment’ all ‘interests … in the assets [of a 
company]’,403 and on the specific quality of the shareholder (which was controlling the company 
and had had an active role in the acquisition of the assets at stake). 
Nationality of investors 
Nationality is a critical element for jurisdiction, since investors which are nationals of the host 
State and/or do not possess the eligible nationality under an investment treaty are normally not 
entitled to bring an investment claim. 
                                                 
397 ST-AD above (n 18) para. 284. 
398 Which led an arbitrator to reach a different conclusion, see Todd Weiler’s separate opinion in Berschader above 
(n 157) para. 11-14. 
399 Berschader above (n 157) para. 150. 
400 This possibility was precluded in the Berschader case, because the vehicle had been declared bankrupt. See ibid., 
para. 149: ‘The reason why the Claimants, and not BI [the Belgian vehicle], are bringing a claim under the Treaty is 
that the Claimants no longer control BI since that company has been declared bankrupt. The Tribunal does not believe 
that the purpose of the Treaty is to help shareholders overcome this kind of obstacle.’ 
401 Azurix Corp v. Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Decision on the Application for Annulment of 1 September 
2009. 
402 Ibid., para. 94: ‘…the wording of Article I(1)(a) of the BIT embraces that ABA itself would be an “investment” of 
Azurix for purposes of the BIT, since ABA is a company … owned and controlled directly or indirectly by Azurix … 
Although assets of ABA would as a matter of law belong to ABA and not to Azurix, Azurix nonetheless had, by virtue 
of its controlling shareholding in ABA, “interests in the assets” of ABA (Article I(1)(a)(ii)), … Additionally, the legal 
and contractual rights of ABA (Article I(1)(a)(v)), including the rights of ABA under the Concession, being indirectly 
controlled by Azurix through its majority shareholding in …, would similarly be “investments” of Azurix for the 
purposes of the BIT.’ (emphasis added). 
403 Article I(1)(ii). 
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In the case of natural persons, the analysis is relatively straightforward. In Soufraki v. UAE, for 
example, the claimant’s failure to prove his Italian citizenship in the face of the respondent’s 
objections led the tribunal to decline jurisdiction to hear the claim.404 In Waguih Elie Siag v. Egypt, 
the tribunal applied Egyptian law and rebutted the presumption of Egyptian nationality of the 
investor, based on the certificates of nationality relied upon by the respondent.405 In Burimi v. 
Albania, the claimant was an Albanian company, relying on ‘foreign control’ under Article 
25(2)(b) ICSID and the applicable BIT406 to establish the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The company was 
indirectly owned, and controlled, by a dual national of Italy and Albania. The tribunal extended 
the principle against dual nationality of natural persons (when one is that of the host State)407 to 
the evaluation of the nationality of control, and concluded that – since the controller had dual 
nationality – the claimant could not be treated as an Italian company because of ‘foreign 
control’.408 The instrument establishing the jurisdiction of the tribunal might require, in lieu of a 
specific nationality, residence in a specific country.409 Whereas nationals who are (also) citizens 
of the host State cannot bring an ICSID claim,410 the possibility is not precluded outside the ICSID 
framework proceedings if the applicable BIT allows it, as an UNCITRAL tribunal held in García 
and García v. Venezuela.411 The tribunal in Cem Cenzig Uzan v. Turkey needed to determine 
whether a natural person satisfying the residency requirement at the time of the arbitration could 
qualify as investor even if, at the time of the investment, he was a national of, and resident in, the 
host State.412 The tribunal found that the claimant was missing an ‘essential transnational link’413: 
                                                 
404 Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. The United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Award of 7 July 2004, para. 
84 (jurisdiction) para. 88. This decision was impugned in annulment for breach of Art. 52(1)(b) (manifest excess of 
powers), without success, see Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of Mr Soufraki of 
5 June 2007. 
405 Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, and Partial Dissenting Opinion of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña of 11 April 2007, para. 
172 (because the investor had not made a request to retain Egyptian nationality upon obtaining Lebanese citizenship, 
he effectively lost Egyptian citizenship). In Champion Trading Company, Ameritrade International, Inc. v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9 (formerly Champion Trading Company, Ameritrade International, Inc., 
James T. Wahba, John B. Wahba, Timothy T. Wahba v. Arab Republic of Egypt), see Decision on Jurisdiction of 21 
October 2003, at stake was a similar presumption of Egyptian nationality of individuals born in the US by a US 
naturalised father (Egyptian nationality is automatically transmitted to children of Egyptian nationals). The father was 
unable to prove that he had validly renounced his Egyptian citizenship. This conclusion seemed to rely on a different 
reading of Egyptian law from the Waguih’s one and/or on a different presumption (instead of presuming that Egyptian 
citizenship lapsed upon naturalisation, the tribunal relied on evidence of the claimants relying on Egyptian citizenship 
to presume that it had been maintained).  
406 Namely, Article 8(3) of the Italy-Albania BIT. 
407 In Article 25(2)(a) ICSID. 
408 Burimi SRL and Eagle Games SH.A v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/18, Award of 29 May 2013, 
para. 121. 
409 That is the case for the ECT, of which Article 1(7)(a)(i) defines ‘investor’ as ‘[A] natural person having the 
citizenship or nationality of or who is permanently residing in that Contracting Party in accordance with its applicable 
law.’ 
410 See Champion above (n 405). 
411 García v. Venezuela above (n 305) 197 ff. 
412 Cem Cengiz Uzan v. Republic of Turkey, Award on Respondent’s Bifurcated Preliminary Objection of 20 April 
2016. 
413 Ibid. para. 152. 
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the investment was made in Turkey and Turkey committed the alleged breaches. Any subsequent 
change of residency would not suffice to make it an ‘investor’ under the ECT.414  
The analysis of the nationality of legal persons can be more complex. Layered corporate structures 
and restructuring operations might result in a claimant changing nationality and/or having a 
tenuous link with its formal State of nationality (or, better, in claimant’s nationality having little 
to do with the investment).415 In similar circumstances, the claimants’ use of their new/formal 
nationality to derive benefits from a specific treaty – including access to arbitration – might appear 
inappropriate. However, the prevailing principle in general international law is that the nationality 
of corporations depends on their place of incorporation416; the formal datum prevails over the 
substantive one when the two do not correspond.417 Accordingly, investors are free to structure 
their business as they deem fit so as to enjoy treaty protection; for instance, they can establish a 
corporate vehicle in a specific jurisdiction covered by a BIT with the host State,418 or choose a 
controller of a protected nationality when the exception under Article 25(2)(b) ICSID is 
available.419 The principle of good faith patrols the fine line between legitimate corporate 
governance and malicious nationality-shopping: 
                                                 
414 Contrast this conclusion with the reasoning of the Decision of the Paris Court of Appeal above (n 305), 6 (the lack 
of a protected nationality at the moment of the making of the investment was not fatal, if it was subsequently acquired 
before the breach occurred, and maintained until the claim). 
415 On the various strategies employed by multinational enterprises to benefit from treaties, and on how treaties could 
prevent abusive tactics, see Mark Feldman, ‘Multinational Enterprises and Investment Treaties’ (2017) Yearbook on 
International Investment Law and Policy (forthcoming). 
416 Of course, international law might provide for specific criteria that would serve as lex specialis in specific cases, 
and domestic law might provide for a different rule, for instance the use of the siége sociale as decisive aspect. The 
applicable law will determine, in other words, whether the general principle of incorporation will apply. See, in 
general, Manuel Casas, ‘Nationalities of Convenience, Personal Jurisdiction, and Access to Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement’ (2016) 49 NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 63, 68-80. 
417 Barcelona Traction above (n 393) para. 56 ff (limiting the possibility of ‘lifting the corporate veil’ to exceptional 
cases). For instance, see Gold Reserve above (n 213) para. 252: ‘where the test for nationality is “incorporation” as 
opposed to control or a “genuine connection”, there is no need for the tribunal to enquire further unless some form 
of abuse has occurred. … It is irrelevant whether the company is headquartered at the location of incorporation or if 
it is the result of a corporate restructuring.’ The same conclusion was reached, for instance, in Isolux above (n 47) 
para. 668, 670 (the Respondent argued, unsuccessfully, that piercing the veil would be required, since the investor had 
no real presence in the Netherlands, and was controlled by Spanish and Canadian shareholders). 
418 See Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Partial Award of 17 March 2006, para. 229: ‘The 
parties having agreed that any legal person constituted under their laws is entitled to invoke the protection of the 
Treaty, and having so agreed without reference to any question of their relationship to some other third State 
corporation, it is beyond the powers of this Tribunal to import into the definition of “investor” some requirement 
relating to such a relationship having the effect of excluding from the Treaty’s protection a company which the 
language agreed by the parties included within it.’ See Soufraki above (n 404) 2004, para. 83; ADC Affiliate Ltd. and 
ADC & ADMC Mgmt. Ltd v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award of 2 October 2006, para. 357-
359; Mobil above (n 48) para. 204; Aguas del Tunari (n 111) para. 330(d). An overview of the practice is available in 
Christoph Schreuer, ‘Nationality Planning’ in Arthur W Ravine (ed), Contemporary Issues in International 
Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers (Brill 2012) 15-27, 19 ff. Consider in particular HICEE v. Slovakia, 
above (n 166) para. 103. 
419 In Guardian Fiduciary above (n 385), at stake was precisely the identity of the controlling investor. Whilst the 
putative controller had a Dutch nationality, the actual controller had not, which prevented the claimant from relying 
on the Dutch-FYROM treaty. 
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Such restructuring could be “legitimate corporate planning” as contended by the Claimants 
or an “abuse of right” as submitted by the Respondents. It depends upon the circumstances 
in which it happened.420 
The award in the case MNSS v. Montenegro421 supports this well-established view. A change of 
nationality will fail to provide treaty-protection only when the actual dispute has already arisen or 
a specific future dispute is foreseeable.422 In rejecting the respondent’s objection based on the 
nationality restructuring of claimant, the tribunal noted that it was an ‘objection to its jurisdiction 
based on ratione personae.’423 This apparently innocuous remark could be taken to prove that 
similar objections relate to the jurisdiction of the tribunal rather than the admissibility of the claim 
– an arguably preferable characterisation, see the discussion below in respect of the Philip Morris 
v. Australia dispute. 
Whilst ownership-engineering to accede a protected nationality is allowed in principle, the 
nationality of a trust or of its trustee might be insufficient to satisfy the requirements ratione 
personae. In Blue Bank, the claimant was a trustee from Barbados, acting on behalf of a trust 
established under the laws of Barbados. The applicable BIT defined investments as assets 
‘invested’ by ‘companies’.424 On the one hand, Barbadian trusts do not have a corporate identity425; 
on the other, the trustee had very limited powers that could not establish ownership and, therefore, 
had not ‘invested’ in the trust’s assets.426 Neither subject, therefore, met the basic requirements of 
the treaty; the tribunal declined jurisdiction. 
The instrument recording the State’s consent (whether domestic statute or investment treaty) can 
provide additional requirements ratione personae, for instance regulating the attribution of 
nationality to legal persons more strictly than does customary law. In Ampal v. Egypt,427 for 
instance, the US/Egypt BIT provided that a company would be regarded as a US company only 
when, besides being incorporated there, US natural persons have a ‘substantial interest’ in it.428 
The claimant showed the US residence of most shareholders, but was unable to prove that they 
were US citizens. The tribunal, however, relied on the presumption that at least some US residents 
are likely to be US citizens,429 and rejected the objection of the respondent State.430 
The host State was instead successful in the Venoklim v. Venezuela.431 The claim was brought 
under the joint provisions of a BIT and of the national investment law,432 which only applies to 
                                                 
420 Mobil v. Venezuela (n 388) para. 191. 
421 MNSS v. Montenegro above (n 37). 
422 Ibid. para. 182. 
423 Ibid. para. 183. 
424 Article 8(1) of the Barbados-Venezuela BIT. 
425 Blue Bank above (n 317) para. 165. See also Renta 4 above (n 176) para. 122, 127. These cases are without prejudice 
to the possibility that the governing law – domestic or otherwise – provide differently. For instance, NAFTA expressly 
includes trusts among the entities that qualify as ‘entreprise’ under Article 201(1).  
426 Blue Bank above (n 317) para. 168, 173. 
427 Ampal above (n 23). 
428 Article I(1)(b). 
429 A similar presumption was used by the Iran-US Tribunal in the case Flexi-Van v. Iran, CLA-224, 2-3. 
430 Ampal above (n 23) para. 121-123. 
431 Venoklim above (n 321). 
432 Ley de Promoción y Protección de Inversiones, promulgada mediante el Decreto No. 356 del 3 de octubre de 1999. 
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international investors, and requires international investors to own or control an international 
investment.433 Since the parties did not discuss the criterion of ownership, the tribunal focussed on 
the control of the investment, piercing the veil of several ownership layers and finding that the 
ultimate owners were Venezuelan.434 The tribunal’s dictum that treating the investor as a foreign 
one under Article 25 ICSID would be tantamount ‘to let formalism prevail over reality’435 is 
puzzling, because it seems to disregard the well-established view that incorporation – in the 
absence of specific safeguards resulting from different applicable rules – is the criterion for 
citizenship of corporations in international law. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the tribunal could 
simply disregard the possibility that the investor could in fact qualify as an international investor 
under the domestic law using the criterion of ownership (rather than control). Since this criterion 
is listed in the Venezuelan statute, the tribunal arguably had a duty to apply it, regardless of 
whether the parties discussed it (both because the tribunal should determine its jurisdiction proprio 
motu and under the principle jura novit curia). The Thunderbird v. Mexico case illustrates the 
interpretation of the specific NAFTA regime, which allows an investor that ‘owns or control’ an 
entreprise in the host State to bring an investment claim against it.436 The tribunal proceeded on 
the assumption that minority shareholding would not suffice to qualify as ‘owner’ and ascertained 
whether the claimants de facto controlled the entreprise.437 
 In Gaëta v. Guinea, 438 consent to ICSID arbitration was recorded in a domestic statute which only 
applied to ‘foreign claimants.’ Whereas the determination of the claimant’s foreign-ness under 
Guinean law was ultimately not necessary in the specific case,439 the requirement might have called 
for a different test than the customary one necessary to ascertain jurisdiction under Article 25(2)(b) 
ICSID. 
2. Admissibility Instances 
Arbitral practice with respect to admissibility is scarce, as the very notion of admissibility is far 
from established in this field.440 Especially in the context of ICSID arbitration, objections alleging 
the inadmissibility of the claim must overcome the tribunal’s reluctance to read admissibility into 
the Convention as an implicit notion.441 The doctrinal reasons behind the dubious pedigree of this 
                                                 
433 See Articles 3 and 22 of the Ley de Inversiones. 
434 Venoklim above (n 321) para. 147-149. 
435 Ibid., para. 156, my translation. 
436 See Article 1117.1 NAFTA. 
437 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Award of 26 January 
2006, para. 105-106: ‘The Tribunal does not follow Mexico’s proposition that Article 1117 of the NAFTA requires a 
showing of legal control. The term “control” is not defined in the NAFTA. Interpreted in accordance with its ordinary 
meaning, control can be exercised in various manners. Therefore, a showing of effective or “de facto” control is, in 
the Tribunal’s view, sufficient for the purposes of Article 1117 of the NAFTA . In the absence of legal control however, 
the Tribunal is of the opinion that de facto control must be established beyond any reasonable doubt.’ 
438 Gaëta above (n 46). 
439 The tribunal determined that the claimant, in spite of French incorporation, lacked French nationality, in light of 
French law. The reasons why French law was applied, even if customary international law might have led to a different 
conclusion, might have to do with the Claimant’s strategy to invoke it, see para. 128, 137, 139. 
440 Andrew Newcombe, ‘Investor Misconduct: Jurisdiction, Admissibility or Merits?’ in Brown and Miles above (n 
23) 187-200, 193, noting that it is not even accepted widely that tribunals have to power ‘to dismiss a claim as 
inadmissible.’ 
441 Rompetrol above (n 48) para. 115. 
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procedural institution are explained more fully below.442 At this stage, suffice it to note that the 
procedural relevance of retaining admissibility as a separate grounds for preliminary objections is 
very limited, as these will be normally lumped together with the challenges to the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal, when bifurcation is granted.  
References to admissibility in the practice are common but rarely respond to, or reflect, a systemic 
doctrine. In BIVAC v. Paraguay the tribunal cared to split the host State’s objections regarding the 
umbrella clause claim in two. Paraguay’s claim that the umbrella clause could not turn a contract 
claim into a treaty one was a jurisdictional objection (and it was rejected). Paraguay’s claim that 
the exclusive forum-selection clause in the contract prevented the tribunal from hearing the 
umbrella clause claim, instead, was an objection to its admissibility (which was upheld).443 
Coordination with parallel, potential or past proceedings (under the principles res judicata, lis alibi 
pendens, electa una via, forum non conveniens) is precisely a matter that often leads tribunals to 
declare the claim’s inadmissibility, rather than their own lack of jurisdiction. The dispute falls 
under their institutional mandate, but there is an external reason (loosely concerned with the abuse 
of processes) why they should not exercise it in the specific instance.444 Objections to parallel 
proceedings are not always successful, mainly due to the difficulty to prove the triple identity 
between them.445 
Besides these instances of regulation of multiple proceedings, and a diverse set of other cases in 
which admissibility was used or at least invoked,446 there are two issues which have arisen 
systematically and which tribunals tend to handle resorting to the category of inadmissibility. First, 
a claim can be inadmissible when it constitutes an abuse of process (1). Second, the investor’s 
misconduct can lead to the tribunal’s dismissal of the claim as inadmissible in accordance with the 
clean hands doctrine (2). Other instances where admissibility is used, but the practice is 
controversial, are discussed in the second half of the next Part of this essay. 
1. Abuse of process 
                                                 
442 See Part B. 
443 Bureau Veritas above (n 31) para. 142. 
444 For a discussion of some relevant cases, see Eric De Brabandere, ‘‘Good Faith’,‘Abuse of Process’ and the 
Initiation of Investment Treaty Claims’ (2012) 3(3) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 609-636, 630-632. In 
Hochtief above (n 181) para. 90, the tribunal found that a claim might be inadmissible by virtue of lis pendens or 
forum non conveniens. Likewise, see SGS v. Philippines above (n 38) para. 170, footnote 95. Conversely, In S.A.R.L. 
Benvenuti & Bonfant v. People’s Republic of the Congo, ICSID/ARB/77/2, Award of 8 August 1980 (not public), 
para. 1.13 and 1.14, the tribunal discussed lis pendens as a jurisdictional issue. 
445 Champion Trading International, Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, Award on 
Jurisdiction of 21 October 2003, para. 3.4.3 (because the claimants before ICSID and the claimant before the Egyptian 
Conseil d’Etat were not the same, there was no reason to reject the ICSID claim); Alex Genin above (n 89) para. 331. 
446 See for instance Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. 
UN3467, Award of 1 July 2004, para. 80 and 92 (the expropriation claim was manifestly groundless and was rejected 
as inadmissible); H&H Enterprises Investments, Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB 09/15, Decision 
on Objections to Jurisdiction of 5 June 2012, para. 86-88 (the objection based on an equitable principle of prescription 
– the claim was brought too late – is rejected because the respondent has not demonstrated its existence). 
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The grand arrêt for the doctrine of abuse of process in investment arbitration is the Phoenix v. 
Czech Republic case.447 In that case, the host State argued that the claimant was a sham Israeli 
company, established by a Czech individual only to obtain the right to launch arbitration under the 
BIT. The tribunal concluded that the claimant, indeed, had engaged in bad faith conduct.448 It 
ultimately declared its lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae (bad faith investments cannot be 
covered by the consent of the State parties, as codified in the applicable treaty) rather than 
inadmissibility of a claim on grounds of bad faith (abuse of process).449 The decision of the ST-
AD tribunal followed closely the reasoning in the Phoenix award and found a lack of jurisdiction.450 
Some recent decisions, instead, construed abuse of process as grounds for inadmissibility or at 
least contemplated this legal characterisation.451 In Levy v. Peru, the tribunal held that ‘the 
characterization of the abuse of process objection as a jurisdictional or as an admissibility issue 
can be left open in the present case’.452 It recalled approvingly the dictum of the Pac Rim decision, 
that it was not worthy clinging on to ‘a distinction without a difference’.453 However, the tribunal 
noted that the objection based on the abuse of process was not directed at the jurisdiction ratione 
temporis of the tribunal – which had been established – but to its exercise.454 The claimant (Ms. 
Levy) appeared to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements ratione personae and temporis, after 
acquiring shareholding in the investment eight days before the challenged measures.455 The 
tribunal correctly clarified that the acquisition of an investment after the challenged measures or 
after the dispute is squarely a problem of jurisdiction.456 Beforehand, when no dispute is at the 
horizon, nationality and corporate restructuring is legitimate. Therefore, the temporal room 
available for abuse of process to occur is narrowly framed between the time when the dispute 
becomes foreseeable and the time when the challenged measures are actually passed. The critical 
question, of course, is what counts as foreseeable. The threshold is high: the dispute must be highly 
probable and not just possible.457 In the instant case, the sudden transfer of shares which qualified 
Ms. Levy as investor was clearly carried out with the sole purpose of bringing a claim taking avail 
of her nationality, at a time when she must have known about the forthcoming measure.458 
In the Philip Morris v. Australia case, the tribunal rejected the claim as inadmissible, upon a 
finding that the claimant had artificially acquired Hong Kong nationality to launch abusively the 
arbitration. As noted above, the nationality was obtained in time for the tribunal to have jurisdiction 
                                                 
447 Phoenix above (n 254). 
448 Ibid., para. 144: ‘the claimant’s initiation and pursuit of the arbitration [was] an abuse of the system of 
international ICSID investment arbitration.’ 
449 On this approach, see the comments of Shany above (n 25) 142. 
450 ST-AD above (n 18) para. 421-422. 
451 An exception seems to be the reasoning of the tribunal in Cervin above (n 60) para. 287 ff, which refers to 
jurisdiction ratione voluntatis. However, resort to this catch-all category and reliance on the precedents using 
inadmissibility seem to suggest that the tribunal reasoned in terms of inadmissibility, as does the express attribution 
of the onus probandi to the respondent. 
452 Levy v. Peru above (n 251) para. 181. 
453 Pac Rim v. El Salvador above (n 302) para. 2.10 
454 Levy v. Peru above (n 251) para. 182. See also Lao Holdings above (n 247) para. 72-79. 
455 Levy v. Peru above (n 251) para. 161. 
456 Ibid., footnote 218. 
457 Pac Rim v. El Salvador above (n 302) para. 2.99; Tidewater above (n 137) para. 194; Lao Holdings above (n 247) 
para. 76. 
458 Ibid., para. 195. 
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over the claim (that is, before the adoption of the contentious measures). However, the tribunal 
surmised that the dispute with Australia was at least foreseeable at the time of the nationality 
restructuring,459 and rejected the claim as inadmissible. In the Lao Holding v. Laos460 case, the 
tribunal recalled the Phoenix doctrine461 and aligned it with the later cases’ distinction that hinges 
on the critical time at which the protected nationality is acquired (if before the breach/dispute, 
abuse of right can be invoked; if afterwards, lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis).462 Whilst the 
tribunal did not go as far as explicitly ascribing to admissibility the objection relating to the abuse 
of right, it expressly contrasted it with the jurisdictional objection, and considered it waivable by 
the respondent.463 
In the case Isolux v. Spain, the investor acquired the protected nationality (Dutch) two months 
before the passing of the long-anticipated State measures later challenged in the claim. However, 
the tribunal characterised the move as ‘legitimate corporate planning’,464 simply noting that the 
corporate restructuring preceded the rising of the dispute.465 The matter was clearly treated as one 
of jurisdiction ratione temporis rather than admissibility – a somewhat lamentable simplification 
since the objection had been expressly advanced as one based on abuse of process.466 The Cervin 
v. Costa Rica tribunal focused the analysis differently; it held that what matters for jurisdiction 
ratione temporis is not so much whether a dispute was foreseeable at the critical time, but whether 
the investor acted in bad faith.467 When it comes to jurisdiction ratione voluntatis, however, an 
objection can succeed if the respondent proves that the investor made the investment – and 
acquired a protected nationality – ‘with the only purpose of benefitting abusively from a procedural 
advantage.’468 
In the TGGE case469 the tribunal examined the preliminary objection alleging the investor’s abuse 
of process. Whereas the tribunal did not expressly qualify abuse of process as a matter of 
                                                 
459 Arguably, the tribunal construed extensively a principle that was already established in the case-law, which 
concerned disputes that pre-dated the acquiring of nationality. See for instance Aguas del Tunari above (n 111) para. 
330 and Tidewater above (n 137) para. 145–146 and 184. The ‘foreseeability’ criterion seems to derive only from the 
cases Pac Rim v. El Salvador above (n 302) para. 2.99 (where it is conceded that the distinction between is the ‘very 
high probability’ of a foreseeable dispute and an existing dispute is a ‘thin red line’) and Levy v. Peru above (n 251) 
para. 185. 
460 Lao Holdings above (n 247). 
461 Note that Brigitte Stern acted as chair in the Phoenix tribunal, and as respondent-appointee in the Lao Holdings 
one. 
462 Lao Holdings above (n 247) para. 71, citing in Mobil v. Venezuela 2010 Jurisdiction above (n *) 205. 
463 Lao Holdings above (n 247) para. 83. This approach would suggest that the objection did not go to the jurisdiction 
of the tribunal, otherwise it would have been expected to entertain it proprio motu. See in this respect the reasoning 
of the Berkowitz above (n 246) para. 225: ‘the Tribunal notes that an assessment of whether jurisdiction exists in 
respect of a given dispute is required of all tribunals, whether a party raises the issue or not.’ 
464 Isolux v. Spain above (n 47) para. 701, citing Mobil above (n 48) 
465 Isolux v. Spain above (n 47) para. 704: ‘el conflicto es posterior a la restructuración discutida y a la colocación 
de la inversión en una sociedad holandesa.’ 
466 In other words, there was no issue in this case of a possible waiver of the abuse of right objection, as it was the 
case in the Lao Holdings proceedings, see above (n 247) and accompanying text. 
467 Cervin above (n 60) para. 285. 
468 Ibid., para. 292. My translation, the original reads: ‘con el único propósito de lograr indebidamente una ventaja 
procesal.’ 
469 TGGE v. Panama above (n 86). 
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admissibility, this characterisation would follow from the remark of the tribunal, noting that at 
stake was not its jurisdiction tout court but only its exercise: 
The Tribunal has chosen to consider this objection [relating to abuse of process] first, 
because the existence of abuse of process is a threshold issue that would bar the exercise 
of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction even if jurisdiction existed.470 
The tribunal, indeed, noted that the Claimant had attempted to ‘create artificial international 
jurisdiction over a pre-existing domestic dispute.’471 This attempt took the form of a contract 
whereby a local company was established, under the joint control of a Panama individual and a 
US company which held the majority of the shares. However, the tribunal held that, in spite of the 
ownership arrangements, the Panama individual retained de facto control of the company, while 
intending ‘at the same time to benefit from the foreign nationality of TGGE for the purpose of 
pursuing this arbitration.’472 In other words, the entry on stage of the US company did not alter, 
in the facts, the nature of the claimant, which was a local individual managing a local company. 
The timing and circumstances of the corporate reconfiguration, moreover, were revealing. The US 
company only came into play after it appeared that Panama would not execute certain judicial 
decisions in favour of the Claimant – the circumstances might have warranted using the 
foreseeability criterion used in Philip Morris v. Australia. Moreover, the Claimant’s manager 
repeatedly conceded that arbitral proceedings were a safety net, launched in case the host State did 
not comply with the domestic rulings.473 
In AMPAL, the host State argued that the claimant’s alleged abuse of process resulted in four 
parallel arbitration proceedings (two sets of commercial arbitration, two investment disputes). The 
tribunal conceded that the dispute overlap might seem abusive, but that no problem emerged upon 
closer scrutiny. The commercial disputes were distinguishable from those based on treaty claims. 
The latter, in turn, were brought by separate investors (different shareholders in the investment) 
and their parallel development was not abusive per se.474 However, the tribunal noted that the 
claimants in the two investment proceedings were seeking overlapping remedies from the same 
respondent, creating the risk of double recovery, an actual manifestation of abuse of process.475 
The tribunal noted that the abuse was not identifiable a priori: the attempt to bring different claims 
in different fora was legitimate and made in good faith. Nonetheless, since the tribunal in the 
parallel proceedings had upheld jurisdiction, the prospect of parallel proceedings reviewing the 
merits of partly overlapping claims had materialised.476 To cure the resulting abuse of process, the 
                                                 
470 Ibid., para. 100. See Pac Rim v. El Salvador above (n 302) para. 2.10. 
471 TGGE v. Panama (n 555) para. 118. 
472 Ibid., para. 111.  
473 So much so that, in a few occasions, Claimant requested the suspension of the arbitration proceedings when it 
seemed that Panama would comply with its domestic rulings without problems. 
474 Ampal above (n 23) para. 329. The attempts to consolidate the investment claims into one set of proceedings failed 
because only one of the two could use the ICSID framework, and the parties disagreed, respectively, to have a 
consolidation under ICSID or under UNCITRAL rules. 
475 The parallel investment dispute is the UNCITRAL case Mr. Yosef Maiman and Others v. Egypt, which is 
confidential. 
476 Ampal above (n 23) para. 333: ‘the abuse of process constituted by the double pursuit of the [specific] portion of 
the claim in both proceedings must now be treated as having crystallised.’ 
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tribunal invited the claimant to elect to pursue the relevant portion of the claim only in the ICSID 
proceedings before it, therefore forfeiting it in the parallel UNCITRAL proceedings.477 
The Orascom case evinced another permutation of abuse of process, which resulted in the 
inadmissibility of the claim. At stake were parallel claims brought by entities in the same corporate 
structure – the claimant being one of the indirect shareholders of a local company affected by the 
State measures.478 Because the applicable BIT protected shares as an investment, none of the 
claims fell outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction,479 no matter how indirect the shareholding. However, 
the tribunal framed the issue of multiple claims as one of admissibility: 
If the harm incurred by one entity in the chain is fully repaired in one arbitration, the claims 
brought by other members of the vertical chain in other arbitral proceedings may become 
inadmissible depending on the circumstances.480 
It then examined whether the damages sought by the claimant, relating to the diminution of values 
of its shares in the local investment, had already formed the object of arbitral requests by the local 
company or by an intermediate holding company.481 Moreover, the intermediate holding company 
had reached a settlement with the host State, which brought a PCA arbitration to an end. Insofar 
as the settlement agreement stood in lieu of an arbitral award, the Orascom tribunal found that it 
‘put[]an end to the dispute arising from Algeria’s measures’482 and, therefore, the claimant could 
not re-litigate claims that had thus ceased to exist. 
The Orascom tribunal did not limit itself to find the claims inadmissible for these reasons. It noted 
‘[i]n addition’483 that the claimant also committed an abuse of rights by pursuing its claim. The 
tribunal referred to the doctrine’s status as general principle to introduce its operation in a scenario 
hitherto unregulated.484 It is doubtful whether the tribunal really pointed to a discrete ground for 
inadmissibility; the tribunal appeared rather to abstract from the specific conclusions of the case a 
more general framework for abuse of process in the case of multiple claims, applicable also to 
other scenarios. Citing the risk of multiple recoveries and conflicting decisions, in cases where a 
remedy has already been sought, the tribunal remarked: 
where multiple treaties offer entities in a vertical chain similar procedural rights of access 
to an arbitral forum and comparable substantive guarantees, the initiation of multiple 
                                                 
477 Ibid., 339. The tribunal stressed the advantage of ICSID protection that would follow the election, and the 
mechanism of exclusive jurisdiction envisaged by Article 26 ICSID: ‘Consent of the parties to arbitration under this 
Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy.’ 
478 Orascom above (n 48) para. 495. 
479 Ibid. footnote 764: ‘The Tribunal may dispense with determining whether it is appropriate to fix a cut-off point 
beyond which an investor is “too far removed” to have a claim.’ 
480 Ibid. para. 495. 
481 Ibid. para. 518: ‘the claims before the Tribunal in reality seek reparation for losses covered by the requests for 
relief raised in the OTH Arbitration [involving an intermediate shareholder].’ 
482 Ibid., para. 524. 
483 Ibid., para. 539. 
484 All previous resort to abuse of process arguments concerned cases of abusive restructuring of the nationality of the 
investment or investor, see above. 
69 
 
proceedings to recover for essentially the same economic harm would entail the exercise 
of rights for purposes that are alien to those for which these rights were established.485 
The tribunal unsurprisingly evoked the CME/Lauder precedent, less to distinguish it than to reject 
it, in light of a better and ‘evolved’ case-law.486 In light of such evolution, the tribunal felt confident 
to extend the notion of abuse of process, to avoid frustrating the principles and ‘the very purposes 
underlying the conclusion of [investment] treaties.’487 
This doctrine could apply in the pending Eskosol v. Italy case.488 The claimant is a local company, 
owned at 80% by a Belgian investor, seeking to bring a claim because of foreign control. The 
Belgian investor had already brought an ICSID dispute against the same measures, and lost on the 
merits.489 Italy brought proceedings under Rule 41.5 and alleged, among other things, that 
Eskosol’s claim was duplicative and should have been barred by virtue of res judicata or ne bis in 
idem. The tribunal declined to throw out the claim, noting that claims brought by the investor and 
by its shareholders belonged to different subjects, hence presumptively failed the triple identity 
test – a conclusion redolent of that reached by the AMPAL tribunal.490 It also remarked that the 
shareholder only represented 80% of the claimant’s shares, making the case distinguishable from 
RSM v. Grenada (see below).491 Interestingly, the tribunal expressed sympathy at the position of 
the host State, forced to fend off repeatedly what essentially amounted to the same claims. 
However, it noted that the current design of ICSID and the applicable treaty allowed separate 
claims for corporations and shareholders: 
neither the ICSID system as presently designed, nor the ECT itself, incorporate clear 
avenues (much less a requirement) for joinder in a single proceeding of all stakeholders 
potentially affected by the outcome. Absent such a system – which States have the power 
to create if they so wish – it would not be appropriate for tribunals to preclude arbitration 
by qualified investors, simply because other qualified investors may have proceeded before 
them without their participation.492 
                                                 
485 Orascom above (n 48) para. 543. Note that whilst the tribunal in Flemingo seemed to endorse a different approach, 
the fact that one of the parallel claims was discontinued essentially defused the risk of conflicting decisions or double 
recovery, see Flemingo above (n 332) para. 339, 347. 
486 Consolidation of virtually identical cases plays in favour of the Respondent, because it reduces the opportunity of 
adverse findings. In this light, it is fair to note that the Czech Republic refused consolidation of the CME and Lauder 
claims. A similar scenario occurred in the case of the Lao Holdings and Sanum claims against Laos. See Lao Holdings 
above (n 247) para. 367: ‘Does the pursuit of overlapping claims in two different arbitral tribunals established under 
two different BITs by different parties constitute an abuse of process? As already observed above, it is undisputed that 
the Respondent refused to consolidate this proceeding and the Lao Holdings Arbitration. This fact is sufficient ground 
for the Tribunal to consider that there is no abuse of process.’ 
487 Orascom above (n 48) para. 547: ‘it cannot be denied that in the fifteen years that have followed those cases, the 
investment treaty jurisprudence has evolved, including on the application of the principle of abuse of rights (or abuse 
of process)’. 
488 Eskosol above (n 283). 
489 Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, Award of 
27 December 2016. 
490 Eskosol above (n 389) para. 166: ‘A shareholder’s claim for its reflective loss through an entity in which it holds 
shares cannot be equated automatically to that entity’s claim for its direct losses.’ 
491 Ibid., para. 168-169. 
492 Ibid., para. 170 
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This conclusion is in apparent tension with the doctrine of abuse of process formulated in Orascom. 
In that occasion, the tribunal considered that ‘preclud[ing] arbitration’ was indeed possible, even 
in the absence of an institutionalised system created by the parties. Whereas certain factual 
differences might be used to explain the different outcomes of the two cases (most importantly, 
the summary nature of all findings of Rule 41.5 proceedings), the statements of principle made by 
the tribunals point evidently in different directions, with regard to the management of corporate 
versus shareholders’ claims. 
The approach advocated by the Orascom tribunal had found an easy application in the RSM v. 
Grenada case.493 In that case, the tribunal endorsed the parties’ characterisation of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel,494 which bars re-litigation of a finding regarding matters that had already been 
discussed and determined in prior proceedings, and which were ‘necessary to resolving the 
claims’495 put forward therein. Crucially, this doctrine refers to determinations already made 
(‘issue preclusion’) rather than legal claims: it does not mirror the res judicata, lis pendens and ne 
bis in idem claim-based doctrines. Therefore, certain matters of contracts law decided by a previous 
tribunal – including in commercial or domestic arbitration496 – could not be re-opened,497 and led 
to the tribunal’s summary dismissal of the claims that hinged on their re-litigation. The conclusion 
was reached even if the claimants in the two cases were different: the prior one involved an 
investor, the subsequent one its 100% shareholders. The tribunal noted: 
The three individual Claimants collectively own 100% of RSM’s stock and therefore 
entirely control the corporation. In these circumstances, we agree with Respondent, that 
there is nothing unfair in holding them to the results of RSM’s Prior Arbitration.498 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel – an atypical kind of estoppel, see below for other categories – 
seeks to curb abuse in parallel or multiple proceedings, but only operates on specific issues. It does 
not preclude the tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction of a claim, only its consideration of certain 
matters. Without triple identity, tribunals hesitate to decline jurisdiction, but collateral estoppel or 
simple persuasion by arguments might at least align the findings of separate tribunals.499  
2. Investor’s clean hands and estoppel 
                                                 
493 RSM v. Grenada above (n 71). 
494 For a seminal formulation of the principle, see Amoco Asia Corporation v Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/81/1, Decision on Jurisdiction (Resubmitted Case) of 10 May 1988, para. 30. 
495 RSM v. Grenada above (n 71) para. 7.11. 
496 Helnan International Hotels A/S v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Award of 3July 2008, para. 6. 
497 RSM Production Corporation v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14, Award of 13 March 2009. 
498 RSM v. Grenada above (n 71) para. 7.1.6. 
499 In this sense, see the tribunal’s recommendation to the host State in the Eskosol case, following the rejection of the 
res judicata argument: ‘Italy is free later in this case to argue, if it so wishes, that the conclusions of the Blusun tribunal 
were persuasive and should be followed by this Tribunal, exercising its independent judgment.’ See Eskosol supra (n 
389) para. 172. Whilst in Eskosol the corporate claim followed the shareholders’ one, it might be possible to apply the 
rationale of the Grynberg tribunal’s dictum: ‘It is true that shareholders, under many systems of law, may undertake 
litigation to pursue or defend rights belonging to the corporation. However, shareholders cannot use such 
opportunities as both sword and shield. If they wish to claim standing on the basis of their indirect interest in corporate 
assets, they must be subject to defences that would be available against the corporation - including collateral 
estoppel.’ RSM v. Grenada above (n 71) para. 7.1.7. 
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Host States often invoke some form of misconduct allegedly committed by the investor to 
challenge the claim’s admissibility. As will be explained below in relation to the allegations of 
corruption, the matter is often discussed as one of jurisdiction ratione materiae, or even merits.500 
The purpose of this section is to observe a set of instances in which the tribunals characterised the 
State objections as going to the admissibility of the claims (or, at least, not to the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction) instead. 
A straightforward application of the doctrine of clean hands occurred in Hesham T.M. Al Warraq 
v. Indonesia. The claimant had verifiably engaged in fraudulent tactics and was recklessly 
oblivious to his duties under local law.501 The tribunal referred to a classic enunciation of the 
principle in common law, positing that ‘[n]o court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause 
of action upon an immoral or illegal act.’502 The claim was considered inadmissible and rejected. 
However, the tribunal did not apply a general principle of law alone, but relied on a specific and 
uncommon provision of the applicable investment treaty (the OIC Agreement503), imposing 
specific obligations on the investor. Specifically, investors are required to uphold ‘the laws and 
regulations in force in the host state and … refrain from all acts that … may be prejudicial to the 
public interest [and] from trying to achieve gains through unlawful means’.504 Therefore the 
tribunal found that since he had ‘breached the local laws and put the public interest at risk, he has 
deprived himself of the protection afforded by the OIC Agreement’.505 
The clean hands objection was discussed in detail in the Hulley v. Russia case.506 The tribunal 
ultimately held that the irregularities attributable to the investor were negligible, and did not decide 
whether the objection would bar the jurisdiction of the tribunal or deprive the investment of the 
treaty protections (by making the claim inadmissible).507 Crucially, whereas the tribunal was ready 
to construct the investment treaty so as to include a clean-hands requirement implicitly, it did not 
find the doctrine to exist under an autonomous rule of general international law.508 
In Awdi v. Romania the State’s assertion of the claim’s inadmissibility (based on the investor’s 
alleged misconduct) was countered by the claimant’s invocation of estoppel, which required a 
special decision on the admissibility of the State’s objection on admissibility.509 Romania had 
stated before the tribunal that the arbitration was not about the criminal liability of the investor, 
                                                 
500 See also Jorge Viñuales, ‘Investor Diligence in Investment Proceedings: Sources and Arguments’ (2016), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2827774, 15-16. 
501 Hesham above (n 388) para. 638-644. 
502 Namely, Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson (1775), 1 Cowp 341, an English contract law case decided by the 
Court of King’s Bench. The court did not uphold the claimant’s action for non-payment of a stock of tea, because he 
was aware that the purchaser intended to smuggle the tea from France into England. 
503 The Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments among Member States of the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference. 
504 OIC Agreement, Article 9. 
505 Hesham above (n 388) para. 645. 
506 Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 226, Final Award 
of 18 July 2014, para. 1343 ff. 
507 Ibid., para. 1353. 
508 Ibid., para. 1363. 
509 Mr. Hassan Awdi, Enterprise Business Consultants, Inc. and Alfa El Corporation v. Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/13, Decision on the Admissibility of the Respondent's Third Objection to Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 
Claimant’s Claims of 26 July 2013. 
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hence in the investor’s view it could not raise a clean-hands admissibility objection. The tribunal 
rejected the estoppel argument but reassured the claimant that, in assessing evidence drawn from 
the criminal proceedings, the tribunal should be guided by the presumption of innocence as a rule 
of public international law.510 The admissibility objection was equally rejected: the State had not 
proved convincingly its allegations (that the claimants had looted its company’s business and 
breached the rights of its employees), let alone provide ‘evidence at a level required to meet the 
threshold of inadmissibility, be it on the ground of misrepresentation and/or the principle of good 
faith in an investment arbitration.’511  
In Chevron v. Ecuador, the respondent claimed that the investor was estopped from bringing a 
denial of justice claim, since it had previously praised the work of the Ecuadorian judiciary in US 
domestic proceedings.512 The tribunal appeared to accept in principle the respondent’s objection, 
but held that it was not so strong, on the evidence, as to ‘exclude’ the claimant’s case prima facie.513 
At the stage of the merits the tribunal rejected the estoppel argument, finding that Ecuador had not 
‘overcome the presumption in favor of the Claimants’ right to bring their claims under the BIT.’514 
In Siag and Vecchi v. Egypt, the respondent argued that since the claimants had previously 
maintained to have Egyptian nationality they were estopped from asserting the contrary in the 
proceedings. The tribunal cited the ‘complete[ness]’ of the procedure set by Article 25 ICSID as 
reason to join the estoppel arguments to the phase of the merits.515 Treated together with the merits, 
and in spite of the tribunal’s refusal to consider it a preliminary issue in the merits phase, the matter 
of estoppel became an exception préliminaire du fond, akin to an objection of inadmissibility based 
on the investors’ alleged misconduct. Indeed, the tribunal looked into the behaviour of the 
investors and held that although they had indeed represented themselves as Egyptian nationals 
when they were not, they were not aware of having lost Egyptian citizenship. In light of their good 
faith conduct, ultimately, they were not estopped from denying their Egyptian nationality in the 
arbitration.516 
It is perhaps appropriate to end with the Copper Mesa tribunal, which characterised (illegality and 
clean hands) objections based on the post-establishment conduct of the investor as objections of 
inadmissibility.517 The ensuing decision – in that case – to treat the objections jointly with the 
merits, instead, is not capable of generalisation and inevitably hinges on the facts of each dispute. 
3. Conclusions of Part A 
                                                 
510 Ibid., para. 84. 
511 Hassan Awdi above (n 47) para. 212. 
512 Chevron Corporation (USA) and Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 34877, Interim Award of 1 December 2008, para. 128. 
513 Ibid., para. 149. 
514 Chevron Corporation (USA) and Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 34877, Partial Award on the Merits of 30 March 2010, para. 354. 
515 Siag and Vecchi v. Egypt above (n 405) para. 212. 
516 Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award 
of 1 June 2009 para. 483. 
517 Copper Mesa v. Ecuador above (n 26) para. 5.62. 
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This is the first part of a two-part essay. Its purpose is to survey the field, map the practice and 
support the largely theoretical analysis of Part B. However, it also retains a discrete function: it 
serves as an up-to-date representative selection of the practice of investment tribunals faced with 
questions of jurisdiction and admissibility. From this general look at the practice some general 
observations can be drawn: 
- On several crucial matters the arbitral practice has not reached consensus. Among these 
are: the treatment of MFN-based jurisdiction, the survival of the State’s offer to arbitrate 
after withdrawing from ICSID, the protection of indirect investments, the regime of denial 
of benefits clauses, the extent to which umbrella clauses apply ratione materiae (i.e., to 
which contractual or statutory obligations) and ratione personae (i.e., to obligations 
between entities other than the investor and the host State). Contradictions across awards 
are not rare, nor inherently worrisome. When inconsistency derives from the ad hoc nature 
of arbitration, it might be considered an inevitable side-effect of a system that ensure 
comparatively greater gains. However, the question might be asked whether at least part of 
this confusion is not ascribable to the uncoordinated work of the tribunals, but to the 
irreducible fuzziness of the notions used (jurisdiction and admissibility). 
 
- Preliminary objections are predominantly treated as going to the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
rather than the admissibility of the claim. Tribunals show a general reluctance to use the 
notion of admissibility: the Lao Holdings tribunal’s obstinate elusion of the word to 
characterise an objection based on abuse of right is revealing. 
 
- Taking stock of the few instances in which admissibility is used, it is possible to identify a 
common feature. All findings of inadmissibility have a retributory function: they sanction 
some questionable aspect of the claim or the claimants. Inadmissibility thus is used to deter 
multiplication of claims, abusive tactics, shameless nationality-shopping, misconduct by 
the investor, lack of good faith. Admissibility considerations, moreover, are very likely to 
derive ultimate authority from general principles of law rather than treaty provisions.  
 
- Conversely, jurisdictional objections do not partake in direct or indirect value-judgment. 
The alpha and omega of tribunals’ determination of their own competence is the inquiry 
regarding the precise extent of the parties’ consent. Of course, the distinction blurs when 
the parties stipulate (i.e., consent to) some explicit safeguard against misconduct – for 
instance, when they agree that compliance with domestic law is an essential aspect of the 
investment. In that case, it is the parties’ consent, as opposed to a general principle of 
procedural fairness, that entitles the tribunal to turn down a claim. 
 
- The practical difference between jurisdictional and admissibility objections does not 
emerge clearly in the practice. From the awards, it is difficult to reverse-engineer a test to 
distinguish clearly jurisdiction from admissibility. At the same time, the tribunals’ 
prevailing indifference towards the distinction might suggest that it is one ultimately not 
worth making. 
 
These preliminary findings are statistically helpful but call for deeper scrutiny at the theoretical 
level. Part B will precisely question their root-causes and validity. It will explore whether the 
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blurred distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility is inherited from the field of public 
international law litigation and analyse the import and implications of such elusive distinction. The 
study will reconsider and probe the received knowledge that purports to recognise one notion from 
the other, describe their respective distinctive features and their different legal effects. 
Moreover, further examples in the practice of investment arbitration will be studied, which test the 
outer limits of the notions of jurisdiction and admissibility as commonly understood. These cases 





PART B. The Theory: An Inherited Confusion 
After Part A illustrated the practice of investment tribunals dealing with jurisdiction and 
admissibility, this Part B illustrates the theory behind these concepts. This Part is divided into two 
sections: Section 1 explores the theory of jurisdiction and admissibility in public international law, 
with the aim to expose its flaws and confusion. Section 2 returns to the investment arbitration case-
law and singles out specific cases in which this confusion emerged, accounting for the difficulty 
of tribunals called to handle it. 
1. Jurisdiction and admissibility in international law 
Investment arbitration is a species of international law litigation. Tribunals called upon to interpret 
and apply international norms draw from a shared set of concepts that pertain to the ‘common law’ 
of international law dispute settlement.518 It is fair to assume that investment tribunals confronted 
with the notions of jurisdiction and admissibility look back to the wider system and draw 
inspiration from the theory and the practice concerning international law adjudication and 
arbitration. This Section starts up by illustrating the PIL lineage of these doctrines. It will be shown 
that the lack of clarity is not a prerogative of investment arbitration, but a staple of these notions 
at the international level too. 
1. Jurisdiction, competence and admissibility 
Jurisdiction: a concept borrowed from domestic systems. The role of consent 
In domestic systems, binding norms govern the allocation of jurisdiction to courts.519 Moreover, 
the prescriptive reach of national law covers, in principle, all matters brought to litigation. 
Accordingly, by default there is a competent court and an applicable law for all claims with legal 
relevance. The law itself identifies both.520 
Neither feature applies to international law.521 There is no guarantee that international law regulate 
every instance of State conduct.522 Even when an international norm exists, no tribunal possesses 
a jurisdiction of general scope (juridiction de droit commun) serving as a fall-back forum to hear 
any controversy regarding alleged breaches of such norm. The existence of several specialised 
jurisdictions does not guarantee that every case will fall under some tribunal’s mandate: 
sometimes, no body is competent to hear a claim.523 
                                                 
518 Chester Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication (OUP 2007). 
519 Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools), Germany v. Poland, Judgment of 26 April 1928, P.C.I.J. 
Series A, No 15, 23. 
520 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, Order of July 5th, 1951: I.C.J. Reports 1951, 89, 96-97. 
521 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić a/k/a ‘Dule’, decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 
ICTY Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para. 11. 
522 Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (1927), para. 38. 
523 Abi Saab hinted to this circumstance in the Dissenting Opinion of 28 October in the case Abaclat and Others (Case 
formerly known as Giovanna Beccara and Others) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 4 August 2011. He rejected the claimants’ argument that the tribunal’s refusal to 
exercise jurisdiction would have amounted to denial of justice, see para. 257: ‘international law, given its a-centralized 
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State consent makes up, if partially, for the lack of a comprehensive system of compulsory 
international jurisdiction. States can bind themselves to accept the authority and findings of an 
adjudicating body, whether permanent or established ad hoc (juridiction attribuée). States can be 
the parties to the dispute directly, or they can bear some connection – through consent – with the 
establishment of the tribunal and the formulation of its jurisdiction (for instance, when one party 
of the dispute is an individual).524 Although expressed in various ways (even implicitly), consent 
underpins the activity of adjudicatory bodies of international law. Consent explains why 
international decisions have binding force and command compliance even by States that do not 
agree with them. In this sense, consent and willingness diverge; previous consent to unspecified 
future obligations – deriving from the judges’ determinations – prevails over a lack of willingness 
to perform them when they arise.525 In the field of international adjudication, the better comparator 
is not the system of domestic courts, but arbitration between private entities.526 Consent must 
validate the foundational jurisdiction of a court (its establishment and general mandate) as well its 
specific jurisdiction (the authority to hear a specific dispute).527 
A convincing demonstration of one State’s consent to both is in principle sufficient to trump 
jurisdictional objections.528 The elusive principle of in dubio mitius, hinting at a preference for the 
interpretation that least encroaches on sovereignty,529 cannot upset the expression of the State’s 
consent. To identify State consent as expressed in the relevant instruments, courts and tribunals 
                                                 
character, has no system of courts or tribunals of plenary or general jurisdiction (juridictions de droit commun) 
covering all cases and litigants, barring a specific exception attributing jurisdiction over a particular type of matter 
or litigant to another specialized organ, and where every dispute or every claim can ultimately and necessarily find a 
competent forum to handle it. By contrast, as explained earlier …, all international courts and tribunals are tribunals 
of attributed jurisdiction (juridictions d’attribution); a jurisdiction based on the consent of the parties or litigants and 
confined within the limits of this consent’. 
524 Note that even in the case of the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
despite not having given their consent directly to the jurisdiction of such tribunals, had irrevocably consented, by 
signing the UN Charter, to be bound by the UN Security Resolutions that established them.  
525 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Concept of International Judicial Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal’ (2003) 3 The Law 
and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 501, 514: ‘By giving consent to judicial jurisdiction a State merely 
performs an act the legal effects of which are pre-determined by a constituent instrument and not by the State itself’. 
526 A consequence of this setup is the parties’ power to ‘disseise’ the ICJ, which led Robert Kolb to comment that 
‘[the ICJ’s] jurisdiction is probably a purely ‘attributive’ one, meaning that it is the parties who in this respect remain 
the sole domini negotii’. See Kolb above (n 526) 197. For a recent study of the arbitration-like features of the ICJ’s 
activity, see Serena Forlati, The International Court of Justice - An Arbitral Tribunal or a Judicial Body? (Springer 
2014). 
527 This distinction is made by Yuval Shany, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility’, in Cesare Romano, Karen Alter, and 
Yuval Shany, Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (OUP 2014) 782. The two kinds of consent associated 
with each kind of jurisdiction are described in Abi Saab, dissent above (n 523), para. 162. Kolb above (n 526) 212, 
refers to a similar distinction, between general and specific jurisdiction (and uses a similar dichotomy with respect to 
admissibility). 
528 Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I. J., Series A, No. 9, 32. 
529 SS Louts above (n 522) 18. The WTO Appellate Body mentioned this principle in the case EC – Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, report of 16 January 1998 (para. 165, 
footnote 154). However, its operation is unclear, at least when it should entail the displacement of legal commitments. 
See Christopher J Larouer, ‘In the Name of Sovereignty? The Battle over In Dubio Mitius Inside and Outside the 
Courts’ (2009) Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers 22; Luigi Crema, 




tend to use the ordinary principles of interpretation rather than a deferential bias against 
obligations.530 
In the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Case the ICJ arbitral panel held that ‘the Court 
necessarily derives its competence from the consent of both the parties to the present 
arbitration.’531 Consent founds the jurisdiction of permanent bodies too: both the PCIJ and ICJ 
repeatedly clarified that the Court’s jurisdiction depends on the will of the Parties,532 and that ‘it 
cannot decide a dispute between States without the consent of those States to its jurisdiction.’533 
One obvious implication of this approach is the principle developed in the Monetary Gold Case, 
typically referred to as the principle of the indispensable third party.534 The Court refused to 
establish its jurisdiction on the dispute because a decision would have been tantamount to 
determining the international responsibility of a State that did not partake in the proceedings and, 
therefore, had not given consent thereto (nor, by extension, had entered an obligation to comply 
with the judgment).535 
The search for an intention to confer jurisdiction informs the assessment of any procedural 
objection. The PCIJ clarified as much in the Chorzów Factory judgment: 
[t]he Court will, in the event of an objection – or when it has automatically to consider the 
question – only affirm its jurisdiction provided that the force of the arguments militating 
in favour of it is preponderant. The fact that weighty arguments can be advanced to support 
the contention that it has no jurisdiction cannot of itself create a doubt calculated to upset 
its jurisdiction. ‘When considering whether it has jurisdiction or not, the Court’s aim is 
always to ascertain whether an intention on the part of the Parties exists to confer 
jurisdiction upon it.’536 
                                                 
530 Indeed, although the role of consent has been central in the emersion of the international judicial systems, the 
practice has significantly evolved since then, and there have been cases where the principle of consent was invoked 
by certain States to escape the jurisdiction of a tribunal, but was dismissed by the latter. See generally Orakhelashvili 
above (n 525) 501-502, referring to the case LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2001, p. 466; the ECHR cases Chrysostomos v. Turkey (App. Nos. 15299/89, 15300/89 and 15318/89, 68 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 216, 245 (1991)) and Loizidou v. Turkey, preliminary objections (App. No. 25781/94, Ser. A, No. 
310) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ cases Ivcher Bronstein, Competence, Judgment of September 
24, 1999, (Ser. C) No. 54 (1999) and Constitutional Court, Competence, Judgment of September 24, 1999, (Ser. C) 
No. 55 (1999). 
531 See 1977, 18 UNRIAA at 24. 
532 Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion of 23 July 1923, P.C.I.J. Series B, No. 527, 22; Minority Schools 
above (n 519) 22; Corfu Channel case, Judgment on Preliminary Objection: I.C. . Reports 1948, 15, 27; Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Co. above (n 520) 103. 
533 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, 90, 101. 
534 Case of the monetary gold removed from Rome in 1943 (Preliminary Question), Judgment of June 15th, 1954: I.C.J. 
Reports 1954, 19. 
535 For a recent appraisal of the principle, and an analysis of its use by the ICJ and ITLOS, see Filippo Fontanelli, 
‘Reflections on the indispensable party principle in the wake of the judgment on preliminary objections in the Norstar 
case’ [2017] 1 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 163-183. 
536 Factory at Chorzów above (n 528) 32. 
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In sum, the element of consent is critical to distinguish the international system from the national 
one537 and to justify the establishment of certain obligations, but cannot go much further. Once 
consent is established as a gateway requirement, the operation of international jurisdiction is 
redolent of that of national jurisdictions (mutatis mutandis). As Madame Rosalyn Higgins said, 
speculating on the scholarly tendency to overrate the importance of sovereignty and the deference 
it should elicit, 
once [consent to jurisdiction] has been given – and, if necessary, the Court has determined 
that it has been given – States become normal litigants before a court.538 
This analogy accounts for the vast set of terminology and conceptual categories that domestic and 
international jurisdictions have in common.539 However, it is precisely the search for consent that 
informs the powers of international jurisdictional actors.540 In this sense, all reference to the 
general principles of competence, jurisdiction and admissibility in international law requires a 
caveat. These general principles cannot have a precise correspondent in domestic law.541 In other 
words, they are general principles that, in spite of the terminological overlap, are relevant only 
under international law.542 They flow from the States’ recognition of their validity as expressed in 
international practice, as they ensure the viability of international proceedings; they do not arise 
from States’ practice in foro domestico.543 If anything, the principles relating to jurisdiction in 
international proceedings find the closest parallel in the corresponding rules governing the 
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, in view of the (still) prevailing consensual paradigm that both 
share. 
The notions of jurisdiction, competence and admissibility in international law 
                                                 
537 Cesare PR Romano, ‘The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication: 
Elements for a Theory of Consent’ (2006) 39 New York University Journal of International Law & Policy 791, 793-
794. 
538 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Respecting Sovereign States and Running a Tight Courtroom’ (2001) 50 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 121-132. (emphasis in the original) For a slightly different view, see Romano above (n 
537) 801: ‘international courts should tend to err on the side of declining jurisdiction whenever jurisdiction is 
contested rather than on the side of exercising jurisdiction, as they currently do’. 
539 Orakhelashvili, above (n 525) 514, quoting Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice’ (1998) British Yearbook of International Law 4. 
540 Abi Saab, above (n 523), para. 17: ‘As with jurisdiction, the concept of admissibility in international law partakes 
of its generic meaning in the general theory of law, but is further particularized in function of the specificities of 
international adjudication, including its consensual basis’. 
541 Shabtai Rosenne and Yael Ronen, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2005 (Brill 2006) 517. 
542 For a brief overview of this category of principles, which is not expressly mentioned in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, 
see Giorgio Gaja, ‘General Principles of Law’ (2013) Oxford Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 17-20. 
See also Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff 1991) 50-54 and the short 
discussion in Neha Jain, ‘Judicial Lawmaking and General Principles of Law in International Criminal Law’ (2016) 
57(1) Harvard Journal of International Law 119: ‘[this] category of general principles that stem from the specific 
characteristics of the international community is the only conception where municipal laws appear to play little to no 
role.’ 
543 Whether the general principles operating in the international legal order are capable of application as such in the 
field of investment arbitration is another issue. Section C, explored below, accounts for the peculiarities of investment 
arbitration in this respect. 
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The terms ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘competence’ are commonly used as synonyms,544 even if their 
etymon suggests a distinction. ‘Jurisdiction’ (from jus dicere) refers to the activity and power of 
declaring what the law is;545 ‘competence’ (from cum petere) implies a notion of physical 
pertinence: a specific matter is naturally falling within the sphere of action of the (competent) 
subject. Yet, this terminological distinction is virtually irrelevant in the judicial practice of 
international courts and tribunals546; since there is no added value to retaining it, jurisdiction and 
competence are hereafter used interchangeably.547 Jurisdictional powers are scrutinised when their 
limits are at stake: jurisdiction is exercised unless a procedural hurdle is raised and not overcome. 
Determining the jurisdiction of a tribunal encompasses a variety of matters that, normally, are 
determined at the preliminary stage of the proceedings and before the review of the merits, 548 for 
reasons of judicial economy. 
This section analyses the practice of international courts and tribunals other than investment 
tribunals. Undoubtedly, this practice informs the work of investment tribunals too, as it clearly 
emerges, for instance, from the ubiquitous use of public international law authorities in arbitral 
awards.549 
In Tadić, the ICTY’s Appeal Chamber embarked on an accurate appraisal of the concept of 
jurisdiction. It concluded that a challenge to its own establishment was, too, a jurisdictional matter. 
                                                 
544 Rosenne and Ronen, above (n 541) 524, try to infer a doctrinal distinction: ‘‘[j]urisdiction’ is a stricter concept 
than ‘competence’. Jurisdiction relates to the capacity of the Court to decide a concrete case with a binding force. 
‘Competence’, on the other hand, is more subjective, including both jurisdiction and the element of the propriety of 
the Court’s exercising its jurisdiction.’ Although this distinction is plausible, it blurs the boundaries between 
jurisdiction and admissibility, see discussion below.  
545 See Abi Saab’s Dissenting Opinion above (n 523), para. 10: ‘The term ‘jurisdiction’ (from the latin ‘jurisdictio’, 
literally to ‘pronounce’ or ‘enunciate the law’, dire le droit), when used in the judicial or adjudicative context, denotes 
‘the legal power of an organ to decide cases (in general) or a case (in particular) by application of law’. In other 
words, it is the empowerment to exercise the judicial function. Thus, jurisdiction refers first and foremost to a legal 
power to exercise a certain type of activity, the judicial function’. 
546 In domestic jurisdictions, these terms might indicate different aspects. For instance, in Italy giurisdizione will 
refer to the specific branch of the judiciary that can hear a claim (e.g., criminal, civil, or administrative), while 
competenza will determine which territorial division can hear it (e.g., the civil court of Rome rather than that of 
Florence). 
547 Kolb above (n 526) 211-212. Heiskanen’s proposal (Veijo Heiskanen, ‘Jurisdiction v. Competence: Revisiting a 
frequently neglected distinction (1994) 5 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 1) deserves special praise for 
squaring the circle by considering competence as the institutional side of admissibility. His proposal, therefore 
distinguishes between jurisdiction and competence/admissibility, differently from most other authors. 
548 Such distinction between the jurisdictional phase and the merits is commonly referred to by the ICJ, see Legality 
of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 
1999, 916, 925: ‘there is a fundamental distinction between the question of acceptance by a state of the Court’s 
jurisdiction and the compatibility of particular acts with international law; the former requires consent; the latter 
question can only be reached when the Court deals with the merits after having established its jurisdiction.’ See also 
the dissenting opinion of judge Ndiaye in case The M/V 'SAIGA' (No 2), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, 
Merits, Judgment, ITLOS Case No. 2, ICGJ 336 (ITLOS 1999), 1st July 1999, para. 5: ‘Il ne faut pas se méprendre 
sur «un principe universel du droit de la procédure» indiquant qu’il faut distinguer entre, d’une part, le droit de saisir 
un tribunal et le droit du tribunal de connaître du fond de la demande et, d’autre part, le droit au regard de l’objet de 
la demande que le demandeur doit établir à la satisfaction du tribunal (voir Affaire du Sud-Ouest-Africain, C.I.J. 
Recueil 1966, paragraphe 64).’ 
549 For instance, see a study of the impact of the ICJs’ case law over arbitral decisions relating to the preliminary 
objections: Alain Pellet, ‘The Case Law of the ICJ in Investment Arbitration’ (2013) 28 ICSID Review 223, especially 
at 231-232 and cases referred to therein. 
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The Chamber recalled a significant quote, pointing at the original and most basic meaning of 
jurisdiction: 
‘[Jurisdiction] is the power of a court to decide a matter in controversy and presupposes 
the existence of a duly constituted court with control over the subject matter and the 
parties.’ Black’s Law Dictionary, 712 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Pinner v. Pinner, 33 N.C. App. 
204, 234 S.E.2d 633).)550 
The Chamber correctly remarked that jurisdiction does not simply indicate an ambit, shaped by 
the combination of the qualifying features – dimensions, or rationes – for a dispute to be heard 
(ratione temporis, loci, personae and materiae). The jurisdiction of a court constitutes ‘a legal 
power, hence necessarily a legitimate power, «to state the law» (dire le droit) within this ambit, in 
an authoritative and final manner.’551 If a court has jurisdiction, it is entitled and required to make 
the necessary legal determinations to process the claim:  
once a case is duly referred to it, [a tribunal] is endowed with full jurisdiction and may take 
cognisance of all questions of fact or of law arising in the course of the proceedings, 
including questions which may have been raised before the Commission under the head of 
admissibility.552 
Indeed, the admissibility of a claim (or recevabilité) is a separate matter, which falls to be 
considered and reviewed only when the jurisdiction is not contested or is positively established. 
Impediments that do not ensue from a lack of consent to its primary jurisdiction may nonetheless 
prevent a tribunal from decide a case on the merits. In other words, 
an unsuccessful jurisdictional plea leaves open the possibility that a finding on the ultimate 
merits may still be excluded through a decision given against the substantive admissibility 
of the claim.553 
A widespread – but ultimately unsatisfactory – understanding is that these defects of the claim 
relating to admissibility are less fundamental or immutable than those tainting the primary 
jurisdiction of the tribunal.554 Labelling is not inconsequential. Grounds for inadmissibility might 
be subject to different rules of invocability (the tribunal might have no obligation to raise them 
proprio motu,555 or the parties could lose the right to invoke them after a certain phase of the 
                                                 
550 See Tadić above (n 521), para. 10. 
551 Ibid. 
552 See ECHR case Klass and Others v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, Series A no. 28, para. 32. 
553 Gerald G Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice (Grotius 1986) Vol. 2, 439. 
554 Chittharanjan F Amerasinghe, International Arbitral Jurisdiction (Brill 2011) 71. 
555 The seemingly unusual case of Larsen/Hawaii (Lance Larsen v. the Hawaiian Kingdom, PCA, case no. 99-001, 
under the UNCITRAL 1976 Rules, Award, 5 February 2001, (2001) 119 ILR 566; (2001) 95 AJIL 927–933), in which 
the Tribunal appeared to analyse admissibility proprio motu, is exceptional because it deals with a fabricated claim in 
which both parties had no interest in raising procedural objections. An obverse exception might be found in 
Transglobal Green Energy, LLC and Transglobal Green Energy de Panama, S.A. v. The Republic of Panama, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/13/28, Award of 2 June 2016, where the tribunal noted that the Respondent had failed to pursue a 
jurisdictional objection ratione materiae, and that a decision on it was unnecessary (para. 96). Since the claim failed 
on other preliminary objections, this remark might have been just a signal of judicial economy rather than a refusal to 
observe jurisdictional objections proprio motu. See also ibid., para. 100: ‘The Tribunal may choose to consider the 
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proceedings).556 Moreover, whereas the jurisdiction of a tribunal is fixed, the inadmissibility of a 
claim can sometimes be cured (for instance, when brought again after the local remedies are 
exhausted or the waiting period expires). A crucial difference concerns the possibility of review.557 
Findings on jurisdiction might be subject to the review of a controlling body entitled to ascertain 
that the decision-maker did not exceed its powers, but determinations on the admissibility of a 
claim are normally final, or at least as final as the findings on the merits.558 Characterising a matter 
as pertaining to competence rather than admissibility might affect the logical sequencing of the 
analysis carried out by the tribunal, as well as the allocation of the evidentiary onus between the 
parties.559 
The ICJ cared to distinguish between matters of competence and admissibility. In Interhandel560 
it specified that the claimant’s failure to exhaust local remedies tainted the admissibility of the 
application, not the Court’s jurisdiction. Likewise, in Nottebohm,561 the Court treated the failure 
to negotiate and exhaust local remedies, as well as the nationality of the claimant, as matters of 
recevabilité. The ICJ also underlined that the jurisdiction of the tribunal is directly linked with the 
consent of the parties, whereas the admissibility of the claim is not: ‘in determining the scope of 
the consent expressed by one of the parties, the Court pronounces on its jurisdiction and not on 
the admissibility of the application’.562 Normally, the fact that jurisdictional and admissibility 
objections are raised together and pursue the same goal (preventing the tribunal from entering the 
                                                 
objections to its jurisdiction in any particular order.’ On the impossibility to examine admissibility flaws proprio motu, 
see the characterisation of the ICJ’s approach in Hochtief AG v. Argentina, ICSID Case no. ARB/07/31, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 24 October 2011, para. 5: ‘[i]n the ICJ, for example, rules on admissibility include such matters as the 
rules on the nationality of claims and the exhaustion of local remedies. The ICJ may have jurisdiction to decide 
whether State A had injured corporation B in violation of international law; but it may be that the claim actually filed 
is inadmissible because it has been brought by the wrong State, or because local remedies have not yet been exhausted. 
But if no objection is raised on such grounds, the Court will not raise the matter proprio motu.’ An interesting case, 
explored below, is that of the objection to the jurisdiction ratione loci of a Tribunal seised by the claim against Russia 
of an Ukranian investor relating to measures in Crimea. The Respondent having no interest in pointing out that Crimea 
had been illegally occupied, it was for the Tribunal to raise the concern proprio motu. See case PJSC Ukrnafta v. The 
Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2015-34, Award on Jurisdiction of 4 July 2017 (confidential). 
556 Amerasinghe above (n 554) 71: ‘an objection relating to recevabilité may be waived or the opportunity to raise it 
lost, whereas a defect in jurisdiction can technically never be cured’. 
557 This distinction is used by Jan Paulsson (see the article ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility’ in Gerald Aksen et al (eds), 
Global Reflections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert 
Briner (International Chamber of Commerce 2005) 601) to highlight the importance of the distinction between 
jurisdiction and admissibility. 
558 This distinction is crucial in the field of international arbitration, where annulment or setting aside of awards is 
typically possible only on narrow grounds which do not include a review of the merits. 
559 Yuval Shany, Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility before International Courts (CUP 2015) 130, 
accompanies the list of these practical consequences with a careful assessment of the ‘analytical reasons’ which 
depend on the correct distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, that is, ‘the distinction may help us better 
understand the way courts exercise judicial power and the legal interests of relevant constituencies affected as they 
do so.’ The present study will not focus on this illuminating aspect of the distinction and will only focus on its practical 
applications. 
560 Interhandel (Switzerland v. USA), Judgment, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1959, 6, 26. 
561 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1955, 26. 




merits of a controversy) makes it unnecessary to distinguish the latter from the former. As the PCIJ 
noted in the Mavrommatis case: 
The Court has not to ascertain what are, in the various codes of procedure and in the various 
legal terminologies, the specific characteristics of … an objection [to the effect that the 
Court cannot entertain the proceedings]; in particular it need not consider whether 
“competence” and “jurisdiction”, incompétence and fins de non-recevoir should invariably 
and in every connection be regarded as synonymous expressions. … [Ultimately, the Court 
should not just assess] whether the nature and subject of the dispute laid before the Court 
are such that the Court derives from them jurisdiction to entertain it, but also whether the 
conditions upon which the exercise of this jurisdiction is dependent are all fulfilled in the 
present case.563 
Critically, only the constitutive instrument of a judicial body can define expressly the grounds for 
inadmissibility for a claim brought before it. However, these grounds being directly or indirectly 
inspired by general principles of international adjudication and arbitration, it is possible to spot 
recurring solutions across the different judicial frameworks, which sometimes emerge in the 
absence of express rules and fill the gaps. To better explain the distinction between jurisdiction 
and admissibility in the practice, two lists of typical instances are provided below, categorising 
jurisdictional and admissibility issues, respectively. As it will be explained below, one element’s 
belonging to either list is often contestable: the classification is not normative but descriptive. It 
primary collates the patterns and the outliers emerged in the practice. When inconsistencies and 
overlaps exist between the categories, they will be pointed out. 
2. Issues of competence 
This classification starts from very preliminary and abstract questions and progressively advances 
towards the merits of a case. It is implied in the following that a claim has already been brought to 
litigation, in compliance with the applicable procedural rules for the submission of a claim (seisin). 
The question is not perfunctory, insofar as matters of inadmissibility could result in the invalidity 
of the seisin and halt the procedure before the proceedings come into existence and the tribunal is 
even empowered to review its own competence.564 
The correct establishment and functioning of the tribunal  
The most preliminary notion of jurisdiction regards whether an international court or tribunal is 
lawfully established. This aspect necessarily ‘goes beyond and subsumes’ any other issue 
regarding the scope of its judicial activity.565 This element is not likely to be scrutinized with 
                                                 
563 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Greece v. United Kingdom, Objection to the Jurisdiction of the Court, 
Judgment, P.C.I.J. 1924 Series A, No 2, 10. 
564 Juan Pablo Hugues Arthur, ‘The legal value of prior steps to arbitration in international law of foreign investment: 
Two (different?) approaches, one outcome’ (2015) 15 Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 449, 459 and 
literature cited therein. See for instance in Bosca v. Lithuania how the respondent argued that the claimant’s failure to 
include his address in the Statement of Claim rendered the claim inadmissible, in light of the applicable UNCITRAL 
rules. Luigiterzo Bosca v. Lithuania, PCA Case No. 2011-05, Award of 17 May 2013, para. 109 and 119. 
565 See Tadić, above (n 521), para. 12: ‘In sum, if the International Tribunal were not validly constituted, it would lack 
the legitimate power to decide in time or space or over any person or subject-matter. The plea based on the invalidity 
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respect to long-established permanent bodies.566 Questions of original legitimacy, however, can 
be relevant for the activity of arbitral tribunals, which are often appointed ad hoc to resolve a 
specific dispute or class of disputes. Any matters that may concern the legal and proper functioning 
of the tribunal and affect its ability to act judicially, as constituted in the particular proceedings, 
may be relevant to this scrutiny of competence. These include the conditions of establishment of 
the judicial body, the constitution of its bench and the profile of the judges, and instances of 
conflict of interest or impartiality which pre-date the establishment.567 
The tribunal’s competence to assess its own jurisdiction 
Next to that of lawful establishment, the most preliminary question is whether a certain tribunal 
can determine its own power to hear a particular legal claim. This scrutiny is typically devolved to 
the tribunal itself, pursuant to the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. This formula indicates the 
competence of every international tribunal to assess, in addition to any challenge aimed at the 
tribunal per se, its own competence to hear a legal claim considered in the abstract, including any 
preliminary objections thereto. 
Again, the Appeals Chamber in Tadić provided an exhaustive account of this principle: 
This is not merely a power in the hands of the tribunal. In international law, where there is 
no integrated judicial system and where every judicial or arbitral organ needs a specific 
constitutive instrument defining its jurisdiction, ‘the first obligation of the Court – as of 
any other judicial body – is to ascertain its own competence.’568 
The reach of this general principle is such that it is rarely challenged, and it has also been codified 
in many instruments, like the statute of the ICJ (Art. 36(6)), the statute of the UN Adminstrative 
Tribunal (Art. 2(3)), the European Convention Human Rights (Art. 49), the statute of the ILO 
Adminstrative Tribunal (Art. II(7)), or the ICSID Rules (Art 41). This is, perhaps, the only general 
principle of international procedure that applies without questions in the field of investment 
arbitration.569 
There can be also cases where findings on jurisdiction of a tribunal, originally devolved to the 
tribunal itself, can be challenged and brought before a second one for review.570 Note that 
                                                 
of constitution of the International Tribunal goes to the very essence of jurisdiction as a power to exercise the judicial 
function within any ambit. It is more radical than, in the sense that it goes beyond and subsumes, all the other pleas 
concerning the scope of jurisdiction. This issue is a preliminary to and conditions all other aspects of jurisdiction.’ 
566 Unsurprisingly, it was raised with respect to the (then) newly created ICTY in the Tadić judgment, above (n 521). 
567 Subsequent questions, that arise or are known after the start of the proceedings, can be used by the parties or the 
arbitrators to denounce or terminate the proceedings, see for instance the case of the arbitration between Croatia and 
Slovenia administered by the PCA. See Arman Sarvarian and Rudy Baker, ‘Arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia: 
Leaks, Wiretaps, Scandal’ (2015) EJIL: Talk! of 28 July 2015, at http://www.ejiltalk.org/arbitration-between-croatia-
and-slovenia-leaks-wiretaps-scandal/. 
568 See Tadić above (n 521) para. 18, quoting from Judge Cordova’s dissenting opinion in Advisory Opinion on 
Judgements of the Administrative Tribunal of the I.L.O. upon complaints made against the U.N.E.S.C.O., 1956 I.C.J. 
Reports, 77, 163. 
569 Jorge Viñuales, Morelli Lectures 2016, Rome 28/29 May 2016; Id. ICSID Review (forthcoming 2017). 
570 This is the case, for instance, of Art. XII of the ILOAT statute and the corresponding provision of a former version 
of the UN Administrative Tribunal Statute (in force between 1955 and 1996), entrusting the ICJ with the task of 
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competence to determine the lawful establishment and the competence of a tribunal, discussed 
above, is of inherent nature, in that it does not need an express consent to be established.571 This 
does not mean that the requisite of consent is overlooked; in fact, once the tribunal has found the 
lawfulness of its own establishment or its own competence to decide on jurisdictional issues, the 
next step is precisely the scrutiny of procedural objections, if any arise, based on an alleged defect 
of consent. 
Requirements of primary jurisdiction 
A tribunal’s power to proceed judicially in a particular case and reach the merits (i.e., its primary 
jurisdiction572) flows from its constitutive instruments. These might be a statute, an international 
convention, a compromis concluded by the parties, and/or any other instrument governing its 
activity. This power results from the combination of foundational and specific jurisdiction. Matters 
of jurisdiction can only be determined with reference to an actual dispute. To ascertain the 
existence of foundational jurisdiction, the dispute is broken down into a set of essential 
components. Foundational jurisdiction can be construed as a check-list exercise, which notes the 
essential features of a dispute, as opposed to a review of admissibility, which is normally 
understood to hinge on the circumstantial or accidental aspects of a claim or a claimant. Specific 
jurisdiction, relating to the parties’ consent that the tribunal entertain the specific claim, is an 
intermediate notion – the existence of which reveals the difficulty to draw a line between 
jurisdiction and admissibility. 
General rules with respect to the establishment of primary jurisdiction concern the existence and 
continuing presence of a dispute,573 which presupposes that the claim is genuine and is not moot 
for lack of object, or merely hypothetical.574 Outside these general principles, the scope of 
                                                 
reviewing the correctness of a finding of jurisdiction. More generally, arbitral awards are typically subject to second 
level review on matters of jurisdiction (through setting aside proceedings in domestic courts, or annulment in the 
ICSID framework). This is an important point: the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz does not rule out the possibility 
that another body is ultimately entrusted with the power to review the initial decision on jurisdiction. See William W 
Park, Determining an Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction: Timing and Finality in American Law (2007) 8 Nev. LJ 135, 136: ‘the 
principle that arbitrators may decide jurisdictional questions says nothing about who (judge or arbitrator) will 
ultimately decide any particular case’. 
571 The expression ‘inherent jurisdiction’ usually refer to the set of powers implicitly entrusted to a tribunal in order 
for it to discharge its mandate, see e.g. Human Rights Committee Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago Communication 
No. 845/1998 26 March 2002 CCPR/C/74/D/845/1998, par. 6.4. For further details, see Chester Brown, ‘The Inherent 
Powers of International Courts and Tribunals’ (2005) 76 BYIL 195, and Filippo Fontanelli and Paolo Busco, ‘The 
function of procedural justice in international adjudication’ (2016) 15(1) The Law and Practice of International Courts 
and Tribunals 1-23. 
572 This power is often termed ‘primary jurisdiction,’ in contrast with other jurisdictional powers relating, for instance, 
to the management of the proceedings or the issuing of remedies.  
573 Mavrommatis above (n 563) para. 164-166; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, 832. Shany above (n 559)  69 refers to a set of cases in which 
the ICJ derived from Article 36 ICJ the conclusions that only ‘legal disputes’ fall under its jurisdiction, and therefore 
characterised the absence of a legal dispute as a jurisdictional flaw. See in particular South West Africa (Ethiopia v. 
South Africa), 1962 ICJ 319, 328; Aegean Sea (Greece v. Turkey), 1978 ICJ 3, 13; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 
1995 ICJ 90, 99-100. However, this requirement is sometimes described as one of admissibility, due to its threshold 
character. 
574 Note, however, that the similar conclusion in Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United 
Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 2 December 1963: I.C.J. Reports 1963, 15, at 33-34, appears to be 
reached on the basis of inadmissibility. In the arbitration Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration 
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jurisdiction of one tribunal is to be identified interpreting its constitutive instrument(s), with the 
auxiliary help of general principles of law when necessary. Jurisdiction may be delimited ratione 
personae (e.g., the Iran – US Tribunal can only hear cases against a government or a government-
controlled entity; only States can appear before the ICJ in contentious proceedings; only States 
that have ratified a treaty can normally invoke its norms), ratione materiae (e.g., the ICTY has 
jurisdiction only over crimes committed in the context of an international armed conflict; many 
compromissory clauses expressly confer jurisdiction only over disputes arising from, or related to, 
the obligations created by a specific instrument, some compromissory clauses are defined by 
reference to their limits575), ratione loci and temporis (e.g., the ECCC only have jurisdiction over 
crimes committed in Cambodia between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979). All these dimensions 
of jurisdiction have a direct connection with consent: when the dispute lacks one of the qualifying 
features, the defendant State has not consented to its resolution in the forum seised by the claimant 
(better: the instrument registering the defendant’s consent to jurisdiction does not extend to such 
a dispute). 
Requisites which make access to a court contingent on the exhaustion of some previous procedure 
(negotiation, quasi-judicial settlement, domestic proceedings) are harder to categorise. They can 
be used as instance of the grey area in which (specific) jurisdiction and admissibility are difficult 
to tell apart.576 Although procedural in nature, these requirements speak directly to consent, as they 
are normally contained precisely in the compromissory clauses establishing the court’s 
jurisdiction. The fact that the defect might not be fatal (a fresh claim can be brought in the future, 
upon compliance with the precondition) would suggest qualifying it as a matter of inadmissibility, 
but the weight of State consent prevails and militates in favour of a different conclusion when they 
are registered in treaty language. Along these lines, the ICJ has prevalently577 treated similar 
requirements as matter of competence, stating clearly that  
its jurisdiction is based on the consent of the parties and is confined to the extent accepted 
by them … When that consent is expressed in a compromissory clause in an international 
agreement, any conditions to which such consent is subject must be regarded as 
constituting the limits thereon. The Court accordingly considers that the examination of 
such conditions relates to its jurisdiction and not to the admissibility of the application.578 
                                                 
Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, Decision on Preliminary Objections of 27 July 
2006, the tribunal held in passing that it had no jurisdiction over hypothetical claims, see para. 169. 
575 See Article 282 UNCLOS, which restricts the reach of the methods of dispute settlement of Part XV of UNCLOS 
when the parties have agreed to an alternative method of compulsory dispute settlement. 
576 See Arthur above (n 564); Gary Born and Marija Šćekić, ‘Pre-Arbitration Procedural Requirements ‘A 
Dismal Swamp’’ in David D Caron et al. (eds), Practising Virtue, Inside International Arbitration (OUP 2015) 227-
263. 
577 One exception being Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, 69, where the Court treats interchangeably competence/jurisdiction and 
admissibility, treating in turn the preliminary objections raised by Honduras. 
578 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Rwanda), I.C.J. Reports 2006, 39, para. 88 (emphasis added); Case Concerning mutual assistance in criminal matters 
(Djibouti v. France), I.C.J. Reports 2008, 204, para. 62. The Court, in the 2002 order, mentioned his previous case law 
to support this view, for instance South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa ; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, 344-346; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, 427-429, 
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It can be tentatively suggested that the subsumption of the consent’s ‘limits’ under the rubric of 
jurisdiction flows from their form (i.e., their being recorded ‘in an international agreement’) rather 
than from the quality of the substantive or procedural requirements. This could be the conclusion 
reached through adding a catch-all dimension to the four classic jurisdictional elements: the 
category of jurisdiction ratione voluntatis.579 As such, one could conceive a formalistic policing 
of the blurry line between jurisdiction and admissibility: States are allowed to elevate any matter 
to a condition of jurisdiction, if they so will. This additional category is redundant: it simply serves 
as reminder that the parties can shape their consent to be subject to a court’s jurisdiction by 
common agreement, but has no pre-determined or inherent content. As a separate ratio of 
jurisdiction is unspecific (all jurisdictional rationes flow from and codify the parties’ consent); as 
a catch-all category covering all conditions to the exercise of jurisdiction is over-inclusive (as 
discussed, it is very easy to tuck admissibility requirements into this fifth genus). If the parties do 
not agree on express qualifiers in the applicable instruments, the distinction between jurisdiction 
and admissibility defects falls to be determined by general principles of law. 
3. Other procedural impediments 
Matters of inadmissibility 
The following list is merely illustrative, but gathers the most common reasons for a court or 
tribunal to reject a claim on grounds of inadmissibility.580 Indeterminacy of the claim’s object: the 
tribunal is unable to recognize a discrete claim or the remedy sought (and consequently to assess 
its merits under the relevant applicable law), or the claim litigated is a different one from the one 
presented in the seisin.581 Absence of a genuine legal dispute: there is no dispute,582 or the claim 
                                                 
para. 81-83; Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, 88-90, para. 42-48; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, 16, para. 16-19; 24, para. 39-40. 
579 Because of its apparent self-reference, the category is not employed in this study. However, it might simply indicate 
all other conditions precedent for the operation of consent, codified in international instruments. 
580 Reasons for admissibility are not organised in a conceptual taxonomy and might be difficult to predict. See 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, 412, 456: ‘If the objection is a jurisdictional objection, then 
since the jurisdiction of the Court derives from the consent of the parties, this will most usually be because it has been 
shown that no such consent has been given by the objecting State to the settlement by the Court of the particular 
dispute. A preliminary objection to admissibility covers a more disparate range of possibilities.’ 
581 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, 
240, para. 62-67. 
582 In the Northern Cameroon case, above (n 574), the Court seemed to treat this matter as one of admissibility. See 
para. 38: ‘Whether or not at the moment the Application was filed there was jurisdiction in the Court to adjudicate 
upon the dispute submitted to it, circumstances that have since arisen render any adjudication devoid of purpose. 
Under these conditions, for the Court to proceed further in the case would not, in its opinion, be a proper discharge 
of its duties… The Court finds that the proper limits of its judicial function do not permit it to entertain the claims 
submitted’. Michael Waibel (in ‘Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility’, in August Renisch et al (eds), 
Handbook on International Investment Law (Hart 2015) 1212 lists this requirement among those of jurisdiction, but 
also noted the decision in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, above (n 555), in which the tribunal declared itself obliged 
to consider (proprio motu) the absence of a legal dispute and – crucially – the fact that a third country was a necessary 
third party in the case, as ‘objections to the admissibility of arbitral proceedings’ (para. 13.2). Contra, see 
Amerasinghe above (n 554); Shany above (n 559) 69 (see above, where the requirement of existence of a dispute is 
also listed as a possible obstacle for jurisdiction). 
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refers nominally to norms falling within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, but the question submitted 
hinges on purely political matters and exceeds the boundaries of adjudication.583 Lack of legal 
interest or mootness: the claimant bears no legal interest in the dispute,584 or the case has become 
moot during the proceedings.585 Coordination with connected proceedings: when there is triple 
identity between two disputes, lis pendens or res judicata could arise in international 
adjudication.586 Alternatively, a court could decide – exercising comity587 – to refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction or suspend proceedings if a connected dispute is pending elsewhere, if 
another forum is fitter for the case (forum non conveniens),588 or if the parties agreed ‘to use 
another method of pacific settlement’589. Non-exhaustion of local remedies: the defendant has 
consented to the use of the international tribunal by a foreigner only as a subsequent and subsidiary 
forum to its domestic judicial system, not as an alternative.590 Procedural irregularities: the 
                                                 
583 Northern Cameroon above (n 574) 37. 
584 South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, 6, para. 44. 
585 Lockerbie, Preliminary Objections above (n 578) 129, para. 37. This requirement, which in fact is seldom applied 
in the practice, has been sometimes considered one of jurisdiction, see above (n 574). One case that is arguably treated 
as one of admissibility is the Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, 475-476: ‘there is 
no occasion for a pronouncement in respect of rights and obligations of the Parties concerning the past… [the Court] 
must not fail to take cognizance of a situation in which the dispute has disappeared because the final objective which 
the Applicant has maintained throughout has been achieved by other means’ (emphasis added). Whereas the Court 
avoided referring to either category in the judgment, in the earlier Order on preliminary measures it had assessed its 
own jurisdiction prima facie, noting that ‘it cannot be assumed a priori … that the Government of Australia may not 
be able to establish a legal interest in respect of [its] claims entitling the Court to admit the Application’ (emphasis 
added), see Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, 99, 
para. 23. But see the declaration attached by Judge Jiménez de Aréchaga (ibid, 108), who argued that the existence of 
a legal interest was a question of merits unfit for determination prima facie, and that the applicable test at the stage of 
the interim measures was one of jurisdiction, i.e. ‘whether the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights’. 
586 This is a rare occurrence, as the triple identity test requires the two disputes to share same parties, same object and 
same legal cause of action. See Anzilotti’s dissent in the case Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at 
Chorzów) 1927 PCIJ Series, No. 13, 23, commenting on Article 59 of the Statute of the PCIJ: ‘we have here the three 
traditional elements for identification, persona, petitum, causa petendi’. The res judicata objection was confirmed to 
concern admissibility by the International Court of Justice in Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 
Judgment on the Preliminary Objections of 16 March 2016, para. 53. 
587 Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping in International Adjudication: The Role of Preliminary Objections (CUP 
2014) 217. See also Filippo Fontanelli, Comity (2015) Westlaw UK Insight. 
588 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, MOX Plant (Ireland v. UK), Order No. 3, 42 ILM 1187, 1190 (2003) (PCA, 
24 June 24), para. 26; in the case Arbitral Tribunal Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan) 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 4 August 2000, para. 54 and 65, the tribunal held that it ‘lacked 
jurisdiction’ but also expressly refrained from assessing the matters of admissibility, exercising judicial economy. 
Moreover, the conclusion of the tribunal was based on Article 281(1) UNCLOS which limits the scope of application 
of the UNCLOS dispute settlement procedures when an alternative means of dispute resolution has been agreed and 
has been attempted. In other words, the conclusion relied on a finding of lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae.  
589 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, 412, 456. This instance of inadmissibility, perhaps, is better 
characterised as one of jurisdiction ratione materiae, at least when the priority for the alternative forum is expressly 
envisaged in the instrument establishing the jurisdiction of the tribunal (the parties have consented not to extend the 
foundational jurisdiction of the court to a category of cases). See for instance Article 282 UNCLOS. 
590 Article 42 of the ECHR; Article 5(2)(b) of the ICCPR first Optional Protocol; Article 14 of the ILC Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection (UN Doc. A/61/10), see for instance Case concerning Elettronica Sicula (United States of 
America v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, 15, para. 59. But consider the ICJ’s more recent view, mentioned 
above, that the previous exhaustion on alternative dispute resolution fora required in the compromissory clause is a 
matter of jurisdiction/competence. See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
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claimant has not complied with the applicable procedure (for instance, it has not respected a 
deadline for the seisin).591 Note, however, that the PCIJ declared that it would not ‘attach to 
matters of form the same degree of importance which they might possess in municipal law’.592 The 
ICJ has been flexible with formal defects, to the point of implying that it would not refuse to 
proceed if a procedural flaw were the only reason not to.593 Nationality of the claim: this requisite 
is critical in the field of diplomatic protection and investor-State disputes. A state cannot espouse 
a foreign citizen’s claim in diplomatic protection; to invoke a protection treaty an 
investment/investor must have the nationality of a State party to it (other than the host State), at 
the time of the claim.594 This requisite can alternatively be considered as one of recevabilité or of 
primary jurisdiction, depending on whether customary law applies or treaty rules, respectively.595 
The constitutive instrument of a tribunal might treat nationality as a matter of jurisdiction, to 
highlight its fundamental importance in the specific régime (for instance, under the ICSID 
Convention, or the Claims Settlement Declaration establishing the Iran – US Tribunal). This 
oscillation, similar to that highlighted above related to the procedural precondition of alternative 
dispute procedures, revolves perhaps around the relative fixity of the nationality condition (the 
claim cannot change nationality, but it can be espoused by the right state). 
Interestingly enough, the Monetary Gold principle is difficult to categorise despite its direct 
bearing on consent.596 That a court is unable to hear a dispute entailing the determination of a third 
party’s responsibility seems to flow from the limits of its foundational jurisdiction and the pacta 
tertiis rule.597 The fact that the parties cannot seek a binding decision on the rights of a third State 
suggests a lack of locus standi, i.e., a matter of specific jurisdiction.598 Alternatively, the principle 
                                                 
of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, 70, 
125 (para. 131) and 140 (para. 184). 
591 For the practice of the PCIJ and the ICJ, see Kolb (n 526), 165 ff. In particular, it is important to note that ‘the 
Court rejects the idea that defects of form are a fatal bar to its jurisdiction or to the admissibility of a document. (ibid., 
166). 
592 Mavrommatis above (n 563). 
593 Such as the failure to indicate the precise norms invoked in the application, as required under Art. 32(2) of the 
Rules of Court, see Northern Cameroon (n 574) 27-28. 
594 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1970, 3, 32, para. 32-33 (consider, however, how the Court treated the question of nationality as a matter of 
jus standi rather than mere admissibility; i.e., it looked at whether Belgium was owed any obligations by Spain). An 
odd case is the investment case Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award of 26 June 2003, in which the tribunal decided to dismiss the claim because the investor, 
which met the nationality requirement at the moment of seisin, had lost the qualifying nationality during the 
proceedings. The requirement is listed among the instances of inadmissibility in the Croatia v. Serbia Judgment on 
Preliminary Objections above (n 589) 456. 
595 Nottebohm, above (n 561), 16, 20; Iran – US Claims Tribunal, Iran and United States, Case No. A/18, Decision 
No. DEC 32-A18-FT (6 April 1984), 5 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 251. 
596 On the difficult classification of this principle, Fontanelli above (n 535) 120-125. 
597 See Amerasinghe above (n 554) 90-91. 
598 Ibid, 77: ‘matters of standing (locus standi) are concerned with jurisdiction (compétence) and not receivability’. 
Contra, see Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (USA v. Italy), ICJ Rep. 1989, 15; Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore 
and Matthew Weiniger, International investment arbitration: substantive principles (OUP 2007) para. 6.93; ;likewise 
Wehland above (n *) 239. It is however possible to consider the ELSI case as one hinging on a question préliminaire 
du fond. In Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/13, Decision on Preliminary Objections of 27 July 2006 the tribunal rejected the claimant’s 
submissions that objections to the investor’s jus standi be joined with the merits, and agreed to examine them ‘when 
dealing with jurisdiction’, see para. 209. 
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can be regarded as one of admissibility, designed to ensure the propriety of the judicial function: 
a tribunal can refrain from exercising its (otherwise existing) jurisdiction on the claim if its 
judgment could undermine the fundamental rule of consent to international obligations and 
international adjudication.599 See how the ambiguity of the ‘indispensable third party’ principle 
emerged in the characterisation of the doctrine provided by the tribunal of the Chevron v. Ecuador 
arbitration tribunal.600 At first, the tribunal noted that the principle prevents a court from exercising 
its validly established jurisdiction (pointing to an objection relating to admissibility): 
although a tribunal may have jurisdiction over a dispute it must not or should not exercise 
that jurisdiction if the very subject-matter of the decision would determine the rights and 
obligations of a State which is not a party to the proceedings.601 
In the next paragraph, however, the tribunal considered the Monetary Gold principle as one 
flowing from consent, and accordingly (but contradictorily) situated it among the requirements of 
jurisdiction:  
no arbitration tribunal has jurisdiction over any person unless they have consented. That 
may be called the ‘consent’ principle, and it goes to the question of the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.602 
This example unveils another complication: the tribunal, in any specific instance, might find a 
problem that affects, at the same time, its jurisdiction and the claim’s admissibility both. The 
application of the Monetary Gold principle might just be one such instance.603 Moreover, if one 
accepts that matters of jurisdiction are simply determined by their inclusion in a binding 
instrument, it is easy to anticipate instances where the parties chose to elevate a matter of 
inadmissibility (actionable under the general principles of law, or customary law, or the inherent 
powers of the tribunal) to a jurisdictional requirement. When that is the case, the court’s power to 
declare a case inadmissible as a matter of judicial propriety is codified and, for this reason alone, 
turned into a limit to its jurisdiction. 
Exceptions préliminaires du fond 
At times, a preliminary objection is such that the tribunal is not able to address it conclusively 
without considering the merits of the case. In this scenario, tribunals can proceed to the 
examination of the merits suspending the decision on competence.604 
                                                 
599 Shany above (n 527) 798; id. above (n 559) 49; Waibel above (n 582); Arthur above (n 564) 458. Contra, see 
Amerasinghe above (n 554) 93. 
600 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. 2009-23, Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 27 February 2012. 
601 Ibid., Part IV, para. 4.60 (emphasis added). 
602 Ibid., para. 4.61 (emphases added). 
603 See, for another example relating to the finality of judgments challenged for denial of justice, below (n 723). 
604 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ndiaye in the case M/V 'SAIGA' above (n Error! Bookmark not defined.) para. 
29: ‘Autrement dit, la jonction au fond s’impose dans la mesure où une décision sur lesdites exceptions exige un 
examen de l'intégralité ou de la quasi-intégralité du fond … Car ce que conteste le défendeur, ce n’est pas la 
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In light of the generalization mentioned above (all preliminary objections are gathered under the 
‘procedural’ umbrella), these particular objections, whose treatment is non-preliminary by 
definition, end up having a ‘secondary impact’605 on the judgment (that is, they are tackled at the 
stage of the merits). 
Already did the PCIJ find little interest in treating this category as a discrete one, noting that the 
correspondent distinction in domestic procedural laws had little bearing on the functioning of the 
Court, and that the ultimate purpose of objections purportedly linked with the merits was in any 
event to stop the Court from ruling on the merits (if after having looked into them).606 In two cases 
(South West Africa and Barcelona Traction (new application)), the Court upheld one jurisdictional 
objection that it had previously joined to the merits, therefore pronouncing on it only at the second 
phase (that usually deals with the merits). 
Generally, this category of jurisdictional issues is not a separate one from the ones described above, 
it just differs from them for not being preliminary in practice. 
Applicable norms and Oil Platforms – a species of the excéptions préliminaires du fond 
A question on the merits might be framed as an excéption préliminaire du fond, if the subject 
matter of the claim lies outwith the tribunal’s jurisdiction.607 When the claim is based on an 
erroneous legal characterisation of the facts, the respondent can successfully claim that the norms 
invoked cannot apply, even taking the factual allegations of the claimants at face value. This 
scenario, in turn, would determine a lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae or of inadmissibility (the 
claim could theoretically proceed to the merits, but the outcome being pre-determined the tribunal 
would better decline to entertain it). 
When the tribunal is competent only to hear disputes arising from the interpretation and application 
of a specific instrument, the impossibility of that instrument applying would be fatal to the claim. 
This is why, as Sperduti noted,  
il arrive assez fréquemment qu’un Etat défendeur, qui se considérait en mesure d’introduire 
une exception préliminaire de fond s’il la considérait recevable, s’applique à transformer 
une exception de cette nature en une exception formelle, notamment en une exception 
d’incompétence.608 
                                                 
recevabilité de la demande au regard de la procédure, mais le droit qui sert de fondement à cette demande. Ce sont 
des exceptions préliminaires de fond.’ 
605 Rosenne and Ronen above (n 544) 820. 
606 German Interests in Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Judgment of 25 August 1925, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 6. 
See also Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Estonia v. Lithuania), Preliminary objections, Order of 30 June 1938, P.C.I.J. 
Series A/B, No. 75, 16. 
607 Heiskanen (n *) 603: ‘a defence which challenges the admissibility of the claimant’s claims on the basis that the 
subject matter of the dispute is elsewhere can never be considered as possessing 'an exclusively preliminary 
character.’ 
608 Giuseppe Sperduti, ‘La recevabilité des exceptions préliminaires de fond dans le procès international’ (1970) 53 
Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 461, 465; see also Roberto Ago, ‘Eccezioni ‘non esclusivamente preliminari’’ in Il 
Processo internzionale, Studi in onore di Gaetano Morelli, Comunicazioni e Studi, vol. XIV (Giuffré 1975) 1. 
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In this sense, every question of competence ratione materiae of a tribunal (in the sense of the 
power to solve a dispute applying the rules of a certain legal regime) is necessary intertwined with 
the analysis of the merits. This is because the question of the norms applicable to a dispute can 
only be conclusively defined in light of the facts submitted.609 As it has been authoritatively noted, 
the issue concerning the competence of an international court or tribunal is precisely [an 
issue that can never be decided independently of the merits], because it relates to the 
question of applicable law … and thus raises, in a very specific and concrete way, the 
question of the competence not only of the court or of the tribunal, but also of the judge or 
of the arbitrator, in terms of education and otherwise, to deal with the claim.610 
The divergence between the claim’s subject matter and the ICJ’s competence ratione materiae 
arose specifically in the case Oil Platforms.611 Whereas the US’s objection failed, Judge Higgins 
cared to elucidate ‘the methodology for determining whether a particular claim falls within the 
compromissory clause of a specific treaty.’612 She concluded that  
The Court should thus see if, on the facts as alleged by Iran, the United States actions 
complained of might violate the Treaty articles.613 
This test established itself in the practice. A successful Oil Platforms objection will result in the 
dismissal of the claim for inadmissibility, but it would be equally plausible to speak of a lack of 
jurisdiction ratione materiae or, more simply, of an issue of the merits.614 The hybrid 
categorisation of this objection derives from its pedigree: it essentially emerged as a gateway 
objection, so it shares in the preliminary character of other procedural objections, but concerns in 
fact the merits of the dispute.615 
4. Conceptual difficulties 
One common characterisation of the divide between jurisdiction and admissibility refers to the 
distinction between fundamental and less fundamental procedural impediments. Fundamental 
flaws would affect the competence of the tribunal to hear the case, whereas other impediments 
would only prejudice the admissibility of the specific claim.616 Accordingly, the former would be 
irremissible whereas reasons for inadmissibility could be either cured or waived by the parties, 
implicitly by failing to raise them timely or expressly.617 Generally, flaws pertaining to the 
                                                 
609 A learned analysis of what ‘merits’ means in the arbitration field is Veijo Heiskanen, ‘Dealing with Pandora: The 
Concept of ‘Merits’ in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2006) 22 Arbitration International 597. 
610 Heiskanen above (n 547) 31. 
611 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1996, p. 803. 
612 Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, 847, para. 2. 
613 Ibid., 856, para. 33. 
614 I.e., the breach alleged falls under the jurisdiction of the tribunal, but the conduct is not precluded but the applicable 
norms. 
615 The preliminary character of any objection is a matter to determine with a view to ‘ensure the administration of 
justice’, see Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 16. 
616 See for instance Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (CUP 2009) 148. 
617 Amerasinghe above (n 554) 192. For an example, see HRC, Husseini v. Denmark, Communication No. 2243/2013, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/112/D/2243/2013 (2014), para. 8.3: the Committee does not ascertain whether the author of the 
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foundational jurisdiction can be raised by the tribunal motu proprio (or should even be raised ex 
officio), and the parties cannot agree to waive them.618 This distinction also accounts for the regime 
of finality mentioned earlier: jurisdictional decisions are more likely to be reviewable because they 
speak to the delegation of State powers to international courts,619 whereas admissibility decisions 
are by definition taken within the remit of the court’s delegated powers and are ill-fitted for 
external review.620 
These distinctions are either porous (they tolerate overlaps) or inessential (they speak to the effects 
of the distinction, but do not clarify how to draw it in the first place).621 Take the case of a failure 
to exhaust local remedies. This impediment can be characterised both ways. 1) The parties have 
agreed that a specific tribunal only hear cases that have been tried domestically (an issue of 
consent, a fixed delimitation of the tribunal’s authority); 2) the claim is not ripe for adjudication 
(a procedural accident, a curable defect of the claim). Insofar as the conceptual definitions of 
jurisdiction and admissibility do not exclude each other, overlaps will occur and render the two 
categories normatively useless or, worse still, capricious. A pragmatic approach would suggest 
considering all conditions agreed by the parties as jurisdictional622: States confer authority on a 
court through consent, and by consent can they remove it. Distinctions based on the possibility to 
waive the requirement, the ex parte or proprio motu nature of the objections, the allocation of 
evidentiary burdens, and the possibility of review are not real distinctions: they might specify what 
follows from, but not what constitutes, the doctrinal division between jurisdiction and 
admissibility. 
Moreover, it is difficult to agree that admissibility requirements can be always waived, or never 
raised proprio motu,623 that jurisdictional requirements can never be waived and must be reviewed 
                                                 
communication has exhausted domestic remedies under Article 5(2)(b) of the ICCPR Optional Protocol, noting that 
the State has not raised a preliminary objection to this effect. Shany and Seetulsingh, in a joint dissenting opinion, 
objected to the finding of the majority, implicitly considering the State’s conduct as a waiver regarding an admissibility 
flaw. They noted that the HRC should have examined this requirement proprio motu, therefore characterising it as a 
jurisdictional threshold (see on this Shany above (n 559) 136).  
618 This common view is expounded for instance in Andrea Marco Steingruber, ‘Some remarks on Veijo Heiskanen’s 
Note ‘Ménage à trois? Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Competence in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2014) 29 ICSID 
Review 675, 681-682. 
619 Shany above (n 527). 
620 Paulsson above (n 557) 601. 
621 Classification can be an arduous task. Cfr the dispirited words of Herman Melville, who advised against using 
specific elements upon which to build a classification of whales (Moby Dick; or, The Whale (1851, ed. Simonds 1922), 
Chapter 32, 133): ‘it may possibly be conceived that, in the internal parts of the whale, in his anatomy – there, at least, 
we shall be able to hit the right classification. Nay; what thing, for example, is there in the Greenland whale’s anatomy 
more striking than his baleen? Yet we have seen that by his baleen it is impossible correctly to classify the Greenland 
whale. And if you descend into the bowels of the various leviathans, why there you will not find distinctions a fiftieth 
part as available to the systematizer as those external ones already enumerated. What then remains? nothing but to 
take hold of the whales bodily, in their entire liberal volume, and boldly sort them that way. And this is the 
Bibliographical system here adopted; and it is the only one that can possibly succeed, for it alone is practicable.’ 
622 Thirlway above (n 539) 114-115. 
623 Especially when they constitute safeguards to the propriety of the judicial mandate. See Shany above (n 559) 51, 
referring to Northern Cameroons, 1963 ICJ 15, 29: ‘The Court itself, and not the parties, must be the guardian of the 
Court’s judicial integrity’. 
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ex officio,624 that a mistaken finding of admissibility is always immune from review,625 that an 
admissibility defect is always curable,626 that a jurisdictional requirement can never lapse after the 
seisine of the tribunal,627 that a jurisdictional flaw cannot be remedied in fresh proceedings.628 
A line of distinction is difficult to draw in the practice, when procedural objections based on either 
category are often collapsed and raised by the defendant at the same stage.629 The case law of the 
ICJ in this respect is particularly unhelpful, as intimated above. All findings of the ICJ are final 
and the Court’s foundational jurisdiction is not limited ratione materiae, hence an erroneous 
labelling of a procedural objection as relating to jurisdiction as opposed to admissibility (or vice 
                                                 
624 Suffice it here to recall the forum prorogatum doctrine, with respect to ICJ practice. In arbitration, consider Waguih 
Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award of 1 June 
2009, para. 189: ‘Egypt was able to waive its objections to jurisdiction based on Mr Siag’s claimed bankruptcy’ (note 
that in this case the tribunal characterised all preliminary objections as jurisdictional). 
625 See for instance the case Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, App. No. 26307/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (2004). After a first decision 
of admissibility by the Commission, a Chamber of Court of Human Rights agreed to strike out the case after the 
unilateral settlement offer made by Turkey (under Article 37 ECHR, allowing the Court to strike out an application 
from its list of cases, inter alia, when ‘… (b) the matter has been resolved; or (c) for any other reason established by 
the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application’). The Grand Chamber, seised by the 
applicant, reversed the strike out decision, see Tahsin Acar v. Turkey (preliminary objection) [GC], no. 26308/95, 6 
May 2003, para. 84-85. See Gregory S Weber, ‘Who Killed the Friendly Settlement? The Decline of Negotiated 
Resolutions at the European Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 7(2) Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 1, 20 ff. 
626 Think of all the irreversible causes of inadmissibility relating, for instance, to the mootness of the claim, the lack 
of interest, arguments of res judicata or forum non conveniens, the claimant’s prior behaviour (estoppel, clean hands). 
627 According to a well-established principle, jurisdictional requirement are only assessed at the moment of seisin. See 
for instance Ampal-American Israel Corporation and others v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, 
Award of 1 February 2016, para. 136-137. The tribunal took issue with the fact that the denial of benefits declaration 
was issued 8 months after the claim was registered by ICSID (the host State should have issued it during the pre-
litigation negotiations, to delimit the tribunal’s jurisdiction ex ante). However, see Loewen above (n 594) (the tribunal 
declined jurisdiction because the claimant had lost the qualifying nationality during the arbitration). It is also possible 
to hypothesise that the ICJ would not refrain from re-assessing its jurisdiction should one of the States be extinguished 
during the proceedings. A suggestion in this sense can be read in the dictum of the ICJ in the Croatia v. Serbia case, 
judgment of 3 February 2015, para. 116, relating to the application of the Monetary Gold principle to an extinguished 
third necessary party: ‘That rationale has no application to a State which no longer exists, as is the case with the 
SFRY, since such a State no longer possesses any rights and is incapable of giving or withholding consent to the 
jurisdiction of the Court.’ A tribunal dealing with the less radical issue of succession between States noted, however, 
that ‘…jurisdiction is to be determined in light of the situation as it exists on the date the judicial proceedings are 
instituted. … Though changes in the “identity” of States occur less frequently than changes of the nationality of 
natural or legal persons, there is no reason why the two should not be treated in the same way.’ See Mytilineos 
Holdings SA v. The State Union of Serbia & Montenegro and Republic of Serbia, UNCITRAL, Partial Award on 
Jurisdiction of 8 September 2006, para. 159, 162. In Rosenne and Ronen above (n *) 607 the termination of a State’s 
existence, net of all the implications relating to State succession, is deemed to entail inevitably the discontinuation of 
litigation. 
628 Consider for instance the ICJ cases Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) and Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to 
Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom). In each 
case, the Court declined jurisdiction because the applicant had failed to carry out certain compulsory procedural steps 
(consultation, negotiation, exhaustion of alternative means of dispute resolution). It stands to reason that, in spite of 
the Court’s dismissal of the cases for want of jurisdiction, the applicants could comply with these requirements and 
bring fresh applications. See, on this point, Urbaser jurisdiction (n *) para. 118, which is discussed more in detail 
below.  
629 The ICJ has repeatedly noticed this confusion when analysing the grounds for objection raised by the defendant, 
see Nicaragua (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) above (n 578) 429; Northern Cameroon (Preliminary Objections) 
above (n 574) 26.  
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versa) has no practical consequence. A mislabelled finding of lack of jurisdiction will not be 
reviewable, just like it would not be if it were correctly characterised as one of inadmissibility. A 
failure to raise proprio motu an objection relating to the specific jurisdiction will often result in 
the claim falling nevertheless under the Court’s subject-matter fundamental competence. For 
instance, the ICJ has never asked the parties to tackle a jurisdictional issue that they had not raised, 
possibly due to the application of the principle of forum prorogatum, whereby the parties can heal 
a defect of specific jurisdiction displaying their consent to the continuation of the proceeding after 
its institution.630 
To illustrate how consent operates differently on matters of specific and foundational jurisdictions, 
consider the following examples. The Court could exercise jurisdiction if the defending State failed 
to invoke a procedural objection (for instance, a reservation ratione materiae to the declaration 
under Article 36 ICJ, or a failure to exhaust local remedies contained in the treaty conferring 
jurisdiction), but would have to decline a claim brought by an individual, even if the defendant 
had not raised a procedural objection.631 Likewise, no jurisdiction can operate when there appears 
to be no dispute underlying the claim632: the existence of a legal dispute is a primary requisite for 
the institution of any judicial procedure, and the seised tribunal has the competence and the duty 
to ascertain the presence of this element.633 The ICJ, for instance, ‘must always … itself be satisfied 
that a dispute exists.’634 
Accordingly, the analysis of each procedural objection has to be performed on a case by case basis, 
looking at the governing instruments of the tribunal at stake.635 For example, consider the World 
Bank Administrative Tribunal. A claim relating to facts occurred before the entry into force of its 
Statute would be rejected for lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis.636 Article II of the Statute, in 
turn, provides that applications ‘shall be admissible … if filed within one hundred and twenty days 
after [the occurrence of certain qualifying events]’. In this case, the requirement is expressly one 
of admissibility ratione temporis.637 Whereas the former element is surely jurisdictional (it pertains 
                                                 
630 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1998, 275, Sep. Opinion Higgins, 345: ‘it is in principle for a respondent State to decide what points of jurisdiction 
and inadmissibility it wishes to advance. If a State is willing to accept the Court’s jurisdiction in regard to a matter, 
it is generally not for the Court – its entitlement to raise points proprio motu notwithstanding – to raise further 
jurisdictional objections.’ A general description of forum prorogatum is provided by Judge Lauterpacht in Application 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia 
and Montenegro), Order of 13 September 1993 (Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures), Separate 
opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, 416, para. 24: ‘[Forum prorogatum] is the possibility that if State A commences 
proceedings against State B on a non-existent or defective jurisdictional basis, State B can remedy the situation by 
conduct amounting to an acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court’. 
631 Shany above (n 527) 784, frames this remark distinguishing between foundational jurisdiction (on which the parties 
have no control) and specific jurisdiction (whose lacks can be healed through forum prorogatum). 
632 South-West Africa Case (Preliminary Objections) above (n 578) 328. 
633 South-West Africa Case (Second Phase) above (n 584) 33; East Timor Case above (n 533) 100.  
634 Land and Maritime Boundary, Sep. Opinion Higgins above (n 630) 347; Mavrommatis above (n 563). 
635 For instance, issues of nationality of the parties, that are customarily deemed to be relevant for the recevabilité of 
the claim (see Nottebohm, above (n 561)), are instead treated as a requisite of primary jurisdiction by the Iran – US 
Tribunal. Another example might be the competence ratione temporis, which bears a more fundamental character 
before tribunals like the ICTY, the jurisdiction of which is defined precisely in connection to a fixed period. 
636 George Kavoukas et al. v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Decision No. 3 of 5 June 1981. 
637 It was indeed treated as a matter of admissibility in Elizabeth Tweddle v. International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, Decision No. 508 of 29 May 2015 (Preliminary Objection), para. 25-31. 
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to the foundational jurisdiction of the Tribunal) the latter is labelled as pertaining to admissibility 
but could just as well be characterised as a matter of specific jurisdiction ratione temporis, relating 
to the competence of the Tribunal over the specific dispute.638 In this case, the Treaty language is 
dispositive of the issue, rather than the substance of the requirement.639 
Yuval Shany advanced a proposal to sketch a principled taxonomy – less reliant on language 
conventions or analogical patterns.640 Shany conceded that the interchangeable labelling of the 
same factors indicates their essential similarity: saying that a procedural impediment entails a lack 
of jurisdiction ratione personae, instead of inadmissibility ratione personae, is sometimes a matter 
of convention. As such, the current understanding is unsatisfactory because it has no normative 
value. Shany suggested arranging the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility along the 
critical criteria of discretion and propriety. Whenever the claim is dismissed for breach of an 
objective rule regarding the dimensions (the rationes) or conditions of the court’s powers (e.g., for 
lack of qualifying nationality, failure to comply with a precondition, inapplicability ratione 
temporis of the rule invoked) the problem is one of jurisdiction.641 
Conversely, admissibility would operate whenever tribunals exercise judicial discretion and 
refrain from entertaining a claim based on considerations of propriety.642 For example, the tribunal 
could opt for inadmissibility when an essentially but not formally identical claim is pending 
elsewhere, there is abuse of process, the object of the dispute is not arbitrable or susceptible to 
adjudication, there is no legal interest at stake, the claimant did not come to court with clean hands 
or is otherwise estopped from bringing the claim.643 
2. The implications of this blur for investment arbitration 
                                                 
638 For a similar requirement ratione temporis, see NAFTA, Articles 1116(2) and 1117(2). 
639 See also the example of the European Commission of Human Rights, case Macit and 53 others v. Turkey decision 
on admissibility of 31 March 1993, App. No. 19934/92 (Sperduti was sitting on the bench). After noting that the facts 
alleged by the claimants had taken place before the cut-off date after which Turkey accepted the Commission’s 
competence over individual applications. The Commission on one hand noted that ‘la requête échappe à la 
compétence ratione temporis de la Commission,’ but concluded on the other hand that the application was inadmissible 
(‘irrecevable’). 
640 The proposal is briefly but clearly articulated in his Chapter of the Handbook above (n 527). 
641 Shany above (n 527) 785: ‘The scope of jurisdiction conferred upon international courts thus consists of the 
intersection between the different jurisdictional dimensions (often phrased in positive terms) and the jurisdictional 
conditions (often phrased in negative terms) found in the relevant jurisdiction-creating instruments.’ 
642 The reasoning seems to be foreshadowed Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/98/2, Dissenting Opinion of Keith Highet, of 8 May 2000, see para. 58: ‘admissibility is whether the case 
itself is defective—whether it is appropriate for the tribunal to hear it.’ However, it is doubtful whether the thrust of 
Highet’s reasoning was in the remark matter about appropriateness. His reasoning seemed to inscribe itself in the 
mainstream view that admissibility depends on the features of the claim. Another precursor of Shany’s approach is 
the view of Rosenne, see Shabtai Rosenne, ‘International Courts and Tribunals, Jurisdiction and Admissibility of Inter-
State Applications’ (2006) Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, para. 2: admissibility ‘may import 
an element of discretion that has to be exercised not whimsically but strictly in accordance with legal criteria.’ 
643 The gist of Shany’s proposal seems to be in line with Judge Fitzmaurice’s separate opinion in Northern Cameroons 
(Cameroon v. UK), 1963 ICJ 15, 101: ‘… the real distinction and test would seem to be whether or not the objection 
is based on, or arises from, the jurisdictional clause or clauses under which the jurisdiction of the tribunal is said to 
exist. If so, the objection is basically one of jurisdiction. If it is founded on considerations lying outside the ambit of 
any jurisdictional clause, and not involving the interpretation or application of such a provision, then it will normally 
be an objection to the recevability of the claim.’ 
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One of the main claims of this study is that there is no reliable line between jurisdiction and 
admissibility, either in the practice of international law proceedings or in investment arbitration. 
This Section zooms in on the practice of investment disputes: whereas Part A was devoted to the 
practice tout court, this section will examine a selection of hard cases, in which the blur affects the 
reasoning of the tribunals and the outcome of the disputes. 
By way of introduction, note the dispirited words of the tribunal in Apotex v. US (UNCITRAL), 
referring to the requirement of finality of judicial acts in connection with denial of justice claims 
and the futility exception: 
The Parties have differed … on the precise calibration of the “obviously futile” exception. 
At the outset of the oral hearing, the Tribunal questioned the proper characterisation of this 
objection, and in particular whether it raised an issue of jurisdiction or admissibility, or 
whether it might also be viewed as a preliminary substantive objection. This is a debate 
with a long heritage as a matter of international law, and long-divided views. … In line 
with both Parties’ approach, the Tribunal proceeds on the basis that this objection concerns 
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae. In the alternative, the Tribunal has also 
considered the matter in terms of the admissibility of claims.644 
Whereas the tribunal’s approach is commendable for acknowledging the debate,645 the arbitrators 
avoided to take a position and relied on the parties’ characterisation. When the distinction entails 
no practical difference, doctrinal precision is not necessary. However, there are cases in which the 
difference matters. In investment arbitration, the practice is still confused or uninterested in the 
distinction. The scholarship has diligently borrowed from the field of international law the alleged 
hallmarks of each category, and some authors have accepted that a distinction exists and is 
positively identifiable. Typically, they explain how jurisdiction and admissibility differ in relation 
to reviewability of the determination; allocation of the pertaining evidentiary burdens; invocability 
ex officio, waivability and timeliness of the respective objections; curability of the underlying 
flaws; essential characters (tribunal’s power versus claim’s defects).646 
Section (1), below, accounts for the difficulty to tell jurisdiction from admissibility in investment 
arbitration, in light of the remarks made above (in Part A) about the corresponding difficulty in 
international legal proceedings at large. The main take-away of this section is that the prevailing 
taxonomies are unsatisfactory. Section (2) zooms in and tackles selected scenarios in which these 
doctrinal shortcomings affect the outcome of the proceedings, or simply undermine the principle 
                                                 
644 Apotex UNCITRAL above (n 246). 
645 However, it is important to note that the exhaustion of local remedies in a denial of justice claim is perhaps better 
characterised as a ‘substantive law requirement’ (see Shany above (n 559) 100) rather than a procedural issue. As 
such, it should be reviewed at the merits stage, or at most at the Oil Platforms stage of the jurisdictional stage. See, 
for instance, Pantechniki above (n 90) para. 102. A similar characterisation appears in Mytilineos above (n *) para. 
212: ‘In the final award the Loewen tribunal did not entertain any jurisdictional challenge to the claim brought 
against the United States. Rather, it found that there was a substantive obligation incumbent upon claimants to 
challenge lower court judgments in order to invoke the international responsibility of the forum State for a denial of 
justice.’ 
646 See in particular Waibel above (n *) and Wehland above (n *) 232-234. 
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of legal certainty. These, as will be shown, are the cases where the elusive line of distinction is 
critical, and clarity more urgently needed. 
1. The line between jurisdiction and admissibility in investment arbitration 
When it comes to assess the host State’s consent and its jurisdictional implications, it is impossible 
to find a consistent use of the concepts of jurisdiction and admissibility in investment arbitration. 
The ICSID Convention and most investment treaties do not differentiate between jurisdictional, 
admissibility and procedural requirements, nor do they specify which are mandatory and which 
are not.647 Moreover, the investment arbitration practice is influenced by the cognate practice in 
international commercial arbitration, in which a similar confusion exists regarding procedural 
requirements.648 As a result, the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, tentatively 
outlined above in the field of public international law litigation, is all the more difficult to trace in 
the practice of investment arbitration.649 
A confused practice: the example of the investor’s misconduct 
There are several reasons why, arguably, the conceptual essence of these two notions is blurred 
almost insolubly and, at any rate, a normative classification is elusive. First, matters of jurisdiction 
and admissibility are conflated in the phase of the procedural objections.650 In this sense, the 
pragmatic stance of several tribunals is not to fixate on a distinction that might not reflect a 
difference: if upheld, a preliminary objection will prevent the review of the merits, whatever its 
label.651 Second, specific investment agreements, the ICSID Convention (when applicable) and 
other procedural instruments like the UNCITRAL Convention contain different language 
concerning the powers of the tribunal. It is therefore possible that a matter of admissibility under 
the practice governed by general international law is considered one of jurisdiction under the 
applicable treaty rules (the most common examples being the requirements of nationality and local 
exhaustion652). Third, when a tribunal is established ad hoc to hear a specific claim the conceptual 
distinction between competence (the power to hear a category of disputes, and a specific dispute 
in particular) and admissibility (the specific claim’s capability to be heard by that tribunal) is very 
porous. 
                                                 
647 Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9 (formerly Giordano Alpi and 
others v. Argentine Republic) Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 8 February 2013, para. 572. 
648 For an exhaustive overview of pre-arbitration requirements in the practice of commercial and investment tribunals, 
see Born and Šćekić above (n 576) 227. 
649 The difference between jurisdiction and competence is largely ignored. 
650 Which often, but not always, are treated in a different stage of the proceedings. On bifurcation, see Lucy 
Greenwood, ‘Does Bifurcation Really Promote Efficiency?’ (2011) 28 Journal of International Arbitration 105.  
651 Ian Laird, ‘A Distinction without a Difference? An Examination of the Concepts of Admissibility and Jurisdiction 
in Salini v. Jordan and Methanex v. USA’ in Todd Weiler (ed), International Investment law and Arbitration: Leading 
Cases from ICSID, NAFTA and Customary International Law (Cameron May 2005) 201. 
652 Whereas exhaustion of local remedies in normally inapplicable in the field of investment arbitration, States can 




A good example in point is the arbitral practice relating to the allegations of corruption, or illegality 
lato sensu, on the part of the investor.653 If a tribunal upholds these assertions, what are the 
consequences? In the abstract, it is possible to anticipate: 
a) a lack of jurisdiction654 of the tribunal ratione materiae (particularly if there is a treaty655 
or statutory656 clause requiring the investment’s legality under domestic law but, arguably, 
also when there is none657); and/or 
                                                 
653 These cases are to be distinguished from the scenario in which the investor is not implicated (for instance, when 
the State is alleged to have attempted extortion). A perceptive commentary of this set of cases in contained in Aloysius 
P Llamzon, Corruption in International Investment Arbitration (OUP 2014) and in the book review Joan E Donoghue, 
‘The Corruption Trump in Investment Arbitration’ (2015) 30(3) ICSID Review 756-761. See also Attila Tanzi, ‘The 
Relevance of the Foreign Investor’s Good Faith’ in Attila Tanzi, Andrea Gattini, Filippo Fontanelli (eds), General 
Principles of Law and International Investment Arbitration (BRILL 2018). 
654 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The Republic of the Philippines (Fraport I), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/25, Award of 16 August 2007, para 396-404. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic 
of the Philippines (Fraport II), ICSID Case No. ARB/11/12, Award of 10 December 2014, para. 467-468; Alasdair 
Ross Anderson and ors v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, Award of 19 May 2010, para. 59; Inceysa 
Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award of 2 August 2006, para. 207. See 
also, for a discussion of the applicable law to this kind of illegality objections, Oxus Gold plc v. Republic of Uzbekistan, 
the State Committee of Uzbekistan for Geology & Mineral Resources, and Navoi Mining & Metallurgical Kombinat, 
UNCITRAL, Award of 17 December 2015, para. 705 ff. 
655 Metal-Tech Ltd v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No ARB/10/3, Award of 4 October 2013. An accurate 
analysis of the possible effects of domestic legality clauses is found in Cameron A Miles, ‘Corruption, Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility in International Investment Claims’ (2012) 3(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 329, 
343 ff. A straightforward case of application of a specific domestic legality clause is the dispute Yaung Chi Oo Trading 
Pte Ltd v Government of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN Case No ARB/01/1, Award of 31 March 2003, see para. 62. 
In this case, the applicable investment treaty (the ASEAN Investment Agreement) contained an explicit requirement 
that investments be approved and registered by the host State. The tribunal thus declined jurisdiction ratione materiae. 
Lack of approval of the investment determined also the lapse of the tribunal’s jurisdiction in the case Gruslin v. 
Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award of 27 November 2000, para. 25.5. 
656 See for instance Gaëta above (n *) para. 232-233. The Guinean statute providing for the right to launch ICSID 
arbitration required that foreign investments be approved and comply with domestic laws. 
657 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No ARB/03/24, Award of 27 August 2008, para. 
138: ‘Unlike a number of Bilateral Investment Treaties, the [Energy Charter Treaty] does not contain a provision 
requiring the conformity of the Investment with a particular law. This does not mean, however, that the protections 
provided for by the ECT cover all kinds of investments, including those contrary to domestic or international law. ... 
The Tribunal concludes that the substantive protections of the ECT cannot apply to investments that are made contrary 
to law’. According to Miles above (n 655) 338, this passage would suggest that corruption would entail the 
inadmissibility of the claim: ‘where a tribunal simply refers to the dismissal of a claim or a general refusal to extend 
the protections of an IIA to a particular investment, the tribunal is generally holding the claim in question 
inadmissible’; the same view is shared by Newcombe above (n 440) 197. Ampal above (n 627) para. 301: ‘It is a well-
established principle of international law that a tribunal constituted on the basis of an investment treaty has no 
jurisdiction over a claimant’s investment which was made illegally in violation of the laws and regulations of the 
Contracting State’; see also Getma International and others v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/29, 
Award of 16 August 2016, para. 174. See also David Minnotte and Robert Lewis v. Republic of Poland, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/10/1, Award of 16 May 2014, para. 131 (corruption disqualifies the investment from treaty protection). 
It is however doubtful whether legality could be an implicit requirement of investments or whether an ‘illegal or bad-
faith investment remains an investment’, see Cyrus Benson, Penny Madden and Ceyda Knoebel, ‘Covered investment’ 
in Barton Legum (ed), The Investment Treaty Arbitration Review (Law Business Research 2016) 15, citing Quiborax 
S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of 27 September 2012, para. 226; Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/3, Award of 4 October 2013, para. 127; Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic 
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b) the inadmissibility of the claim under the doctrines of ordre public international,658 
clean hands,659 estoppel, abuse of rights/process660 or ex injuria jus non oritur; and/or 
c) a finding on the merits against the investor661; and/or, possibly, 
d) a finding on the merits that might ultimately favour the investor but takes the illegality 
into account in the calculation of damages owed by the State,662 or even just in the 
allocation of legal costs. 
These consequences are radically different, but they do not necessarily exclude each other and it 
is not possible to maintain with any precision, at the state, which is normatively correct.663  
A plausible rule of thumb relates to the time of the wrongdoing: if it is committed before the 
investment is established, or in connection with its establishment, there is a lack of jurisdiction.664 
If the misconduct arises subsequently, the problem is one of admissibility or merits.665 For an 
example of this approach, consider the reasoning of the Oxus tribunal: 
… the Arbitral Tribunal finds that only this argument [i.e., the claimant’s misrepresentation 
allegedly occurred before or during the making of the investment] is relevant to determine 
whether Claimant’s investment qualifies for protection under the BIT. As concerns 
                                                 
of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, Excerpts of Award of 22 June 2010, para. 187; Saba Fakes v. Republic 
of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award of 14 July 2010, para. 114, 119; Oostergetel above (n *) para. 176, 
178 (the tribunal’s jurisdiction requires the legality of the investment’s making even in the silence of the treaty). 
658 World Duty Free above (n 29) para. 157, 188. See Newcombe above (n 440) 196-197. 
659 Patrick Dumberry and Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, ‘The Doctrine of “Clean Hands” and the Inadmissibility of Claims 
by Investors Breaching International Human Rights Law’ (2013) 10(1) Transnational Dispute Management. 
660 Phoenix above (n 254) para. 100. 
661 Plama above (n 657) para. 112 and 135. It is however not too clear from this award whether the matter is one of 
merits or it is just joined to the merits phase. Para. 138 is particularly ambiguous, see above (n 657). A good instance 
of this approach is the Oxus case above (n *). For instance, the investor’s irregularities contributed to the tribunal’s 
determination that a governmental audit was not arbitrary or unfair – and therefore did not breach the FET standard, 
para. 799. Likewise, the tribunal concluded that the non-renewal or non-extension of certain licenses did not breach 
the FET obligation, since the investor had failed to comply with the applicable regulations, see para. 802-803 (‘the 
Complex State Audit … identified serious non-compliances with various regulations, including on the operational 
level … [thus] Respondent had sufficient justifiable reasons not to renew or issue such licenses.’ Likewise, see 
Minnotte above (n *) para. 163: ‘It is … entirely possible that the conduct of a third party, or a claimant’s negligence, 
may justify specific conduct of a respondent that could in other circumstances amount to a violation of the BIT.’ 
662 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile SA v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award of 25 May 2004, para. 242-
243. 
663 A recent critique of the current situation is contained in Miles above (n 655) and Newcombe above (n 440). 
664 This practice mirrors that relating to the requirement that the investment be ‘admitted’ by the host State, which 
stands to apply only ‘at the time of entry into the country and not during the entire operation of the project.’ See 
Churchill above (n *) para. 290; see also Minnotte v. Poland above (n *) para. 132: there are cases in which ‘fraud is 
so manifest, and so closely connected to facts (such as the making of an investment) which form the basis of a tribunal’s 
jurisdiction as to warrant a dismissal of claims in limine for want of jurisdiction.’ 
665 Miles above (n 655) 339-340. This approach is pragmatic but ultimately stands on the assumption that there is a 
legality clause (not a given) and that is refers to investments ‘made’ in accordance with domestic law. See Copper 
Mesa v. Ecuador, above (n 26), para. 5.54-5.55. See also Teinver FINAL (n *) para. 344 (note that the applicable BIT, 
between Argentina and Spain, includes a domestic legality clause at Article 1(2)); Oostergetel above (n *) para. 176 
(issues of management of the investment pertains to the merits); Anatolie Stati et al. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 
Arbitration SCC V (116/2010), Award of 19 December 2013, para. 812. 
100 
 
Respondent’s contentions regarding allegedly ill-gotten profits through the unlawful 
operation of AGF and the violation of currency regulations, they are irrelevant for the issue 
of jurisdiction or admissibility. They may nevertheless be relevant when assessing the 
justifiable character of certain of Respondent’s actions, which Claimant claims are in 
breach of the BIT protection standards or as an element of the evaluation of damages and 
will thus, to the extent necessary, be examined in such contexts.666 
The Copper Mesa tribunal also relied on this distinction, when interpreting a legality clause of the 
applicable investment treaty. It noted that elevating post-establishment wrongdoing as a 
jurisdictional barrier would be an excessive aggravation on the investor and would raise the 
question as to the required seriousness of the wrongdoing. The better solution, in the tribunal’s 
view, was to deal with subsequent illegality at the stage of the merits.667  
The tribunal, however, did not exclude the possibility that a clean hands objection regarding post-
establishment misconduct could pertain to the admissibility of the claim (rather than the merits). 
Whilst it accepted this characterisation in principle,668 it also noted that in the instant case the host 
State’s failure to react to the alleged misconduct under international norms estopped it from 
challenging the admissibility of the claim.669 As for the separate allegations of misconduct under 
domestic law, the tribunal explained that they should be dealt with at the merits stage. Interestingly, 
the tribunal did not simply join the analysis of this preliminary objection to the merits, in light of 
the factual determinations required to assess it. Instead, it re-framed the objection as a plea of 
defense on the merits: 
the Tribunal there prefers to take into account the Claimant [sic: presumably Respondent]’s 
case not in the form of the doctrine of unclean hands as such, but rather under analogous 
doctrines of causation and contributory fault applying to the merits of the Claimant’s claims 
arising from events subsequent to the acquisition of its investment. That result, based on 
the Respondent’s case on the merits, strikes the Tribunal as more legally appropriate to this 
case than an outright dismissal of the Claimant’s claims (in regard to the Junín concessions) 
on the ground of inadmissibility.670 
Whereas the finding is plausible, it shows the difficulty of the tribunal in the characterisation of 
the host State’s objection. The language (‘prefers’; ‘more … appropriate’) is tentative and the 
reasoning is not cogent (‘the outright dismissal’ of a claim being indeed the correct consequence 
of its inadmissibility, it cannot be portrayed as an absurd occurrence, such as to require re-framing 
the objection as a matter of merits). The tribunal used the doctrine of contributory loss, coloured 
by the ‘unclean hands’ allegations, to determine that the claimant was responsible for 30% of the 
                                                 
666 Oxus above (n *) para. 709. 
667 Ibid. para. 5.56: ‘the jurisdictional significance of the requirement of legality was exhausted once the investment 
was made.’ 
668 Ibid., 5.61 (emphasis added). 
669 Ibid., 5.63-5.64: ‘… as regards international law, international public policy and human rights, not a single 
complaint was made by the Respondent against the Claimant at the time. Such a complaint surfaced for the first time 
after the commencement of this arbitration. … In these circumstances, the Tribunal considers that it is far too late for 
the Respondent to raise such objections to the Tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction in this arbitration.’ 
670 Ibid., para. 5.65. 
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injury suffered.671 In this dispute case it is possible to see how the same allegations were raised, 
considered, partly upheld and ultimately applied in relation to all possible stages of the 
proceedings: jurisdiction, admissibility, liability, compensation. 
This variety of legal consequences was noted by the Churchill tribunal. In the dispute, it was found 
that the mining licenses on which the claim was based were forged by an associate of the 
claimant.672 After reviewing the diverse characterisations made in the case-law, the tribunal simply 
noted that the claims, vitiated by a large-scale fraudulent scheme, could not ‘benefit from 
investment protection’ and were inadmissible.673 The tribunal quoted approvingly the Minnotte v. 
Poland award, and the test developed therein to decide cases of alleged fraud which were not 
clearly attributed to the claimant, but from which the claimant’s claim sought to benefit. The 
Minnotte tribunal considered that a deliberate failure ‘to make inquiries which might … have 
unearthed evidence of fraud’674 could ‘vitiate a claim’675 on the merits, but could not affect the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction, or render the claim inadmissible. This test, barely sketched test to assess 
the merits was used by the Churchill tribunal in flagrant disregards of the Minnotte tribunal’s 
instructions, that is, precisely to determine inadmissibility of the claim. The juxtaposed awards in 
the Minnotte and Churchill cases display, again, the permeability of legal categories when at stake 
are the legal consequences of misconduct related to the investment or the investor. 
An irrelevant distinction? 
The doctrinal hesitations of the Copper Mesa tribunal are not surprising, giving that a clear 
distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility does not exist.676 The conceptual overlap is often 
irrelevant for practical purposes677 and tribunals are used to pointing that out.678 Consider for 
instance the forceful remarks of the tribunal in the L.E.S.I. v. Algeria case:  
dans les procédures CIRDI, la distinction est sans portée pratique, à la différence de ce qui 
peut valoir dans d’autres procédures arbitrales; en effet, les recours à l’encontre des 
                                                 
671 Ibid., 6.102. 
672 Churchill AWARD above (n *) para. 494: ‘A review of international cases shows that fraudulent conduct can 
affect the jurisdiction of the tribunal, or the admissibility of (all or some) claims, or the merits of a dispute.’ 
673 Ibid., para. 528. 
674 Minnotte above (n *) para. 139. 
675 Ibid., para. 163. 
676 In Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 14 January 2004, para. 33, the tribunal noted that the ICSID framework only contemplates jurisdiction 
and competence, therefore the category of admissibility does not appear necessary. 
677 See for instance Corona Materials LLC v. Dominican Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/14/3, Award on 
Preliminary Objections of 31 May 2016, para. 191. The tribunal, commenting on a three-year limitation period for the 
launching of arbitration, did not qualify it as a limit of jurisdiction or admissibility, and simply made the pragmatic 
point that the ‘Parties have plainly conditioned their consents to arbitration. If a claimant does not comply with the 
[time-limit], its claim cannot be submitted to arbitration.’ In para. 280 the tribunal, however, notes specifically that 
since the Claimant’s request for arbitration had been filed too late, the tribunal had ‘no jurisdiction over the claims.’ 
678 See for instance Bayindir above (n 38) para. 87: ‘The Tribunal will examine Pakistan’s objections in turn, without 
distinguishing between objections to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and objections to the admissibility of the claims.’ 
This approach was followed in several disputes, see for instance Heiskanen above (n 38) 232-233, and cases mentioned 
in the footnotes accompanying the text. 
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décisions rendues à propos de l’une ou de l’autre question ne sont pas différents, dans le 
système de la Convention, qu’il s’agisse de compétence ou de fins de non-recevoir.679 
A similar approach has prevailed in NAFTA arbitration. The Mondev tribunal pointed to a common 
distinction between ‘issues going to their jurisdiction and questions of procedure in relation to a 
claim which is within jurisdiction’.680 Nevertheless, it noted that NAFTA ‘elides that 
distinction’681 and therefore all procedural conditions really go to the extent of the parties’ consent 
to arbitration,682 save for procedural requirements of minor scope which should not be read ‘in an 
excessively technical way’.683 
Even when the distinction surfaces in the practice, sometimes it is for the sake of doctrinal accuracy 
rather than to support a critical passage of the reasoning. An example is found in the award of the 
S.G.S. v. Philippines case. The dispute hinged on the respondent’s invocation of a forum-selection 
clause in the contract with the claimant, which indicated domestic courts for the resolution of 
disputes. Pursuant to this clause, the tribunal ultimately declined to entertain the claim – which 
was reserved to the local judiciary. However, the tribunal took pains to characterise the issue as 
one of admissibility rather than jurisdiction, observing that the jurisdiction of the tribunal, as 
determined by treaty law, could not be curtailed by the stipulations contained in a private contract. 
The contractual forum selection clause did not affect the tribunal’s jurisdiction, but entailed the 
inadmissibility of the claim.684 
In Micula, the tribunal echoed some of the commonly cited differences between jurisdiction and 
admissibility: reasons for inadmissibility can arise or be removed after the seisin685 and must be 
raised by the parties – as opposed to reasons for lack of jurisdiction which the tribunal can raise 
motu proprio.686 However, the distinction played little role in the judgment and the tribunal was 
ready to concede that the labelling depends on the context and that the utility of the notion of 
admissibility in ICSID proceedings is dubious.687 The Supervision v. Costa Rica tribunal took 
pains to expound the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility and its implications.688 
                                                 
679 Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I.-DIPENTA v. République algérienne démocratique et populaire, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/08, Award of 10 January 2005, Part II, para. 2. The ICSID translation reads: ‘It is true that, in ICSID 
proceedings, the distinction is without practical consequences, in contrast to what may be the case in other arbitration 
procedures: indeed, recourse against decisions rendered on one question or the other does not differ in the system 
instituted by the Convention, whether they relate to jurisdiction or to admissibility.’ 
680 Mondev above (n 13) para. 42. 
681 Ibid. 
682 See Article 1122. 
683 Mondev above (n 13) para. 44. 
684 SGS v. Philippines above (n 38) para. 154. 
685 Joan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmi1 S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 24 September 2008, para. 64 ‘[W]hen an 
objection relates to a requirement contained in the text on which consent is based, it remains a jurisdictional objection. 
If such a requirement is not satisfied, the Tribunal may not examine the case at all for lack of jurisdiction. By contrast, 
an objection relating to admissibility will not necessarily bar the Tribunal from examining the case if the reasons for 
the inadmissibility of the claim are capable of being removed and are indeed removed at a subsequent stage. In other 
words, consent is a prerequisite for the jurisdiction of the Tribunal’. 
686 Ibid, para. 65: ‘a tribunal can rule on and decline its jurisdiction even where no objection to jurisdiction is raised 
if there are sufficient grounds to do so on the basis of the record’. 
687 Ibid, para. 63. 
688 Supervision v. Costa Rica above (n *) para. 268-276. 
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However, the resulting remarks are uncharacteristically superficial and rehash the usual distinction 
(limits of the tribunal’s powers v. defects of the claim) and the obvious conclusion that 
admissibility must be examined after jurisdiction.689 In the application of these principles, the 
distinction proved largely irrelevant: the tribunal qualified as matters of inadmissibility issues that 
could as well be read to delimit the tribunal’s jurisdiction. It rejected some of the investor’s claims 
because the claimant had breached an express fork-in-the road requirement, by failing to 
discontinue court proceedings relating to the same claims690; other claims were rejected for failure 
to provide notice before launching arbitration. As regards the second grounds for admissibility, a 
couple of hints suggest that the tribunal was less clear about the distinction between jurisdiction 
and admissibility than it declared to be. First, it introduced the notice requirement as an ‘important 
element of the State’s consent to arbitration’,691 using language typically associated to the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction. Second, it quoted approvingly the Burlington v. Ecuador tribunal, which 
also considered a failure to notify a dispute to be grounds for inadmissibility. In that case, the 
tribunal appeared comfortable to conflate inadmissibility and lack of jurisdiction, as this short 
quote illustrates: 
Claimant failed to abide by the conditions for acceptance of the offer of ICSID arbitration 
contained in Article VI(3)(a) of the Treaty … and this claim is therefore inadmissible. … As a 
result, the Tribunal upholds Respondent’s objection and declares that it lacks jurisdiction over 
Claimant’s Treaty claim.692 
The Achmea tribunal693 recited the canon endorsed in Micula and Supervision but somewhat 
revealed its contradictions. First, it set a deadline to the respondent for the submission of 
procedural objections pertaining also to the jurisdiction of the tribunal,694 warning that further 
objections would be regarded as waived; then it proclaimed that jurisdictional objections must be 
considered by the tribunal irrespective of the parties’ invoking them, implicating that no waiver is 
possible and, it would follow logically, no deadline appropriate.695 The distinction in any event 
played no apparent role in the decision. It only allowed the tribunal to announce its right to rebrand 
some of the respondent’s jurisdictional objections as relating in fact to admissibility.696 This was 
ultimately unnecessary; the claim was dismissed over a finding of lack of jurisdiction ratione 
materiae (the claimant had failed to show a prima facie case under the Oil Platforms test). In 
                                                 
689 For a critical reading of the award, see Filippo Fontanelli and Attila Tanzi, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility in 
Investment Arbitration. A View from the Bridge at the Practice’ (2017) 16(1) The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals 3, 10-11. 
690 Ibid., para. 330-331. 
691 Ibid. para. 339. 
692 Burlington v. Ecuador on Jurisdiction 2010 above (n *) para. 317-318. 
693 Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2013-12 (Number 2), Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility of 20 May 2014. 
694 See the letter to the parties dated 31 March 2013, quoted in footnote 147 of the award: ‘the Respondent shall file a 
statement containing all and any of its objections to the jurisdiction of this Tribunal and to the admissibility of 
Claimant’s claims to be submitted on or before 14 June 2013, failing which the Respondent will have waived the 
possibility to raise any further objections thereafter’. 
695 Achmea above (n 693) para. 120. 
696 Ibid. On this point see Amerasinghe above (n 554) 78-79. The Author observes that, as a matter of principle, rules 
requiring that jurisdictional pleas be made early in the procedure (see for instance Rule 21(3) of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal) are unable to ‘affect or change the jurisdictional authority of the tribunal’ and must be intended solely to 
facilitate ‘the orderly conduct of business’. 
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Isolux, the tribunal noted that the characterisation of an objection affected the sequencing of the 
decision: admissibility objections must be examined ‘at the outset of the merits review’.697 
In Abaclat, the tribunal noted that whereas the existence and validity of the claimant’s consent was 
a precondition to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the validity of the power of attorney which expressed 
such consent and empowered the legal representative was an issue of admissibility.698 The 
distinction entailed a different applicable law: whereas general international law regulates the 
existence of consent, the instruments of representation are governed by the ICSID Rules (Rule 18), 
possibly in light of domestic law.699 The distinction did not seem to matter to the outcome. 
The Urbaser tribunal took issues with some of these common-place views regarding the distinction 
between admissibility and jurisdiction, noting they might have ‘theoretical appeal but add[] 
nothing’ to the task of interpreting BITs.700 It contested the view that non-compliance with 
admissibility criteria might be agreed or acquiesced to.701 It also rejected the ideas that 
admissibility determinations are not annullable702 and that jurisdictional defects cannot be cured.703 
Interestingly for the present study, it debunked the Abaclat majority’s attempt to find an essential 
distinction between the categories, and exposed its fuzziness: 
The Abaclat Tribunal observes that a salient feature of admissibility demonstrates that a 
lack of admissibility means that the claim was neither fit nor mature for judicial treatment, 
while a lack of jurisdiction strict [sic] sensu means that the claim could not at all have been 
brought before the body called upon. Such a distinction contributes more to the confusion 
than to any elicitation of the issue. If the claim is not mature for judicial treatment it cannot 
be brought before the designated judicial body either, which means that it satisfies both 
requirements of unavailability and irredeemably dilutes the suggested distinction.704 
Under UNCITRAL rules,705 the case has been made that admissibility problems, although 
normally treated in conjunction with jurisdictional ones, are essentially matters of merits.706 The 
Chevron tribunal motivated as follows: 
                                                 
697 Courtesy translation, see Isolux above (n *) para. 709: ‘Si fuera una excepción de admisibilidad y no de jurisdicción, 
tendría que ser examinada al principio del examen del fondo del litigio, toda vez que el Tribunal no decline su 
jurisdicción por otros motivo.’ 
698 Abaclat above (n 523) para. 448. 
699 On the application of domestic law to the validity of the claimant’s power of attorney, see Teinver Final above (n 
*) para. 203. 
700 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Decision on Jurisdiction of 12 December 2012, para. 113. 
701 Ibid. para. 114. 
702 Ibid., para. 117. On this aspect, see below, part **. 
703 Ibid., para. 118. 
704 Ibid., para. 116. Footnotes omitted, emphasis added. 
705 Which contain no reference to admissibility. The relevant provision is Article 21(1), which reads: ‘The arbitral 
tribunal shall have the power to rule on objections that it has no jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to 
the existence or validity of the arbitration clause or of the separate arbitration agreement.’ Note also that the 
UNCITRAL Rules contain no equivalent to ICSID Rule 41(5). 
706 Gerold Zeiler, ‘Jurisdiction, Competence and Admissibility of Claims in ICSID Arbitration Proceedings’ in 
Christina Binder and others (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph 
Schreuer (OUP 2009) 76. 
105 
 
An objection to the admissibility of a claim does not, of course, impugn the jurisdiction of 
a tribunal over the disputing parties and their dispute; to the contrary, it necessarily assumes 
the existence of such jurisdiction; and it only objects to the tribunal’s exercise of such 
jurisdiction in deciding the merits of a claim beyond a preliminary objection. Under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, that is an exercise belonging to the merits phase of the 
arbitration, to be decided by one or more awards on the merits.707 
This conclusion is reached through a reasoning of elimination. Given the letter of the UNCITRAL 
Rules, all non-jurisdictional aspects pertain to the merits. This view is pragmatic, but it overlooks 
the relevance of general principles and the inherent jurisdiction that international courts have to 
preserve the integrity of their judicial function by declining to exercise an existing jurisdiction in 
specific circumstances.708 Whereas clearly admissibility review presupposes a positive finding of 
jurisdiction, it does not follow necessarily that it belongs to the merits. The conflation is ultimately 
justifiable, since there is no reliable and accepted notion of admissibility: each tribunal is forced 
to investigate its relevance, and it might as well conclude that it has no practical value as an 
autonomous legal category, like the Chevron tribunal did. No single tribunal is responsible for the 
doctrinal blur, but many of them are forced to handle it ad hoc.  
The relevance of the distinction for the burden of proof 
It is sometimes argued that the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility has repercussions 
on the burden of proof of the parties. Whereas this is technically true (the investor must prove the 
existence of the jurisdictional requirements709; the State must prove that a claim on which 
jurisdiction exists is inadmissible) the practice is more nuanced and rarely would a difference affect 
the outcome. See how the tribunal in Philip Morris v. Australia articulated the evidentiary 
principles regarding jurisdiction: 
The Tribunal finds that there is no general disagreement between the Parties as to the 
principles governing burden of proof, although the application of these principles to certain 
preliminary objections requires further discussion. Specifically, it is for the Claimant to 
allege and prove facts establishing the conditions for jurisdiction under the Treaty; for the 
Respondent to allege and prove the facts on which its objections are based; and, to the 
                                                 
707 Chevron v. Ecuador above (n 600) para. 4.91. See also Methanex v. USA, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), First Partial 
Award, 7 August 2002, para. 107, 123-126. In Methanex, the tribunal dismissed the admissibility objection based on 
the impossibility that the alleged conduct, even if factually corroborated, could amount to a breach of NAFTA (an 
objection based on the so-called Oil Platforms test). 
708 See Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, 259-260. 
709 Phoenix above (n 254) para. 58-64: ‘if jurisdiction rests on the existence of certain facts, they have to be proven 
[not just established prima facie] at the jurisdictional phase’; Pac Rim v. El Salvador above (n 302) para. 2.9-2.11. 
Blue Bank above (n *) para. 66. A similar statement was made by Franklin Berman in a Dissenting Opinion attached 
to Lucchetti above (n *), Decision on Annulment of 5 September 2007, para. 17: ‘It is one thing to say that factual 
matters can or should be provisionally accepted at the preliminary phase, because there will be a full opportunity to 
put them to the test definitively later on. But if particular facts are a critical element in the establishment of jurisdiction 
itself, so that the decision to accept or to deny jurisdiction disposes of them once and for all for this purpose, how can 
it be seriously claimed that those facts should be assumed rather than proved?’. See also Gaëta above (n *) para. 135: 
‘[le Tribunal] est habilité à se livrer à un examen approfondi du droit national applicable;... Cette manière de 
procéder est en effet indispensable, dès lors que c’est la compétence du Tribunal arbitral qui en dépend’. 
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extent that the Respondent has established a prima facie case, for the Claimant to rebut this 
evidence.710 
Similarly to positive objections to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, objections alleging the claim’s 
inadmissibility are for the State to raise and support with evidence.711 Whether the specific issue 
is one of jurisdiction or admissibility is virtually irrelevant if one takes the view that the party 
which wants to rely on certain facts must prove them.712 Consider for instance a scenario in which 
at stake is the alleged misconduct of the investor. If the allegation seeks to found an objection to 
the tribunal’s competence (which is normally the case if corruption is invoked), the respondent 
must prove713 the facts supporting it714– the investor is not supposed to provide evidence of lack 
of corruption at the outset of the case.715 When the allegations against the investors are raised to 
challenge the admissibility of their claims (on grounds of bad faith, or lack of clean hands) the 
burden of proving them, in spite of the change in legal characterisation, stays with the host State.716 
For instance, the host State’s allegations that the claims were inadmissible because the investor 
‘did not pursue its investments in good faith’ were rejected in Rusoro v. Venezuela717 because the 
State failed to provide any evidence to support them. In the context of an objection based on 
estoppel or abuse of process, the tribunal conceded its doubts whether it would be one of 
jurisdiction or admissibility, but found that either way the burden of submitting the decisive 
evidence would be on the State.718 
A critical scenario where the difference would matter is one in which jurisdiction depends on a 
positive fact (for instance, a specific nationality, or the existence of the investment) rather than a 
negative one (the absence of corruption, the absence of the nationality of the host State, the absence 
                                                 
710 Philip Morris above (n 301) para. 459. 
711 See for instance Flemingo above (n *) para. 345 (the State was unable to prove that the acquisition of the investment 
was made in bad faith and the subsequent claim constituted abuse of process). See also ABCI above (n *) para. 195 
(the State did not prove the investor’s bad faith in changing the investment nationality). A different view is asserted 
in Tulip Real Estate and Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Decision 
on Bifurcated Jurisdictional Issue of 5 March 2013, para. 48: ‘As a party bears the burden of proving the facts it 
asserts, it is for Claimant to satisfy the burden of proof required at the jurisdictional phase.  Here, the Parties agree 
that whilst the Article 8(2) Objection [on a one-year compulsory consultation period] was raised by Respondent, the 
onus remains on Claimant to establish that the requirements of Article 8(2) have been satisfied, and that the Tribunal 
has jurisdiction.’ It is, however, possible to distinguish between negative and positive objections to jurisdiction, and 
consider the failure to comply with the waiting period a negative one, which the respondent cannot be expected to 
prove. See Pac Rim v. El Salvador above (n 302) para. 2.11. 
712 See the discussion in Siag and Vecchi v. Egypt above (n 405) para. 138 ff (it was not for the claimant to prove that 
he was not Egyptian, but for the State to support with evidence the relative jurisdictional objection). 
713 Getma International and others v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/29, Award of 16 August 2016, 
para. 181. 
714 A similar conclusion was reached in Fraport II above (n 654), see for instance para. 481 and 519. See also, with 
respect to jurisdiction ratione temporis, the concession of the respondent in Lao v. Lao above (n 247) para. 66-67. 
715 On the germane case of forged documents, see Churchill above (n *), Award of 6 December 2016: ‘It is a well-
established rule in international law that each Party bears the burden of proving the facts which it alleges (actori 
incumbit onus probandi). Since the Respondent alleges that the Survey and Exploration Licenses and related 
documents are forged and that the Exploitation Licenses were obtained through deception, the Respondent bears the 
burden of proving its allegations of forgery and deception.’ Footnote omitted. 
716 Copper Mesa v. Ecuador above (n 26) para. 5.59. 
717 Rusoro above (n 246) para. 350 ff. 
718 Chevron v. Ecuador above (n 512), paras 138-142. See also Cervin v. Costa Rica, jurisdiction (n *) para. 292 (the 
State must prove that the only purpose of corporate restructuring was to acquire abusively the right to start arbitration). 
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of duplicative proceedings pending in domestic courts in breach of fork-in-the-road clause). In 
such cases, if the investor is unable to prove convincingly an essential element for its claim,719 
jurisdiction cannot be established, even in the absence of convincing contestation: 
the burden of establishing jurisdiction, including consent, lies primarily upon the Claimant. 
Although it is the Respondent which has here raised specific jurisdictional objections, it is 
not for the Respondent to disprove this Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Under international law, as 
a matter of legal logic and the application of the principle traditionally expressed by the 
Latin maxim “actori incumbit probatio”, it is for the Claimant to discharge the burden of 
proving all essential facts required to establish jurisdiction for its claims.720 
More commonly, however, the jurisdictional objection will rely on a positive contestation of the 
facts presented by the Claimant, rather than on their insufficiency. In Oostergetel, for instance, the 
State failed to demonstrate that the claimants had lost their Dutch nationality as a result of their 
permanent residency abroad.721 
Similarly, consider the requirement of futility of any foregone domestic remedy, when exhaustion 
or resort toof local remedies applies, but was not observed the investor.722 It is unsettled whether 
this requirement pertains to jurisdiction, admissibility, merits, or more than one of these categories 
at once.723 If exhaustion is a matter of jurisdiction and the investor fails to prove futility, the claim 
is rejected for lack of competence ratione materiae. If exhaustion is framed as an admissibility 
requirement, futility would constitute an exception in favour of the claimant. Normally, the 
claimant would then be expected to provide the supporting evidence – not differently from the 
jurisdictional scenario. It is fair to say that, in most cases, the characterisation of a matter as 
                                                 
719 Like the link between the claimant and the investment, see Ampal above (n 627) para. 119; or the existence and 
location of an investment, see Apotex UNCITRAL above (n 246) para. 150. See also Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul 
v. The Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), Partial Award of 2 September 2009, para. 145 (noting that 
the uncontested evidence provided by the Claimant is sufficient to prove that he owned the investment). It is important 
to note that the Respondent’s contestation determines the width of the Claimant’s burden to prove the facts that 
establish jurisdiction, see Blue Bank above (n *) para. 66: ‘the Claimant bears the burden of proving the facts required 
to establish jurisdiction, insofar as they are contested by the Respondent.’ This suggestion minimises the gulf between 
the regime of evidence applicable to jurisdiction and admissibility, as in both cases the respondent must act to promote 
its position (contesting the Claimant’s evidence on jurisdiction, or proving the facts entailing the inadmissibility of 
the claim). 
720 National Gas S.A.E. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/7, Award of 3 April 2014, para. 118. See 
also Emmis above (n *) para. 171: ‘The Tribunal must decide [the question of whether the Claimant owned an 
investment capable of expropriation] finally at the jurisdictional stage on the balance of probabilities. The Claimants 
bear the burden of proof. If the Claimants’ burden of proving ownership of the claim is not met, the Respondent has 
no burden to establish the validity of its jurisdictional defences.’ 
721 Oostergetel above (n *) para. 124, 129. 
722 When required by the parties, for instance under the power granted in Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, or in 
the context of a denial of justice claim, see for instance the provision of Article 10(1) of the Spain-Colombia BIT. As 
noted above (n 645), it is perhaps better to characterise exhaustion in the context of denial of justice as a question for 
the merits. 
723 See, for instance, the reasoning of an investment arbitration tribunal concerning the finality of court decisions 
connected to the claim brought in arbitration, and the requirement to exhaust local remedies: the investor’s claim 
‘would fall to be dismissed in any event, on the additional basis that Apotex has failed to exhaust all local judicial 
remedies, and the Tribunal therefore lacks jurisdiction ratione materiae. … In the alternative, and for the same reasons, 




regarding jurisdiction of admissibility would not change the burden of proof dynamics in the 
facts.724 
Some proposals to solve the confusion 
Regrettably, the haphazard treatment of the category of admissibility, taken alone or in relation to 
the category of jurisdiction, has generated an inconsistent practice that resists any attempt of 
normalisation or theorisation by inference. The widely espoused distinctions are, as demonstrated 
so far, porous and/or contestable. It is therefore wiser to discuss a principled theory that is 
preferable to the current practice, rather than attempting to extract one from it. 
Veijo Heiskanen has shown the permeability between matters of jurisdiction and admissibility in 
the reasoning of investment treaty tribunals. Questions relating to the steps that the investor must 
take before requesting arbitration are interchangeably treated as jurisdictional or admissibility 
issues.725 These include the ripeness of the claim for exhaustion of specified procedures like 
negotiations, attempted resolution in alternative fora, respect of waiting periods and deadlines. See 
for instance how a NAFTA tribunal treated an objection based on the non-finality of the State 
measure challenged (i.e., that the claimant had failed to pursue all available domestic judicial 
avenues, and was therefore attacking a non-final judicial act): 
the Tribunal proceeds on the basis that this objection concerns the Tribunal’s jurisdiction 
ratione materiae. In the alternative, the Tribunal has also considered the matter in terms of 
the admissibility of claims.726 
This sentence betrays the non-contradiction between the received definitions of jurisdiction and 
admissibility. The impediment arises because 1) the parties have not conferred on the tribunal the 
power to adjudicate non-exhausted claims, and/or because 2) the claim is defective – it is not ripe 
for arbitration.727 
Various scholars have suggested some ordering criteria to support a principled taxonomy. Abi 
Saab weighed in favour of the formal criterion: any condition included in the jurisdictional 
instrument would become jurisdictional, even those normally considered as conditions of 
                                                 
724 There are, of course, cases in which the allocation of burden of proof is critical, but they do not concern cases in 
which it is unclear whether a requirement is of jurisdiction or admissibility. An obvious case is OPIC Karimum 
Corporation v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/14, Award of 28 May 2013, in which 
the tribunal rejected the claim because the investor was unable to prove that the Venezuelan investment law constituted 
the State’s consent to ICSID arbitration, see para. 179. 
725 Heiskanen above (n 38) 238 ff, and cases cited therein. To consider just two examples, just compare Burlington 
above (n 161) para. 336 (failure to comply with the 6-month waiting period renders the claim inadmissible) with Enron 
above (n 676) para. 88 (the six-month waiting period is ‘very much a jurisdictional one’). See also, for instance, the 
different characterisation of the requirement of domestic litigation for 18 months in Hochtief jurisdiction above (n *) 
para. 96 and Urbaser jurisdiction above (n *) para. 114. 
726 Apotex UNCITRAL above (n 246) para. 260. 
727 A similar confusion is admitted with respect to a 12-month negotiation requirement in Tulip above (n 711) para. 
57: ‘the jurisprudence is very much non constante.’ See ibid. the list of cases which constitute this contradictory case-
law. For a similar remark regarding cooling-off periods, see Al-Bahloul v. Tajikistan, above (n 719) para. 154. 
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admissibility under customary law.728 Heiskanen proposed to consider competence and 
admissibility as one thing (a tribunal is competent to entertain only admissible claims), and 
suggested that claims are inadmissible when they are essentially domestic rather than 
international.729 Paulsson elaborated on the notion of arbitrability, concluding that claims are 
inadmissible when they are not capable of, or essentially intended for, resolution through 
arbitration.730 Born and Šćekić, whose analysis is focused only on pre-arbitration requirements but 
spans across the investment and commercial fields, elaborate on Paulsson’s and Heiskanen’s 
proposals. They suggest that the jurisdiction/admissibility dichotomy is unhelpful, and the guiding 
criterion should be whether the parties intended to submit the issue of non-compliance with a 
preliminary requirement to arbitral or judicial determination.731 
The most unhinging proposal to date is perhaps Shany’s one, discussed above and developed with 
reference to public international law adjudication. This theory uses judicial discretion as the 
controlling element for the distinction. It builds on Abi Saab’s conclusion that ‘[a]ny limits to [the 
legal power to exercise the judicial or arbitral function], whether inherent or consensual, i.e. 
stipulated in the jurisdictional title … are jurisdictional by essence.’732 What is more, Shany 
provides a normative definition of admissibility, something on which Abi Saab’s theorisation did 
not elaborate. 
All these proposals have the advantage of identifying a normative principle that should govern the 
distinction (the source of the condition, the domestic essence of the dispute, the arbitrability, the 
appropriateness). Shany’s proposal reaches further because it deeply reshapes the concepts and 
disrupts the received understanding that the division has something to do with the dichotomy the 
authority of the court versus the features of the claim. His proposal relies on a different dichotomy, 
between the power/duty to exercise powers and the discretionary right to refrain from such 
exercise. The tribunal in Unglaube v. Costa Rica seemingly hinted to a similar approach: 
… objections on the ground of admissibility are different in nature from objections to 
jurisdiction. Respondent has not maintained that the Tribunal may not properly rule on 
these matters, but that, it should not – both as a matter of prudence and in consideration of 
the ongoing deliberations of courts and administrative bodies in Costa Rica, which should 
be permitted to complete their functions without interference or interruption.733 
                                                 
728 Abi Saab, dissenting opinion above (n 523) para. 23: ‘these conditions become conventionally jurisdictional, in 
addition to being admissibility conditions by their legal nature’. The tribunal in ST-AD seemed to adopt this view, 
noting that any pre-condition to arbitration is a limit to consent, and ‘if these conditions are not fulfilled, there is 
indeed no consent’. See ST-AD above (n 18) para. 336.  
729 Heiskanen above (n 38). 
730 Paulsson above (n 556). 
731 Born and Šćekić above (n 576) 259, fn 132. This suggestion, obviously, is much more practicable in the field of 
international commercial arbitration, where judicial review of awards is a default option. In the field of investment 
arbitration, it is difficult to believe that BIT parties – which are not the parties of the arbitration – thought of post-
award review of compliance with pre-arbitration requirements. 
732 Abaclat dissent above (n 523) para. 126. 
733 Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, Award of 16 May 2012, para. 293, 
emphasis in the original. 
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The distinction begs the question to an extent: what criteria guide a tribunal’s discretion (in this 
case: ‘prudence’ and ‘consideration’ for domestic courts)? Yet, it is a workable distinction. It 
poses difficult questions, but relies on falsifiable answers. 
2. Selected cases 
Besides the cases discussed above, in which the distinction did not ultimately matter for the 
dispute, there are other cases in which it proved crucial. Some are reported here by way of example. 
Change of nationality during proceedings 
In the case of Loewen, the requirement of nationality was treated as a jurisdictional condition. One 
of the claimants – the corporation – had the requisite Canadian nationality at the date of the claim, 
but was restructured into a US company during the proceedings. The tribunal decided that this 
occurrence might affect its jurisdiction,734 and decided the issue applying general international 
law. The tribunal held that – by virtue of the customary requirement of continuous nationality – 
after the claimant’s restructuring ‘a NAFTA claim cannot exist or cannot any longer exist … so 
that the Tribunal cannot continue with the resolution of the original dispute, there being no dispute 
left to resolve’.735 In the reasoning, the tribunal seemed to conflate the jurisdictional requirement 
of nationality (which could have been assessed only at the moment of seisin736) and the 
admissibility requirement of the continuing existence of a legal dispute (which can be reviewed 
during the proceedings, to terminate disputes that have become moot).737 This decision cannot be 
explained by reference to the widespread practice (both at the ICJ and in investment tribunals) to 
entertain cases when some requirements for jurisdiction, missing at the time of the claim, are 
subsequently met.738 The rationale of this exceptional principle, in fact, is premised on fairness 
                                                 
734 Loewen above (n 594) para. 226. 
735 Ibid, para. 236. See Maurice Mendelson, ‛Runaway Train: The ‛Continuous Nationality’ Rule from the Panavezys-
Saldutiskis Railway case to Loewen’ in Todd Weiler (ed), International Investment Law and Arbitration (Cameron 
May 2005) 97 
736 Waibel above (n 581). The doctrine was spelled out by the ICJ in Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002, para. 26: ‘The 
Court recalls that, according to its settled jurisprudence, its jurisdiction must be determined at the time that the act 
instituting proceedings was filed. Thus, if the Court has jurisdiction on the date the case is referred to it, it continues 
to do so regardless of subsequent events’. Note that in Philip Morris above (n 301) the tribunal has highlighted that 
an exception to this principle can be made in the interest of the sound administration of justice (para. 148), and to 
avoid unnecessary ‘waste of time and resources’. It cited in support Mavrommatis above (n 573) and Case Concerning 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 18 November 2008, ICJ Reports 2008, pp. 441-442, para. 87, as well as the 
investment award in Teinver above (n 14), para. 135. However, this exception seems to apply only to cure defective 
jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice. In the Loewen case, instead, the reconsideration led to the relinquishment of 
jurisdiction during the proceedings, and the result achieved was all but a paragon of equity and justice. As noted by 
Christoph Schreuer, ‘At what time must jurisdiction exist?’, in David D Caron et al. (eds), Practising Virtue Inside 
International Arbitration (OUP 2015) 264, 271 there is sufficient support to the notion that ‘compliance with a 
requirement, whether it relates to jurisdiction, admissibility or procedure, may take place after the institution of the 
proceedings’ The opposite scenario (the requirement lapses during the proceedings) is normally irrelevant. 
737 Although the difference might have been critical with respect to the issue of nationality (a true jurisdictional 
requirement was perhaps best to be assessed only on the dies a quo), the claim failed also because the claimant had 
challenged a non-final judicial measure of the host State. 
738 For further examples, see the case law described in Schreuer above (n 736). 
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and judicial economy (fresh proceedings would be possible after a decision dismissing the case, 
when the requirement is met, with unnecessary costs and complication).739 In similar cases, the 
question is less about the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, arguably, and turns on 
the possibility to carve out a customary exception to the rule that jurisdiction is assessed at the 
time of the claim. In the Loewen case, where such exception could not apply, the tribunal’s belated 
review of jurisdictional matters is more controversial, and apparently lay on a reasoning of 
admissibility. 
Denial of benefits and seat or registration requirements 
The principle of corporate nationality under international law is formalistic (nationality depends 
only on the place of incorporation). States might insert specific treaty clauses to reserve the 
safeguards of treaty protection to a narrower category of investments, in order to make nationality-
shopping more difficult and benefit only investors who have genuine links with the home State. 
For instance, in the BIT between Cyprus and Serbia and Montenegro the definition of ‘investor’ 
requires that a company, besides being incorporated in the home State, have ‘its seat in the territory 
of that Contracting Party’.740 
In the case CEAC v. Montenegro741 it was debated whether the seat requirement should be 
interpreted in light of domestic law or through an autonomous construction informed by 
international law and whether, accordingly, it was necessary to show a genuine link with the home 
State or just the formal incorporation plus a local address of a registered office. Ultimately, the 
tribunal found that the claimant had failed to prove to have any registered office in Cyprus, thereby 
failing to discharge its burden irrespective of the applicable standard.742 In Alps Finance v. Slovak 
Republic743 at stake was the similar clause in the Slovakia/Switzerland BIT,744 requiring the 
investor to have a seat in the home State. The tribunal found that the claimant had provided 
insufficient evidence to prove that it had a seat ‘in the meaning of international business law’.745 
Whereas the facts of the case might have warranted the same outcome irrespective of the applicable 
law, it is noteworthy that the tribunal opted for a meaning of the seat requirement autonomous 
from domestic laws. The claimant similarly failed to satisfy another requirement of the BIT, that 
of carrying out ‘real economic activities’ in the host State.746 Likewise, in Orascom v. Algeria, the 
Tribunal held that the requirement of a ‘registered office’ stipulated by the applicable BIT did not 
entail a reference to domestic law.747 
                                                 
739 An obvious exception to this trend is the ICJ’s judgment on the preliminary objections in Georgia v. Russian 
Federation, above (n 590). 
740 Article 1(3). 
741 Central European Aluminium Company (CEAC) v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/8, Award of 26 July 
2016. 
742 Even if the claimant had shown a certificate of registered office, the tribunal doubted of its veracity. See ibid., para. 
151 ff, referring to a similar reasoning in Soufraki, above (n 404). 
743 Alps Finance above (n 234). 
744 See Article I(1)(b). 
745 Alps Finance above (n 234) para. 216. 
746 Ibid., para. 226. 
747 Orascom TMT Investments S.à r.l. v. People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/35, Final 
Award of 31 May 2017, para. 280-281. Respondent argued that ‘registered office’ would be a redundant requirement, 
since the other requirement of local incorporation would necessarily entail establishing a registered office. The tribunal 
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The investment treaty can also expressly extend protection only to investments approved by the 
host State. Whilst technically a requirement ratione materiae, similar provisions seek to recoup 
part of the lost privity between host State and beneficiaries, establishing intuitus personae between 
the two (a sort of denial of benefits in reverse, see below). Non-approved investments are not 
protected and any attending claim would fall outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal.748 
Another device used to counter nationality-planning is the use of denial of benefits clauses.749 The 
parties to a BIT can agree to exclude certain investors from treaty-based protection, normally on 
grounds of foreign (third State) control or lack of economic connection with the home State.750 
See for instance the clause of the US/Ukraine BIT: 
Each Party reserves the right to deny to any company the advantages of this Treaty if 
nationals of any third country control such company and, in the case of a company of the 
other Party, that company has no substantial business activities in the territory of the other 
Party or is controlled by nationals of a third country with which the denying Party does not 
maintain normal economic relations.751 
When the language of the clause refers to the whole treaty, the State’s offer to arbitrate is one of 
the benefits that can be denied.752 When, as it is the case of Article 17 of the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT), the clause refers only to the set of substantive protections, the investor maintains the right 
to bring arbitration, but its claim might fall outside the scope ratione materiae of the treaty. 
Formally, this distinction would mean that in the former case there is a straightforward lack of 
                                                 
rejected this view (which aimed at reading the formula under Luxembourg law, requiring the stricter element of siége 
social reel, i.e., an effective office) and recalled the Barcelona Traction case, where the ICJ also used the combined 
requirement (incorporation plus registered office). A different conclusion was reached in Tenaris Talta above (n *) 
para. 169-170, where the tribunal turned to domestic law under Article 32 VCLT, ‘in order to confirm the 
interpretation at which’ it had arrived using Article 31(1) VCLT. 
748 See for instance Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd v Government of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN Case No 
ARB/01/1, Award of 31 March 2003 and Gruslin v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award of 27 November 
2000. This issue was discussed also in Churchill above (n *) para. 289, where the tribunal found that the admission 
requirement refers to the investment’s entry into the country. 
749 On these clauses, see Anne K Hoffmann, ‘Denial of Benefits’ in Marc Bungenberget al (eds), International 
Investment Law (Nomos 2015) 598. In Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 29 April 2004, the tribunal held that the host State cannot plead a lack of jurisdiction on grounds of a 
lack of substantive business in the home State, if there is no denial of benefits clause. See para. 36: ‘… an international 
tribunal should exercise, and indeed is bound to exercise, the measure of jurisdiction with which it is endowed.’ 
750 For an overview on the practice relating to denial-of-benefits clauses, see Lindsay Gastrell and Paul-Jean Le Cannu, 
‘Procedural Requirements of ‘Denial-of-Benefits’ Clauses in Investment Treaties: A Review of Arbitral Decisions’ 
(2015) 30(1) ICSID Review 78-97. The Ampal above (n 627), provides an overview of the available practice on the 
matter, referring to the cases Pac Rim v. El Salvador above (n 302); Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. 
The Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011-17, Award of 31 January 2014; Ulysseas, Inc. 
v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Interim Award of 28 September 2010; Empresa Eléctrica del Ecuador, Inc. 
v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/9, Award of 2 June 2009; Plama above (n 175); Yukos Universal 
Ltd. v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 30 November 
2009, para. 456-459; Hulley v. Russian Federation above (n 244); Anatolie Stati et. al. v. The Republic of Kazakhstan, 
SCC Case No. v. (116/2010), Award of 19 December 2013, para. 717; Sempra Energy International v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02116, Award of 28 September 2007, para. 386. 
751 Article I(2) of the BIT. 
752 See Ulysseas v. Ecuador, bove (n 750) para. 172: ‘In the Tribunal’s view, since such advantages include BIT 
arbitration, a valid exercise of the right would have the effect of depriving the Tribunal of jurisdiction under the BIT.’ 
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jurisdiction ratione personae, whereas in the second the investor’s claim could fail on the merits.753 
However, even the latter scenario might be framed as one of jurisdiction ratione materiae through 
the Oil Platforms test (even if truthful, the claims brought in arbitration are not capable of 
constituting treaty breaches). 
Normally, these clauses do not apply automatically if the conditions are met, but endow the State 
with a power that it can choose to exercise or not; the host State must express its denial through a 
specific declaration, which can only operate prospectively.754 As a result, an investor might bring 
a claim over State measures occurred before the declaration. 
Moreover, the prospective application of denial of benefits declarations affects their availability 
during proceedings. If a declaration of denial entails a lapse of competence of the tribunal 
(resulting from the non-application ratione personae of the treaty), it must be made before the 
launch of proceedings. Alternatively, if framed as an obstacle to the admissibility of the claim, it 
might be made during the proceedings, to raise the corresponding preliminary objection. In Hulley 
v. Russia, the tribunal noted Russia’s failure to deny benefits under Article 17 ECT before the 
arbitration and went as far as noting that it would be useless to do it during the proceedings.755 
The prospective application of denial of benefits raises some practical issues.756 If States are unable 
to deny benefits when a dispute with an investor first arises, they must, to preserve their right to 
avail themselves of these clauses, screen all investors in the territory upon entrance. This would 
be an unlikely scenario in the age of dematerialised investments, which are the precise target of 
such clauses. However, this practical problem does not occur when the denial of benefit clause 
refers to the application of the treaty as a whole (as opposed to its substantive protection only). 
When access to arbitration is among the benefits of which denial is possible, the State can trigger 
the clause after the dispute is first raised, but before the launch of arbitration. Normally the cool-
off period or the requirement of negotiation will guarantee that some months elapse between the 
two relevant dates. In Ampal v. Egypt, the tribunal rejected Egypt’s attempt to deny benefits during 
the arbitration, noting that the host State had a window of opportunity to do that earlier. Namely, 
the declaration (and the connected procedural prerequisites) should have been issued during the 
consultation and negotiations with the investor, after the latter’s notification that a treaty dispute 
had materialised, but before the establishment of the arbitration.757 
                                                 
753 This is the clear instruction issued by the tribunal in Hulley v. Russian Federation above (n 244) para. 440. 
754 Plama above (n 175) para. 159-165; Hulley v. Russian Federation above (n 244) para. 455-458. 
755 See Hulley v. Russian Federation above (n 244) para. 457-458: ‘if the passage in Respondent’s First Memorial … 
is construed as an exercise of the reserved right of denial, it can only be prospective in effect from the date of that 
Memorial. … that Respondent has not denied and cannot now be heard to deny, and will not be able to deny to 
Claimant in any merits phase of these proceedings, the advantages and the benefits of Part III of the ECT on the basis 
of Article 17.’ 
756 Hoffmann above (n 749) 606-607, referring to the reasoning in Stephen Jagusch and Anthony Sinclair, ‘The Limits 
of protection for Investments and Investors under the Energy Charter Treaty’ in Graham Coop and Clarisse Ribeiro 
(eds), Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty (Juris Net 2006) 39-40. 
757 Ampal above (n 627) para. 160: ‘According to Article VII(2) and (3) of the Treaty, Egypt had a window of six (6) 
months after 18 May 2011 [when the investor notified the State of a treaty dispute] to seek to resolve the dispute by 
consultation and negotiation with Ampal. In the opinion of the Tribunal, it was during that six (6) month period that 
Egypt could also have initiated consultations with the United States pursuant to Paragraph 1 of the Protocol. There 
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In Ulysseas v. Ecuador, instead, the tribunal took no issue with the State’s denying ‘the BIT’s 
advantages … at the time when such advantages are sought by the investor through a request for 
arbitration.’758 The retrospective application of the clause did not worry the tribunal either, which 
noted that investors are aware of the host State’s power to trigger the denial if they fit the specific 
features listed in the dedicated clause. Therefore, they can only count on enjoying the protection 
of the BIT subject to that caveat: they have no legitimate expectations that their benefits will not 
be denied.759 The conclusions of the tribunals in Ampal and Ulysseas are difficult to reconcile, 
especially with respect to the retroactive application of the denial. The difference, at least with 
respect to the possibility to raise the denial during the proceedings, might be ascribed to the 
different language in the applicable clauses; whereas Article 1 of the Protocol to the US/Egypt BIT 
contains a procedural pre-requisite (consultation with the home State to seek a resolution) Article 
I(2) of the US/Ecuador BIT does not. 
In Generation Ukraine,760 the tribunal held that control by third country nationals was a 
prerequisite for this clause to apply, and that it was for the respondent to prove it. The evidence-
related point is crucial because it qualifies the requirement as one of admissibility (the host State 
must prove the existence of the conditions barring the admission of a claim) rather than one of 
jurisdiction (the prerequisites of which must be proven by the claimant).761 However, the allocation 
of evidentiary burdens is not dispositive of whether denial of benefits-based objections go to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal or to the admissibility of a claim. For instance, the tribunal in Ulysseas 
v. Ecuador762 reached the same conclusion but characterised the matter as a jurisdictional one. 
Whereas claimants would need to prove the requisites of jurisdiction, it falls on respondent to 
prove the pre-conditions for the denial of advantages, ‘as the party advancing [such] specific 
defence to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.’763 
In Isolux, the tribunal harboured ‘no doubt’ that the objection based on Article 17 ECT ‘raises a 
question of admissibility.’764 It reasoned that the tribunal must have jurisdiction to pronounce on 
the denial of benefits issue. If such determination were one of jurisdiction, in the tribunal’s view, 
‘the investor would be deprived of any forum competent to decide on this issue.’765 Without 
prejudice to the conclusion reached by the tribunal, the reasons are not compelling. By virtue of 
the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz in general and Article 41 of the ICSID Convention in 
particular, the tribunal could pronounce on a question of jurisdiction in any case; there is no need 
to reframe it as one of admissibility solely for the purpose of preserving the tribunal’s powers to 
                                                 
is no evidence in the record that such consultations took place during that period’ (the denial of benefits procedure in 
the US/Egypt BIT provides for consultations and notification with the home State before the denial is formalised). 
758 Ulysseas v. Ecuador above (n 750) para. 172. 
759 Ibid., para. 173. 
760 Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award of 16 September 2003. 
761 Ibid., para. 15(7). 
762 Ulysseas v. Ecuador above (n 750). 
763 Ibid., para. 166. The tribunal refers to the UNCITRAL Rules to support this conclusion, in particular Article 24(1) 
UNCITRAL Rules (which simply enunciates the actori incumbit probatio principle). 
764 Isolux above (n *) para. 711. 
765 Ibid. para. 712. Our translation. The original reads: ‘La solución contraria privaría al inversor de cualquier foro 
necesario para decidir sobre ésta cuestión.’ 
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decide. Ultimately, the tribunal rejected the objection, noting that the respondent had belatedly 
activated the denial clause, at the time of the Counter-Memorial rather than prior to the dispute.766  
In the practice, objections based on denial of benefits are interchangeably treated as issues of 
admissibility, jurisdiction or merits.767 The doctrinal confusion, however, is not the primary cause 
of the ambiguity of the case-law. To the contrary, the conceptual flaws seem to depend on (rather 
than produce) a handful of unresolved matters, such as the possibility that denials apply 
retroactively, the effectiveness of denial declarations made after the request for arbitration, the 
difficulty to determine the allocation of evidentiary burdens in the abstract. 
Compulsory attempts at local litigation 
Even with respect to a narrow category of procedural objections, like pre-arbitration requirements, 
the practice reflects normative ambiguity. Born and Šćekić have shown that requirements relating 
to prior litigation or negotiation, or cool-off periods, are treated alternatively as mandatory or 
aspirational.768 
An apt case study is the dispute Kılıç v. Turkmenistan, touched upon in the introduction of Part 
A.769 In the award, the tribunal rejected the investor’s claim for failure to comply with a procedural 
precondition before starting arbitration. Article VII(2) of the applicable BIT between Turkey and 
Turkmenistan required – in the tribunal’s view – that the investor first bring the claim in the host 
State’s courts. The right to initiate arbitration under the BIT would arise only if the local courts, 
once seised, do not deliver judgment within one year.770 The tribunal held that the precondition 
was compulsory and that the claimant could not invoke an exception (e.g., the futility of recourse 
                                                 
766 Ibid. para. 715. 
767 See the discussion in Hoffmann above (n 749). 
768 See Born and Šćekić above (n 576) 234-235 and extensive case-law cited therein. For an example, see how the 
tribunal treats a cooling-off period as a matter of récevabilité in Consortium RFCC v. Royaume du Maroc, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/00/6, Decision on Jurisdiction of 16 July 2001, and Alps Finance above (n 234) para. 200-211. 
Conversely, the same requirement is treated as one of jurisdiction in Enron above (n 676) para. 88; Murphy 
Exploration and Production Company International v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/4, Award on 
Jurisdiction of 15 December 2010, para. 140 ff; Guaracachi America, Inc and Rurelec Plc v Plurinational State of 
Bolivia (UNCITRAL) Award of 31 January 2014, ¶ 388. In the case Mohamed Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi & Sons Co. 
v. Libya and others, Final Arbitral Award of 22 March 2013, the arbitration clause was contained in a contract, and 
required an attempt at amicable settlement. The tribunal, noting the vagueness of such requirement, relied on the 
approach prevailing in commercial arbitration and found that ‘the fulfillment of the procedural requirements in the 
arbitration agreement are not considered as a prerequisite of the Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction.’ (Section 3 of the 
tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction). In Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/2, Order of 
16 March 2006, the tribunal noted the claimant’s failure to notify the respondent of the dispute, for the purpose of 
reaching an amiable settlement. Instead of rejecting the claim, the tribunal suspended the proceedings and invited the 
claimant to fulfil the notification duty. A similar procedural defect was treated as grounds for inadmissibility in 
Supervision v. Costa Rica, above (n *) see para. 336-348 (the tribunal considered inadmissible certain claims that the 
claimant had presented for the first time in arbitration, thus failing to fulfil the prior steps of notification and 
negotiation established in the BIT). 
769 Kılıç above (n 4). 
770 The correct interpretation of this condition and its characterisation as optional (instead of compulsory) were 
contested in the proceedings. The discussion refers here to the interpretation validated by the tribunal. In another 
dispute, Muhammet Çap & Sehil Inşaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/6, 
tribunal held that the same Article VII(2) of the BIT provided for an optional procedure, see Decision on Respondent's 
Objection to Jurisdiction under Article VII(2) of 13 February 2015. 
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to local courts). Since the claimant had not brought the claim to Turkmen courts, the claim was 
unanimously dismissed. 
However, a member of the tribunal disagreed with the other two as regards one specific finding, 
i.e., the legal characterisation of the procedural impediment. He characterised the precondition of 
Article VII(2) (that the claim could be brought in arbitration ‘provided that’ there had been 
domestic proceedings for twelve months, and no decision therefrom) as one of ripeness or 
admissibility.771 The tribunal’s majority, instead, considered it a qualifier of consent to arbitrate 
and, therefore, a jurisdictional condition.772 Professor Park’s dictum regarding the difference 
between admissibility and jurisdiction is worth quoting in full, as it is possible to appreciate how 
much of the discussion of the previous section of this Part, above, echoed in his remarks: 
Procedural flaws that may be cured during the arbitration are often characterized by 
reference to notions such as ripeness, recevabilité or admissibility. Such terms derive not 
from technical treaty definition, but from usage as convenient labels to describe steps to be 
taken either before or after constitution of a tribunal, even if they must be met prior to 
merits being addressed. These distinctions remain commonplace. Arbitrators often confirm 
jurisdiction, but proceed to the merits only ‘provided that’ Terms of Reference are signed, 
deposits lodged, and/or settlement mechanisms satisfied. Such requirements may be met 
after exercise of a right to arbitrate. Few requirements introduced by ‘provided that’ 
possess an intrinsically jurisdictional quality. Instead, the meaning of a proviso depends on 
the drafters’ intent as evidenced by context, structure and wording, construed in light of all 
related factors.773 
The distinction, in this case, came with a practical difference. The claimant’s failure to attempt 
domestic litigation, in Park’s view, did not deprive the tribunal of its jurisdiction. The tribunal, 
duly seised of the claim, could have ordered the suspension of the proceedings for the time 
necessary to remedy the procedural flaw. According to the majority, instead, the failure to seise 
Turkmen courts determined the lack of jurisdiction over the dispute, hence the tribunal had no 
procedural power over the proceedings, such as the power to suspend them.774 The authority to 
suspend proceedings would have been relatively uncontroversial if the precondition had been 
considered one of admissibility.775 
This distinction between jurisdictional matters (which pertain to the parties’ consent) and 
admissibility matters (which presuppose consent but regulate its exercise) has gained some 
traction. UNCTAD has produced a publication relating to the use of MFN, in which it 
distinguished between cases where the clause is invoked to enlarge the tribunal’s jurisdiction and 
                                                 
771 Kılıç above (n 4) para. 6.5.1; see the separate opinion of William Park. 
772 Kılıç above (n 4) para. 6.3.15: ‘in order for the necessary consent/agreement in writing to result, the offer must 
have been accepted on the basis of, and having regard to, the conditions explicitly set out in the BIT’. 
773 Professor Park’s separate opinion, para. 27-29. Notes omitted. 
774 Kılıç above (n 4) Award, para. 6.4.2: ‘the conditions for jurisdiction not having been met, the Tribunal has no 
jurisdiction to suspend the proceedings’.  
775 SGS v. Philippines above (n 38); Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/2, Order of 
16 March 2006; Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction of 24 June 
1998, para. 58. 
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cases where it seeks to circumvent admissibility problems.776 Skipping the requirements of local 
litigation and waiting periods through MFN clauses would belong to the latter category.777 The 
taxonomy was expressly endorsed by the Teinver v. Argentina tribunal,778 which relied on it to 
allow the investor’s attempt to skip the 6-month negotiation requirement and the 18-month 
domestic litigation pre-conditions in the applicable BIT through the MFN. The UNCTAD 
taxonomy has some descriptive merit but fails to rely on a principled classification.779 
A passage from the Murphy v. Ecuador (ICSID) award, which addressed the claimant’s attempt to 
characterise the six-month negotiation requirement as merely procedural, is worth reading in full: 
The Tribunal also does not accept the consequences Claimant seeks to derive between 
“procedural” and “jurisdictional” requirements. According to [Claimant], “procedural 
requirements” are of an inferior category than the “jurisdictional requirements” and, 
consequently, its non-compliance has no legal consequences. It is evident that in legal 
practice this does not occur, and that non-compliance with a purely procedural requirement, 
such as, for example, the time to appeal a judgment, can have serious consequences for the 
defaulting party.780 
The tribunal went on to discuss a series of arbitral awards in which similar requirements were 
alternatively considered compulsory or waivable. Whereas such distinction should not depend on 
the jurisdiction/admissibility divide, it is often made to depend on it, adding an extra complication 
to the legal uncertainty described above. 
Local courts (zoom-in) – the Argentina cases 
Another instance in which the distinction had an impact on the case is the dispute in Daimler v. 
Argentina,781 selected here as a champion of the several disputes involving the same host State 
where similar issues were raised.782 
The matter of contention concerned Article 10(2) and (3) of the German-Argentine BIT. The 
clauses require the investor to submit the case for 18 months to local courts before bringing 
arbitration. One of the points raised by the claimant was that this requirement was directive and 
procedural in nature, rather than mandatory and jurisdictional. This distinction, in the claimant’s 
view, was critical to the application of the BIT’s Most Favoured Nation clause. This argument was 
rejected. The dividing line, according to the Daimler tribunal’s majority, is firmly rooted in the 
                                                 
776 “Most Favoured-Nation Treatment,” UNCTAD Series on International Investment Agreements II, 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/1, 24 January 2011. 
777 Ibid., 66-67.  
778 Teinver above (n 14) para. 168-172. 
779 See how the ILC discussed in the Final Report of the Study Group on the Most-Favoured-Nation clause, Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission, 2015, vol. II, Part Two, (para. 113): ‘there is no explanation in the UNCTAD 
report as to why it treats cases relating to the 18-month litigation requirement as concerning admissibility rather than 
as concerning jurisdiction.’ 
780 Murphy v. Ecuador (ICSID) above (n 768) para. 142. 
781 Daimler above (n 781). 
782 The ILC report above (n 779) para. 124, noted that in twelve cases (out of eighteen in which the invocation of MFN 
treatment was successful) investors sought to avoid an 18-month litigation requirement in disputes against Argentina. 
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consent of the parties, as registered in the BIT. Any condition or requirement included in a BIT is 
by definition a jurisdictional one (a ‘sweeping generalisation,’ for the dissenting arbitrator783): 
BIT-based dispute resolution provisions [...] are by their very nature jurisdictional. The 
mere fact of their inclusion in a bilateral treaty indicates that they are reflections of the 
sovereign agreement of two States – not the mere administrative creation of arbitrators. 
They set forth the conditions under which an investor-State tribunal may exercise 
jurisdiction with the contracting state parties’ consent, much in the same way in which 
legislative acts confer jurisdiction upon domestic courts.784 
The majority of the tribunal distinguished from the treatment of admissibility in domestic 
jurisdictions. Whereas domestic courts can discard admissibility requirements to preserve the 
efficiency of their mandate, international tribunals cannot do the same without unilaterally 
expanding their jurisdiction beyond the limits established by State consent.785 This remark 
confirms the impression that procedural requirements qualify necessarily as jurisdictional 
whenever they are codified in treaty law, and the connected suggestion that it is perhaps useless to 
observe domestic procedural principles to investigate the operation of their correspondent 
principles in the international system. The majority cited approvingly the words of the Wintershall 
tribunal, which came to the same conclusion with respect to the same provision: ‘the Host State’s 
‘consent’ (standing offer) is premised on there being first submitted to the courts of competent 
jurisdiction in the Host State the entire dispute for resolution in the local courts’.786 
In Daimler, the issue was crucial to the outcome of the decision (had the 18-month rule qualified 
as procedural, it could have been waived by the tribunal or bypassed through the MFN); the award 
was upheld in annulment proceedings, and the specific issue was not examined by the 
Committee.787 It is worth observing here that the attempts to frame admissibility conditions as 
procedural issues aim to justify the tribunal’s decision to waive them. A similar approach had 
emerged in the award of the Biwater Gauff tribunal, referring to cooling off requirement: 
[the Respondent’s] objection depends upon the characterisation of the six-month period in 
Article 8(3) of the BIT as a condition precedent to the Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction, or 
the admissibility of BGT’s claims. In the Arbitral Tribunal’s view, however, properly 
construed, this six-month period is procedural and directory in nature, rather than 
jurisdictional and mandatory. Its underlying purpose is to facilitate opportunities for 
amicable settlement. Its purpose is not to impede or obstruct arbitration proceedings, where 
such settlement is not possible. Non-compliance with the six month period, therefore, does 
not preclude this Arbitral Tribunal from proceeding.788 
                                                 
783 Daimler above (n 781), Dissent by Charles Brower of 15 August 2012, fn 39.  
784 Daimler above (n 781) para. 193 
785 Ibid, para. 192. 
786 Wintershall above (n 176) para. 160(2). 
787 Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Decision on Annulment of 7 
January 2015. 
788 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award of 24 July 
2008, para. 343. 
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Note that the tribunal, which considered the requirement as hortatory, waivable, and certainly non-
jurisdictional, avoided pronouncing on whether it affected the admissibility of the claim. Unlike 
the majority in Daimler, the tribunal in Biwater Gauff did not go as far as claiming that 
admissibility requirements are merely procedural and, therefore, non-mandatory. It also noted the 
futility of any waiting period in casu and the implicit waiver of the Respondent, whose action 
escalated the dispute beyond the possibility of negotiation, making the Claimant’s recourse to 
arbitration ‘entirely reasonable’.789 
Indeed, the hortatory nature of admissibility requirement is contestable. They regulate, by 
definition, the admissibility of the claim; as a result it is to be expected that the specific sanction 
(the case’s dismissal) applies in case of non-compliance. It may be true that procedural 
irregularities can be tolerated,790 but under general international law admissibility is, by definition, 
sufficient to prevent the analysis of the merits and in any case is not always reducible to a matter 
of procedure.791 The tribunal in Philip Morris v. Uruguay noted rightly that irrespective of the 
characterisation (jurisdiction or admissibility) a local litigation requirement was mandatory.792  
The dissenting arbitrator identified the original sin of the award in the qualification of the 18-
month requirement ‘as a jurisdictional hurdle rather than an issue of admissibility’793 and pointed 
approvingly to the opposite conclusion reached by the Hochtief tribunal (interpreting the same 
provision).794 In his opinion, Professor Park hinted at the curability of flaws relating to 
admissibility. It is easy to see that this curability derives from their pertinence to admissibility, and 
does not constitute it.795 In other words, these flaws can be remedied because they affect the 
admissibility of the claim, not vice versa. The qualifying element must be somewhere else: Park 
mentioned that the touchstone must be the ‘drafters’ intent as evidenced by context, structure and 
wording, construed in light of all related factors’.796 
In short, whether a requirement pertains to admissibility or jurisdiction would depend primarily on 
the parties’ consent. This conclusion begs the question on how to interpret the silence of the parties 
– a likely occurrence – and somewhat minimises the practice of international adjudication outside 
treaty investment arbitration, which might otherwise provide some guidance (see section 1 of this 
Part). Compared to the proposals by Heiskanen, Paulsson and Shany, described above, Park’s 
                                                 
789 Ibid., para. 347-348. 
790 For an application of this approach – not relating to admissibility or jurisdiction, but to the four-minute delay of 
the claimant’s Counter-Memorial – see Supervision v. Costa Rica above (n *) para. 266. 
791 Abi Saab noted as much in his dissent to Abaclat above (n 523) para. 28. 
792 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (formerly FTR Holding SA, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay) Decision on Jurisdiction of 2 July 2013, para. 142. See also Generation Ukraine above 
(n 760) para. 14(3): ‘Some authorities consider the requirement to consult and negotiate before proceeding to 
arbitration as “procedural” rather than a condition precedent for the vesting of jurisdiction. This Tribunal would be 
hesitant to interpret a clear provision of the BIT in such a way so as to render it superfluous, as would be the case if 
a “procedural” characterisation of the requirement effectively empowered the investor to ignore it at its discretion.’ 
793 Dissent of Professor Park above (n 783) para. 13. 
794 Hochtief Hochtief above (n 555) para. 96: ‘[the requirement goes] to the admissibility of the claim rather than the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal’. 
795 In the words of Born and Šćekić above (n 576) 246: ‘in most instances, characterization of a procedural 
requirement as ‘jurisdictional’ or ‘procedural’ expresses a conclusion, rather than reasoning for that conclusion.’ 
796 Dissent of Professor Park above (n 783) para. 29. 
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implicit proposal makes the dividing line depending not so much on general principles (this makes 
his suggestion different from Abi Saab’s) but only on the contextual interpretation of the specific 
arrangements of the parties contained in the jurisdictional titles. 
An even bolder approach was adopted by the Abaclat majority, which qualified the obligations to 
attempt an amicable settlement and to seek local remedies for at least 18 months as merely 
procedural, and specified that even if the claimant had breached them, its claim would have been 
admissible as a matter of fairness797: 
a potential non-compliance with the consultation requirement set forth in Article 8(1) BIT 
would simply express that the premises for an amicable settlement were not given because 
one or both of the Parties were not willing to give the dispute an amicable end. As such, it 
could not be considered to constitute per se a hurdle to the admissibility of the claim.798 
The Ambiente Ufficio and Alemanni tribunals, instead, noted that the offer to arbitrate contained 
in the BIT did not differentiate between jurisdiction and admissibility, nor between mandatory and 
non-mandatory or procedural requirements.799 However, the tribunals construed the obligations to 
negotiate and litigate in domestic courts as obligations of means (rather than obligations of result): 
‘it cannot be supposed that two sophisticated governments could have intended that foreign 
investors be required to begin an action before the local courts or administrative authorities just 
for show.’800 The claimants, therefore, were able to plead the futility of the pre-arbitration means 
of dispute settlement. The tribunal agreed that there would not have been a prospect of resolution 
and held that the obligations to negotiate and spend 18 months in local courts ‘did not act as a 
jurisdictional bar to … ICSID arbitration’.801  
The ICS tribunal went as far as using Paulsson’s scholarly proposal to probe the nature of the 18-
month requirement and determine the consequences of its breach.802 It expressed concern about 
the uneasy distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, and acknowledged that in case of 
inadmissibility ‘the tribunal enjoys some discretion as to how to deal with … non-fulfilment’803 of 
a requirement. Ultimately, it approximated the 18-month rule to a rule of exhaustion of local 
remedies, and treated it as jurisdictional. 
In the case TSA Spectrum v. Argentina, instead, the tribunal considered the local litigation 
requirement as jurisdictional. The investor had breached it, by resorting prematurely to ICSID 
arbitration. However, the tribunal did not dismiss the claim, and applied a pragmatic reasoning 
that seemed more apposite to trump admissibility requirements. It noted that ‘it would be highly 
formalistic now to reject the case…, since a rejection … would in no way prevent TSA from 
immediately instituting new ICSID proceedings on the same matter’.804 
                                                 
797 Abaclat above (n 523) para. 583. 
798 Ibid, para. 565. On the 18-month rule, see para. 580. 
799 Alemanni above (n 32) para. 304, quoting Ambiente Ufficio above (n 647) para. 572. 
800 Alemanni above (n 32) para. 311. 
801 Ibid., para. 317. 
802 ICS above (n 176) para. 259-262. 
803 Ibid, 256. 




The Kılıç dispute highlights the possible implications that the blur between jurisdiction and 
admissibility has on the reviewability of awards. 
The claimant sought annulment, without success.805 The claimant argued, among other things, that 
the majority’s view on the jurisdiction/admissibility issue was flawed. The committee conceded 
that the reasoning of the majority was controversial and inscribed itself in a contradictory practice. 
However, the tribunal’s finding was not reviewable in annulment proceedings.806 In other words, 
the committee held that, even admitting that the Claimant and Professor Park were right in labelling 
the condition under Art. VII(2) of the BIT as one of admissibility, the tribunal had not manifestly 
exceeded its powers or departed seriously from a fundamental rule of procedure.807 
Within the ICSID system, a failure to uphold or exercise jurisdiction can certainly amount to an 
excess of powers of the tribunal, constituting grounds for annulment under Art. 52(1)(b) of the 
ICSID Convention.808 Mistaking admissibility for jurisdiction, instead, might hardly constitute 
grounds for annulment as such.809 In either case, the requirement that the tribunal ‘manifestly’ 
exceed its powers makes annulment relatively difficult even in case of wrong characterisations. 
The ad hoc committee deciding on the annulment of the TECO v. Guatemala award stated this in 
the clearest terms: 
… the Committee wishes to clarify that it cannot accept Guatemala’s theory according to 
which a tribunal’s incorrect decision on jurisdiction can never survive annulment because 
any excess of jurisdiction is necessarily manifest.810 
It should be clear, through these examples, that the crux of the matter for the purposes of annulment 
is the gravity of the mistake, not so much whether the mistake related to jurisdiction or 
admissibility.811 The Urbaser tribunal used this approach, and chastised the views of the Abaclat 
                                                 
805 Kılıç Decision on Annulment, above (n 6). 
806 Ibid, para. 166. 
807 ICSID Convention, Art. 50(1)(c)(iii). 
808 Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4 (also known 
as Industria Nacional de Alimentos, A.S. and Indalsa Perú S.A. v. The Republic of Peru), Decision on Annulment of 
5 September 2007, para. 99; Alemanni above (n 32) para. 320. 
809 Consider the Decision of the ad hoc Committee of 27 May 2007 in the case Soufraki above (n 404) para. 42: ‘There 
is, in principle, an excess of power if a tribunal goes beyond its jurisdiction ratione personae, or ratione materiae or 
ratione voluntatis.’ Whereas the focus is clearly on jurisdictional matters only, the inclusion of the requirements 
ratione voluntatis might refer to other preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction that are commonly considered of 
admissibility. 
810 TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, Decision on Annulment 
of 5 April 2016, para. 215. 
811 L.E.S.I v. République algérienne (above n 679) Part II, para. 2: ‘recourse against decisions rendered on one 




tribunal, which distinguished between issues of admissibility (which ‘usually’812 cannot be 
reviewed) and issues of jurisdiction (which would be more prone to annulment): 
under the ICSID system, a decision stating that a claim lacks admissibility may be brought 
before an annulment committee based on one of the grounds listed in Article 52(1) of the 
Convention and in particular when the claimant alleges that the tribunal had ‘manifestly 
exceeded its powers’ (lit. b). This feature of ICSID practice renders both the distinction 
wrong in theory and useless in practice.813 
The tribunal in Supervision v. Costa Rica, however, thought otherwise.814 Among the differences 
that the tribunal attached to the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, it listed the fact 
that ‘a court may review whether an arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction over the dispute, but not 
review the admissibility of a claim.’815 This is a puzzling statement, not only because it makes 
annullability dependent on the jurisdictional character of the mistake, but also because it mentions 
the possibility of a court reviewing arbitral awards, a contingency that could never arise in the 
ICSID system. At the most, such casual remark could – sometimes – hold true with respect to non-
ICSID awards. 
Outside the ICSID system, indeed, the distinction between flaws of jurisdiction and inadmissibility 
can be consequential. Under domestic arbitration regimes, the tribunal’s upholding (or refusal) of 
jurisdiction on the merits can be impugned before a national court. This is what happened in BG 
Group v. Argentina, a case administered through the 1976 UNCITRAL rules. The tribunal upheld 
jurisdiction, and dismissed the respondent’s objection relating to the claimant’s failure to resort to 
local remedies for 18 months, pointing out the absurdity of enforcing this admissibility 
precondition in the circumstances at stake.816 Argentina challenged the award in the US, alleging 
that the tribunal had exceeded its powers.817 The US Court of Appeal examined the question, 
subsumed under the US-flavoured label of ‘arbitrability’ and vacated the award, holding that the 
precondition was compulsory.818 The US Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that 
although the determination of the tribunal was not immune from judicial review, domestic judges 
must review such findings with deference rather than de novo. In the instant case, the investment 
tribunal’s determination on admissibility was lawful. In the folds of the Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court’s decisions it is possible to identify the critical distinction between jurisdiction (the 
requirement conditioned the consent to arbitrate, and was therefore reviewable by domestic courts) 
and admissibility (the requirement operated once consent and jurisdiction had already formed, and 
the tribunal’s determination attracted deference in domestic proceedings). 
Outside the ICSID circuit, the grounds for setting aside investment awards may vary – as the 
idiosyncratic and US-law-centred challenge of the BG award shows. Errors in the assessment of 
                                                 
812 Abaclat and Others v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID/ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 4 
August 2011, para. 247(ii) 
813 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Decision on Jurisdiction of 12 December 2012, para. 117. 
814 Supervision y Control S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/4, Final Award of 18 January 2017 
815 Ibid., para. 268. 
816 BG Group Plc. v. The Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award of 24 December 2007, para. 156. 
817 Under Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. 
818 Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 665 F. 3d 1363 (2012). 
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jurisdiction and errors regarding admissibility might attract a different treatment. The UNCITRAL 
Model Law, upon which the arbitration law of more than 60 States is shaped,819 provides for the 
grounds for setting aside an award.820 Of interest here are the hypotheses of excess of authority 
(the dispute – and the award – exceed the terms of the submission of arbitration),821 the non-
arbitrability of the subject-matter of the dispute822 and the conflict with the State’s public policy.823 
It might be argued that the ‘terms of the submission to arbitration’ delimit the competence of the 
tribunal, rather than the admissibility of the claim. It would follow that alleged mistakes made by 
the tribunal regarding its jurisdiction might result in a vacatur of the award in domestic courts, but 
mistakes regarding the admissibility of a claim might not. This difference would be all the more 
likely to operate in jurisdictions where the domestic arbitration law expressly lists ‘lack of 
jurisdiction’ as grounds for annulment, but is silent about errors regarding admissibility matters.824 
It is also possible that domestic courts indeed subscribe to the widespread idea that matters of 
admissibility are immune from review, and interpret accordingly the language of their local 
arbitration laws. For instance, this approach could make the difference when the available grounds 
for annulment contain a generic reference to the awards resulting from a tribunal’s breach of its 
own mandate, competence or authority. If inherent, ok not to review. 
Mass claims 
In the Abaclat dispute, the tribunal was seised with proceedings that aggregated several thousands 
of similar claims against the host State (initially over 180,000, eventually approximately 60,000). 
By the tribunal’s admission, the investors had brought a mass claim.825 Argentina challenged the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal over mass claims, and their admissibility. The instruments setting the 
tribunal’s competence (the ICSID Convention and the Italy/Argentina BIT) do not mention mass 
claims, and ‘the Parties disagree[d] on how this silence should be interpreted and what it means 
with regard to the present mass proceedings’.826 The tribunal bifurcated the analysis, linking the 
review of its own jurisdiction to the parties’ consent and the analysis of admissibility to the 
management of its procedure. 
The majority concluded that the issue of mass claim was one of admissibility, arguing ex hypothesi: 
the tribunal would have had jurisdiction over a single one of the claimants’ claims, considered 
alone. Therefore, the tribunal cannot lose its jurisdiction only due to the number of these claims. 
Moreover, in light of the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention and the BIT, the silence of 
these instruments could not be interpreted as ‘a ‘qualified silence’ categorically prohibiting 
                                                 
819 See Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Should the Setting Aside of the Arbitral Award be Abolished?’ (2014) 29(2) ICSID 
Review 263-288. 
820 These are normally aligned with the grounds for refusing recognition under Article V of the New York 
Convention. 
821 Model Law, Article 34(2)(a)(ii). 
822 Article 34(2)(b)(i). 
823 Article 34(2)(b)(ii). 
824 For instance, see the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law, Chapter 12, Article 190 (Action for 
Annulment). For an overview of domestic arbitration statutes and the available grounds for annulment, see Susan D 
Franck, ‘The legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration: privatizing public international law through inconsistent 
decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521. 
825 Abaclat above (n 523) para. 296. 
826 Ibid, para. 297. 
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collective proceedings’.827 The challenge regarding the collective nature of the proceedings, 
therefore ‘must be considered a matter of admissibility and not of jurisdiction’.828 
The majority then proceeded on the cavalier assumption that admissibility issues boil down to 
procedural questions. It then relied on Article 44 of the ICSID and Rule 19 ICSID, which empower 
the tribunal to make procedural determinations when no rule exists on a specific issue.829 The 
majority found ‘that the silence of the ICSID Convention concerning collective proceedings is to 
be seen as a ‘gap’.’830 Therefore, it invoked its inherent powers to fill the gap and tackle the 
unprecedented difficulties posed by the claim, without amending any existing rule of procedure. 
Once the issue of accepting a mass claim is reframed as one of adapting the standard ICSID rules 
of procedure,831 the majority examined the admissibility of such scenario, concluding that – in 
spite of the necessary procedural restrictions that collective proceedings impose on both parties – 
the admission of the claim was appropriate: 
the Tribunal finds that not only would it be cost prohibitive for many Claimants to file 
individual claims but it would also be practically impossible for ICSID to deal separately 
with 60,000 individual arbitrations. Thus, the rejection of the admissibility of the present 
claims may equal a denial of justice.832 
Professor Abi Saab dissented vigorously on this point. In his view, the silence in the applicable 
instruments was not a gap, but a confirmation that the powers of the tribunal and the standard 
arbitration rules do not cover mass proceedings. He claimed that a special agreement between the 
parties would be necessary to dispense with this jurisdictional limitation. Consent might provide 
for the foundational jurisdiction of the tribunal over mass claims – as a distinct category. In the 
alternative, the parties could agree on the specific jurisdiction of an existing mechanism over a 
particular dispute (‘secondary consent’), thereby granting the tribunal with the power to adjust its 
procedural framework.833 In the absence of either expression of consent, the tribunal had no 
jurisdiction on the claim as presented. Abi Saab took issue with the majority’s view that the 
adjustment of procedure was a question of admissibility. In so far as procedure regulates the 
arbitration powers of the tribunal and regulates the arbitral function ‘it is essentially a question of 
jurisdiction … in its first and foremost sense of the legal power to exercise the judicial or arbitral 
function’.834 Abi Saab contested also the majority’s conclusion on the admissibility of the 
procedural adjustments. These adjustments, even assuming jurisdiction, would not fall within the 
                                                 
827 Ibid, para. 519. 
828 Ibid, para. 249. 
829 Ibid, para. 521. 
830 Ibid, para. 526. 
831 Ibid, para. 491: ‘with regard to the ‘mass’ aspect of the present proceedings, the Tribunal considers that the relevant 
question is not ‘has Argentina consented to the mass proceedings?’, but rather ‘can an ICSID arbitration be conducted 
in the form of ‘mass proceedings’ considering that this would require an adaptation and/or modification by the 
Tribunal of certain procedural rules provided for under the current ICSID framework?’.’ 
832 Ibid, para. 537. 
833 Abi Saab dissent above (n 523) para. 185. 
834 Ibid, para. 196. 
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tribunal’s inherent powers to conduct the proceedings. The question would not be one of 
admissibility anyway, but one of abuse of judicial powers.835 
The latest in the trail of Argentine-bonds cases was the Alemanni case. The tribunal did not 
attribute much weight to the diatribe regarding jurisdiction and admissibility. It noted that the 
distinction between the two is not very difficult to draw, nor is it very important.836 Nonetheless, 
it referred to a ‘broad division,’837 whereby objections of admissibility are those that invoke the 
reasons why the tribunal should not exercise a formal competence it possesses. The treatment of 
the ‘mass-claim’ objection built upon the arguments of the Abaclat’s and Ambiente Ufficio’s 
majorities and dissents, but tried to reframe the issue in more simple terms. 
Argentina’s argument that mass-claim proceedings would require a special (additional) consent 
was rejected. Parties’ consent cannot expand the foundational jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal,838 
nor did the multiplicity of claimants drive the claim outside the consent of the host State, as 
codified in the BIT’s arbitration clause. The tribunal, indeed, accepted that the critical question 
was whether the multiple claims formed ‘a [single] dispute’ under Article 8 of the Italy/Argentina 
BIT.839 This question, which the tribunal joined to the analysis of the merits, went straight to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal, not to the admissibility of the claim, as the tribunal held in Abaclat. 840 
Abi Saab’s characterisation of the majority’s reasoning in Abaclat is an ideal summary of the issues 
exposed in this section (and explains the careful reasoning of the Ambiente Ufficio majority, which 
reached the same conclusions but avoided to replicate the reasoning of the Abaclat award841). The 
distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, sometimes, matters to the outcome of 
investment proceedings. Unfortunately, the contours of these legal principles are blurry and 
contested, and so are the exact legal effects and implications of each (for instance, doubts remain 
on the sanctions entailed by a breach, and whether the tribunal’s discretion or the parties’ consent 
can trump it). The resulting scenario is one of legal uncertainty: 
[the majority wrongly held] that all limitations on the jurisdiction and powers of the 
Tribunal are obstacles in the way of achieving this object and purpose, that should be 
‘down-graded’, (even with untenable arguments) from ‘jurisdictional’ to ‘admissibility’ 
issues; [it wrongly assumed] that admissibility is less important in its function and legal 
effects than jurisdiction; [it assumed] wrongly again that questions of admissibility, are at 
                                                 
835 Ibid, para. 262. 
836 Alemanni above (n 32) para. 257. 
837 Ibid., para. 260. 
838 Ibid., para. 269. 
839 Ibid., para. 292. The application of consent to ‘a’ dispute is also reflected in the language of the ICSID Institution 
Rules (Article 2) and ICSID Arbitration Rules (Rule 1). 
840 By simply equating the consent to single claims several to the consent to their joint presentation, indeed, ‘the 
Abaclat tribunal begged the question as to jurisdiction that required an answer, and sublimated it into an issue of 
mere ‘admissibility’’; see ibid., para. 289. 
841 The attempts of the majority of the Ambiente Ufficio’s panel to engage with Abi Saab’s dissent are criticised as 
perfunctory by the dissenting arbitrator. See the dissenting opinion of Torres Bernárdez above (n 36) para. 55 ff. 
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the discretion of the Tribunal, which can dismiss them at will as a result of its own 
subjective ‘balancing of interests’ …842 
Conclusions 
This study showed the difficulties of telling jurisdiction from admissibility in investment 
arbitration, and contested the common assumption that the distinction is ultimately useless. 
Investment treaty arbitration, just like international adjudication at large, would benefit from a 
clearer taxonomy of these principles of adjudication. The opposite views on jurisdiction and 
admissibility cannot be reconciled and the clash of the respective implications might even 
undermine the basic principles of international law: 
As recent investor-host State arbitral decisions and awards have had the occasion to recall, in 
public international law there does not exist a default jurisdiction. The residual default rule is no 
jurisdiction. To try to fabricate a different rule through arbitral or judicial decisions by means of a 
free interpretation approach to compromissory clauses in BITs cannot but weaken the ICSID 
system whose cornerstone is the consent of the Contracting Parties, and general public 
international law as well, and will end in a fiasco. Pacta sunt servanda and the law of treaties are 
among the most direct casualties, but there are others as well.843 
This stall creates an embarrassing recurrence in investment arbitration.844 The claimant will argue 
that the preconditions are procedural and dismissible; the respondent will invoke their mandatory 
and jurisdictional nature. Both parties will have ample support in the form of arbitral precedents 
and scholarly literature. Tribunals will pretend that all precedents are somewhat distinguishable, 
and recite the euphemism that ‘this area of investment treaty law remains in the process of 
developing a jurisprudence constante’.845 Then, they will do as they deem fit, drawing ammunition 
from either camp, and in so doing providing ammunition thereto, for future cases. 
The study described the practice, and questioned the theory. Whereas it is possible to navigate the 
former, there are real shortcomings that are caused by the latter, in particular the difficulty in 
drawing a line between jurisdiction and admissibility in general international law and in investment 
practice. A fresh start would be desirable, to leave behind DYI solutions and strategic evasion of 
the unresolved issues. Shany’s proposal to oppose the parties’ consent and the tribunal’s discretion 
has the merit of doing away from sloppy classifications without undoing all the theoretical efforts 
expended so far. It is claimed that such distinction should be endorsed in the practice, and inform 
the analysis of investment tribunals. 
  
                                                 
842 Abi Saab dissent above (n 523) para. 261. A similar remark is made in Ambiente Ufficio cit, para. 575: ‘In no way 
would the distinction between jurisdictional and admissibility issues suggest a different degree of ‘bindingness’.’ 
However, the tribunal seems to overlook the other differences that could result from classifying a procedural defect 
under either category. 
843 Dissenting opinion of Torres Bernárdez cit, para. 60. 
844 Commenting on the inconsistence practice regarding pre-arbitration requirements, Born and Šćekić above (n 576) 
239, note that ‘[t]his uncertainty is inconsistent with the objectives of the arbitral process.’ 
845 Philip Morris above (n 792) para. 134. 
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